By Sitanshu Das

Subhas Bose's relations with Stalin's Russia were complex. Yet a restatement of these is necessary. Without this, it would be difficult to understand the meaning of the reports that Bose in 1944-45 was keen to have sanctuary in Soviet Russia.

Subhas, a scholar of philosophy, had never accepted Marxism as the final revealed truth on human affairs, as the orthodox Bolsheviks of his period claimed. As was the case with many sensitive thinkers and leaders of his generation, Marxism left a deep impression on him, but not to the exclusion of other schools of thought.

He could not accept Jawaharlal Nehru's conclusion that humankind had to opt for either communism or fascism. Knowing the infinite capacity of human mind to evolve, Subhas considered it unscientific to limit India's future choice to either communism or fascism.

Bose upheld the egalitarian philosophy of daridra-narayana, first articulated by Swami Vivekananda and later propagated in the political field by C R Das. Thus he was closer to Congress Socialists than the Communist Party of India. Though as Congress president he created the first National Planning Committee with Nehru as its chairman, he had a questioning mind on totalitarian planning.

He was a proud Indian nationalist. He appreciated the discipline of the Indian communists he met; but he deprecated the subordination of the CPI to the dictates of the Soviet Government. His relations with the Indian communists were never tension-free.

Moscow viewed with deep suspicion his assertive nationalism.

After 1927-28, it became clear that the Soviets would prefer in the Congress hierarchy Nehru to Bose.

The efforts Subhas made in 1939-40 to enlist Soviet help for India's freedom struggle during the Second World War came to nothing. Bose saw in the Hitler-Stalin pact a combination of powers which could confront the European imperial powers. He thought of this as an anti-status quo alliance whose existence created opportunities for India's liberation. But his hope was dashed when Hitler invaded Soviet Russia in 1941.

The Soviets thereafter were aligned with England and America, and Bose was forced to seek tripartite help for India. The Soviets and the CPI thereafter did all they could to frustrate Bose's wartime efforts.

After Burma's General Aung San went over to the victorious British side in 1945, Bose was obliged to seek a new base of operation before the post-war situation cleared.

He had never concealed his criticism of Japan's war against China. In the autumn of 1944, he came to Tokyo to urge Japan to befriend Chiang Kai-shek by ending the China war. The Japanese listened to him, even seemed tempted by the idea. But it was by then too late for Japan to change its China policy. Tokyo realistically did not see why Chiang should now reciprocate Japan's overture when the latter faced defeat and crippling devastation.

The Japanese foreign office was even less responsive to Bose's other proposal - that Japan intercede to secure Soviet sanctuary for Bose and a part of the INA.

This was before the former USSR declared war on Japan after the US dropped the atom bomb on Hiroshima in August 1945.

In sum, Soviet Russia had not encouraged Subhas to count on Soviet help - neither in 1939-41 nor in 1944-45.

If in spite of this Bose decided to enter Soviet territory, he must have done so in the full knowledge of the risks entailed by his decision.

Stalin's paranoia periodically eliminated many communists. If Bose entered Soviet territory in 1945, he clearly exposed himself to grave dangers.

It would truly have been "an adventure in the unknown". Subhas Bose was a brave leader who did not however act without forethought. One does not associate political adventure with him.