Jake Sullivan interview: ‘Sky’s the limit in India-US relations’

In an exclusive interview to HT on Monday, Sullivan spoke about the uniqueness of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming state visit to Washington DC.

Jake Sullivan, President Joe Biden’s national security adviser (NSA), is a pivotal figure who has not just shaped United States (US)’s foreign policy but also given India-US ties new momentum in recent months. In an exclusive interview to Hindustan Times on Monday, Sullivan spoke about the uniqueness of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming state visit to Washington DC, how India fits into the wider US geoeconomic and geostrategic worldview, the China challenge, and the deliverables that can be expected during the visit. Edited excerpts:

US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan. (AFP)

Apart from the ceremonial aspects associated with a state visit, what is it that makes PM Modi’s visit this week so unique?

I think you will see the significance of the visit in the outcomes, the substantive outcomes that it will produce in defence cooperation, in high technology, in deepening people-to-people ties, in economic investment, across all of those features in the relationship. You will see outcomes from this visit that show the gathering momentum in US-India ties and show that we are actually delivering in reality to back up the positive words between our two leaders and between our two countries.

Let me come straight to the elephant in the room, which is China. How much are shared anxieties on China driving this relationship and could you give us a flavor of the conversations that you have with the Indian side on China?

I would say that both President Biden and Prime Minister Modi view the US-India relationship more through the lens of the opportunities it presents than through the threats and challenges it needs to worry about or ward off. The positive agenda, the agenda around building a shared technology ecosystem of trust, around diversified resilient supply chains, around the US and India working together to help the world solve significant problems from climate and food security to poverty – that is much more motivating in the gathering strength of the US-India relationship than the concerns or threats that we see. And honestly, the ballast in this relationship is that people in both countries have a fundamentally optimistic view about the role of the other country as a partner. So this is not some kind of geopolitical bargain or marriage of convenience against a common threat. It is really a relationship built on the foundation of goodwill that permeates public sentiment, private sector engagement, ties between our universities and researchers, and the increasing work that government officials are doing on this very broad affirmative agenda.

That all being said, it is certainly the case that China will be a strategic topic of conversation in the state visit. It is a factor in the world and therefore, a factor in the relationship. And what we have tried to do is develop a common understanding of the concerns that each of our countries have about actions and activities of the PRC (People’s Republic of China) and then as best as possible, to coordinate and align how we are dealing with those concerns. But as I said before, I think that is not the overriding or dominant feature even if it is the one that people tend to like to write about.

You gave a landmark speech in Brookings a few months ago where you articulated the US’s new approach to geoeconomics. How does India fit into what is being called the new Washington consensus?

India fits into it in three fundamental ways. First, when it comes to supply chains, what we are looking for is not to close America off to the world but do exactly the opposite. We are looking to connect to the rest of the world through diversified resilient supply chains and growing India’s manufacturing capacity to contribute to those supply chains in things like semiconductors is fundamentally part of the vision that I laid out.

Second, when it comes to emerging technologies, we believe that the future global economy will be determined by whether or not democracies can make these emerging technologies work for us as opposed to against us, whether it is artificial intelligence (AI) or quantum or 5G or 6G or inputs like semiconductors, biotechnology and the like. And that means increasing the extent to which the US and India are collaborating together to create this shared technology ecosystem of trust. That’s investments in India’s technology base. It is joint research and development. It is co-production in the defence technology space in a number of ways. A deeper partnership on technology between the US and India lies at the heart of the Biden administration’s international economic vision.

And then third, we share a common interest in seeing the evolution of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) and the international financial institutions so that we can mobilise more capital to solve the challenges of the developing world. As G20 chair, India is playing a leadership role in this effort and the US is coming to the table with ideas and resources to help make this happen. That goes both for the affirmative mobilisation of capital through the World Bank and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and other institutions and dealing with the debt challenges that have burdened developing countries coming out of the pandemic. So we are looking to help make India’s G20 presidency a landmark G20 presidency on both of these issues. And so, when I think about what our international economic strategy is, the economic partnership between the US and India lies at the heart of it.

Your national security documents speak of integrated deterrence, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Where does India fit into your larger geostrategic worldview, particularly on defence, especially in the context of enhanced engagement on defence industrial cooperation?

