A new footing in South Asia for India-Russia friendship
PM Modi's visits to Moscow and Ukraine highlight Russia's rising role in South Asia, aligning with India's strategy beyond arms, energy, and China
Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi’s July visit to Moscow and this week’s trip to Ukraine revived the debate on what role Russia plays in India’s evolving strategic balance. Some argue that Russia needs more, not less attention, while others question the utility of the relationship, especially since the Russia-Ukraine war. Common to most analyses, however, is the restrictive tendency to focus on only three pillars: Arms, energy, and China. But a closer look shows that — except for Pakistan — Russia is also playing a rising role in South Asia, aligned with India’s Neighbourhood First policy from Afghanistan to Myanmar and from Bangladesh to Sri Lanka.
Like Ukraine or Georgia who are part of Moscow’s ‘near abroad’ sphere of influence, South Asia is crucial to India’s security. At the inauguration of his third term in June, PM Modi reaffirmed the centrality of the neighbourhood as his top strategic priority. Yet China’s growing influence has threatened India’s once predominant position in the region. To combat this, India must present alternative development solutions for South Asian countries.
So far, India has attempted this through partnerships with extra-regional powers, including the United States, Japan, and Australia. However, bringing in the Quad countries presents its own complications, explaining why India has also been keen to engage with France and other European countries in the Indian Ocean region.
Russia is also playing a growing role in India’s regional posture. Moscow is determined to Look East, with a renewed focus on economic partnerships in Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific. First, it brings a long history of development cooperation in South Asia dating back to the early Cold War, including the Panauti Hydropower Station in Nepal, Ghorashal and Siddhirganj power plants in Bangladesh, or the Ceylon Steel, Tyre and Sugar Corporations in Sri Lanka. Second, in contrast to western values-based interventionism, Russia defaults to non-interference, as evident from issues such as the 2021 Myanmar coup or, more recently, the regime crisis in Bangladesh, where Moscow and New Delhi’s positions broadly overlap.
Two recent examples help explain why New Delhi sees the growing utility in partnering with Moscow in the region. The first relates to supporting nuclear as a source of clean energy for the climate transition requirements of two billion people in the region. Russia and India have developed a growing collaboration on the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant (RNPP) in Bangladesh. Under a 2018 tripartite agreement, Russia provides financing and core construction, while Indian experts and firms are subcontracted to work on-site, with the plant expected to finish construction in 2024.
A second example comes in the context of bitter experiences with China-financed “white elephants” infrastructure projects in South Asia. Moscow and New Delhi are now exploring joint ventures to manage these sustainably. One notable example is Sri Lanka’s Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport. Built on a $190-million high-interest loan from China’s Exim Bank, it was soon dubbed the world’s emptiest airport, sustained heavy losses and shut down. In July 2024, the Sri Lankan cabinet announced that it would transfer the airport’s management for 30 years to an Indo-Russian joint venture.
Such examples demonstrate the potential for partnership, though collaboration with Russia is not without risks for India. First, Beijing’s growing leverage over Moscow could render Russia’s utility as an alternative to China obsolete. Second, Russia may be tempted to use South Asia as a staging ground to undermine American interests, which could complicate India’s more important relationship with the US. Finally, western sanctions have complicated Russia’s ability to conduct international business, limiting what Indian public and private capital can achieve together with Moscow in third countries.
For India, the more actors in the South Asian neighbourhood, the better. No single country is willing or able to single-handedly offer significant alternatives to China’s expanding footprint and New Delhi has been roping in Russia to deliver more, better and faster solutions to its neighbour countries. Future joint ventures could include the takeover of other Chinese-owned projects or the co-development of Nepal’s vast hydropower potential. India and Russia are also likely to explore joint production of military hardware, as well as the softer dimensions of training and defence diplomacy to engage countries in the Indian Ocean region and Southeast Asia — as already exemplified in the co-production and export of the Brahmos missiles to Vietnam and the Philippines.
As Modi stated on his recent visit to Moscow, “the friendship between India and Russia has stood the test of time” and there are growing indications that it is now also finding a new footing in South Asia. The relationship between New Delhi and Moscow is still taking shape, but the regional cases of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka show why India sees Russia as a strategic partner beyond just weapons, oil and global balancing.
Constantino Xavier is senior fellow, and Lucas Daley is former intern, The Centre for Social and Economic Progress. The views expressed are personal
Recommended Topics