India’s triumphant military intervention in erstwhile east Pakistan has emerged as the most successful military intervention in the post World War II era. The victory proved that if employed effectively, India’s armed forces can emerge as a cutting-edge tool of statecraft. Strong political will, synergy between all stakeholders and a fierce national spirit cleared the fog of war and resulted in a decisive victory.
On December 16, 1971, a day after decisive Indian Air Force (IAF) strikes on the Governor’s house broke the will of the East Pakistan administration to resist the Indian assault, the Indian Army rolled into Dacca and forced the surrender of 93,000 Pakistani troops across East Pakistan along with their commander, Lieutenant General Niazi.
As we mark the 75th year of India’s independence from colonial rule, it is important to reflect on why India’s military intervention in East Pakistan has emerged as the most successful military intervention in the post Second World War era.
Less than three months after the termination of military operations in East Pakistan, the Indian Army exited the new nation of Bangladesh. India demanded no leverage from the newly created nation, nor did it seek to exert any geopolitical influence or shape the trajectory of political events beyond what one would expect from the largest and most powerful country in the region.
When one examines this campaign against the backdrop of several failed military interventions in recent years, such as the ones by United States (US)-led coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan, several aspects of the Indian intervention are noteworthy.
Despite its fractured polity, for once, India was united across party lines as its leadership combined realpolitik with genuine empathy for victims of the genocide. On a philosophical plane, this ensured that all the tenets of a “just war” were followed by the Indian State and its armed forces, both in letter and spirit. It was only after exhausting all the other means of diplomacy and leverage did India decide to use force to further its national interest that was largely inward-looking, protective and not expansionist in nature. Even Kautilya would have approved as he has emphasised in his treatise Arthashastra that waging war must be the last resort of the king. Jus in Bello or the right reason to go to war cannot be faulted on any count.
What about Jus Ad Bellum, or the right way to wage war, along with its various ethical and moral dimensions?
Through systematic and careful planning, India’s armed forces only attacked military targets and an enemy leadership target on one occasion (Governor’s house), keeping in mind that any collateral damage would involve the common people of East Pakistan. The Indian Army conducted itself with extreme restraint and there was no indiscriminate killing of Pakistani troops even when Indian troops were shocked at some of the brutality they witnessed on the road to Dacca.
Keeping your own troops out of harm’s way while ensuring victory is another tenet of just war fighting, an aspect that General Sam Manekshaw and his fellow chiefs kept in mind while seeking a preparatory window of six months from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. This allowed them to build an overwhelming superiority in the Eastern theatre that ensured victory without suffering too many casualties.
Jus Post Bellum primarily deals with how the victor treats the vanquished after peace is secured and the impeccable behavior of Indian officers and men towards the 93,000 surrendered Pakistani troops seems unreal when benchmarked against the brutality and lack of compassion in contemporary conflict. Lt Gen Mathew Thomas, then a brigadier and commanding the Indian army’s only Parachute Brigade, recollects that his barracks in Agra were used to house hundreds of Pakistani POWs while his own troops lived in tents.
Realists, however, argue that India took the business of good conduct in the post-war period to levels that allowed a wily Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the Pakistani PM, to outmanoeuvre India’s PM Indira Gandhi at the negotiating table over Kashmir and any quid-pro-quo for the release of the 93,000 prisoners of war. Several from the lot of released prisoners went on to play pivotal roles in crafting fresh strategies that would usher in decades of the covert war that continues to play out in Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistan’s “Bleed India with a Thousand Cuts” strategy.
An army base camp before the break out of war.
Kautilya was an ardent proponent of adequately softening up the enemy’s fighting potential through several covert means. These included the insertion of spies and influencing the local population to rise in revolt against their rulers. Calling this clandestine war or Gudayudha, he argued, “Miraculous results can be achieved by practicing the methods of subversions.”
Demonstrating flexibility of thought and action when her government’s Plan A (military intervention in East Pakistan in April/May 1971) did not find favour with India’s service chiefs led by Gen Manekshaw, instead of fretting and fuming, PM Indira Gandhi turned to her spy-master, the enigmatic RN Kao to chip away at the soft underbelly of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan through a well-orchestrated strategy of subversion and guerilla warfare.
Ably complemented by selected officers and men of the Indian Army, India’s Research and Analysis Wing or R&AW created the Mukti Bahini, a large guerrilla force comprising disaffected Bengali soldiers, sailors and airmen from the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force and thousands of patriotic youth. Together, they spread mayhem across East Pakistan and significantly weakened the Pakistani security forces before the formal military operations began on December 3, 1971. Through deft diplomacy and a whole-of-government approach, India occupied the moral high ground through the summer and autumn of 1971 even as it successfully “waged war by other means” against a sloppy and underprepared Pakistan Army in the Eastern Theatre.
PM Indira Gandhi and Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram were no great strategic geniuses, nor were they endowed with a sound understanding of matters military. Where they played their cards well in 1971 was when they gave clear and congruent political objectives and adequate space and respect to the service chiefs. Capability building was given top priority and the service chiefs enjoyed a fair degree of independence when it came to designing their concept of operations. This resulted in doable campaign plans that were weaved into an overall grand strategy.
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi meets Indian Army officers after the 1971 war in the Western Sector.
In the final analysis, India’s victory in the 1971 war proved that if employed effectively, India’s armed forces can emerge as a cutting-edge tool of statecraft. Strong political will, synergy between all stakeholders of national security and a fierce national spirit to overcome adversity against all odds cleared the fog of war and resulted in a decisive victory.
At the operational level, particularly in the Eastern Theatre, while there was meticulous planning and stocking to create an overwhelming asymmetry, it was the innovativeness and risk-taking propensity of one operational commander, Lt Gen Sagat Singh, that opened the window for an assault on Dacca and a psychological capitulation of 93,000 able-bodied troops. Endowed with exceptional situational awareness, he leveraged the ongoing air and naval operations to deliver a hammer-blow in the form of heliborne landings at multiple locations to confuse and coerce the enemy to surrender.
Was the two-front war in 1971, particularly the campaign to liberate East Pakistan a victory that represented a maturing of Indian strategic culture? Or was it a fortuitous coming together of several decisive individuals who scripted a once-in-a lifetime victory that would be difficult to repeat? As a military historian, it is difficult not to go with the latter proposition as such a coming together of state power in pursuit of a common objective has never played out again in several instances of war, conflict and security crises that have stretched across the spectrum of conflict.
