Therefs a book published tomorrow that deserves to be widely read. Itfs Jaswant Singhfs biography of Jinnah. Read on and youfll discover why.
Singhfs view of Jinnah is markedly different to the accepted Indian image. He sees him as a nationalist, even accepting that Jinnah was a great Indian. Ifll even add he admires Jinnah and Ifm confident he wonft disagree when I interview him tonight on CNN-IBN.
The critical question this biography raises is how did the man they called the Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity in 1916 end up as the Qaid-e-Azam of Pakistan in 1947? The answer: he was pushed by the Congressfs repeated inability to accept that Muslims feared domination by Hindus and wanted gspaceh in ga re-assuring systemh. Singhfs account of how the Congress refused to form a government with the Muslim League in UP in 1937, after fighting the election in alliance, except on terms that would have amounted to its dissolution, suggests Jinnahfs fears were real and substantial.
The biography does not depict Jinnah as the only or even the principal villain of Partition. Nehru and Mountbatten share equal responsibility. While the book reveals that Gandhi, Rajagopalachari and Azad understood the Muslim fear of Congress majoritarianism, Nehru could not. If there is a conclusion, it is that had the Congress accepted a decentralised, federal India, then a united India gwas clearly ours to attainh. The problem: gthis was an anathema to Nehrufs centralising approach and policiesh.
Singhfs assessment of Partition is striking. After asserting that it gmultiplied our problems without solving any communal issue,h he asks gif the communal, the principal issue, remainsc. in an even more exacerbated form than beforec then why did we divide at all?h The hinted answer is that no real purpose was served.
But Singh goes further. He accepts that because of Partition, the Muslims who stayed on in India are gabandonedh, gbereft of a sense of real kinshiph and gnotc one in their entirety with the rest... This robs them of the essence of psychological security.h
But thatfs not all. He does not rule out further partitions: gIn Indiac having once accepted this principle of reservation (1909)c then of partition, how can we now deny it to others...?h
Where the book compares the early Jinnah and Gandhi, the language and the analysis tilt in the formerfs favour. At their first meeting in 1915, Gandhifs response to Jinnahfs gwarm welcomeh was gungracioush. Gandhi insisted on seeing Jinnah in Muslim terms and the implication is he was narrow-minded. Of their leadership, the book says Gandhifs ghad almost an entirely religious provincial flavourh while Jinnahfs was gdoubtless imbued by a non-sectarian nationalistic zealh.
Finally, gJinnahc successfully kept the Indian political forces together, simultaneously exerting pressure on the government.h In Gandhifs case gthat pressure dissipated and the British Raj remained for three more decades.h
Unfortunately, I canft assess the reliability of Singhfs viewpoint. Ifm not an historian. But I can assert that itfs courageous and probably a valuable corrective. We need to see Jinnah without the prejudice of the past. It may be uncomfortable to accept suppressed truths but we canft keep denying them.
This book will stir a storm of protest, perhaps most from Jaswant Singhfs own party. He realises that. But it did not deter him.