So first, we believe that it is in the US’s national interest that we deepen our defence cooperation. And that means contributing to efforts in co-production on important defence technologies. And there will be some announcements in that regard associated with the state visit. Second, we believe that we need to have a common picture of the geopolitical environment in the Indian Ocean and in the broader Indo Pacific. That includes maritime domain awareness, intelligence sharing, more joint exercises and the capacity to operate in ways where we understand one another better in terms of our militaries. And so, when you put all of those pieces together, we think that there will be as outcomes from the state visit a deeper, more effective, more diverse defence partnership than what we inherited when the Biden administration came into office. And we think that that is fundamentally in the US interest.

The GE jet engine deal appears to be on the agenda for the visit. Why is it so significant and what’s the level of technological transfer in the offing?

I will be careful on this because I don’t want to get ahead of the announcements for the visit. I would just point out that, in general, jet engine technology has been a long term strategic advantage of the US and it is a high-level, a very sophisticated technology. So any technology transfer with respect to jet engines is a vote of confidence in the strategic partnership with another country. So that’s the kind of broad context.

You have led ICET (initiative on critical and emerging technologies) for the last five months. How important has ICET been?

ICET is foundational, fundamental, critical because we believe that the future of our economies, societies, security sectors will be determined by the extent to which we can effectively harness emerging technologies on behalf of our people and on behalf of our national interests. And we believe that the US and India are uniquely positioned for a deep partnership on emerging technologies. When you think about our people, when you think about our innovation capacity, when you think about our entrepreneurial cultures, and then when you think about the complementarity of our respective research bases, and the ability for us to build integrated supply chains in high tech, the sky is the limit for what we can achieve. And the impacts will be profound and reverberating not just for the people of our two countries but globally.

So ICET is a powerful engine for the deeper development of US-India ties because it is so fundamental to everything we are trying to accomplish together. And the watchword for me on this is results. ICET has already helped us break through barriers in both of our bureaucracies to produce deeper cooperation. And over the course of the coming months and years, I would ask everyone – judge us by the outcomes and results we show in terms of actually delivering on the promise of ICET in real research partnerships, real supply chain shifts, real cooperation to produce the next generation technologies for 5G and 6G, and for harnessing AI for positive outcomes. That’s what we are aiming at.

Within the US, two concerns have been expressed about the relationship. The first, on the strategic front, is that India is not an ally and any US expectations that India may help in case of a crisis that you may have with China is unfounded. The second is that the values-based convergence may have eroded given the perception of democratic backsliding in India. How would you respond to both the interest-based and the values-based argument and what are your expectations from India on these fronts?

A relationship is not a snapshot in time. It’s dynamic, it’s shifting, it will evolve over time and that goes both for questions related to interest and to values. And so I think it’s incumbent on us to take the long view to look at the fundamentals in this relationship. And as I said earlier, the thing that powers this relationship more than anything else is just the inherent goodwill between our two peoples. When you have that kind of strategic asset, in my view, a lot of other things will end up taking care of themselves, because it means that you have got two publics in two democracies that fundamentally look at the other country as a natural partner. And in having that, I think we can overcome whatever kind of historical obstacles and barriers there have been to closer cooperation or any particular challenges at the moment.

When you were in Delhi, you met PM Modi, your counterpart Ajit Doval, as well as EAM Jaishankar. Could you give us a flavor of those conversations?

My relationship with my counterpart Ajit Doval has been incredibly productive. He is a person of deep wisdom and experience but also someone who cares passionately about producing results and driving…not just to have nice strategic conversation but to actually produce outcomes. I think the visit will reflect the work that he personally has done, and that he and I have done together. Second, EAM Jaishankar is an incredibly deep strategic thinker, the kind of person you can sit with and really help think about the long term in terms of the US-India relationship, and he and I got to have that kind of conversation when I was in Delhi.

And then with the PM, he was generous with his time and we spent about an hour together. He was very open about his perspective on the promise that he sees in US-India ties, with particular emphasis on this technology space. And he was asking both me and Ajit Doval questions about how we are taking ICET forward, for example. It was a constructive conversation. I probably won’t go deeper than that, because it was behind closed doors, and I don’t want to read it out too much, but I’ll leave it there.