Relations with Pakistan cannot be normalised so long as it denies responsibility for sponsoring terrorism against India. No meaningful dialogue can take place if it does not curb support for jihadi organisations active in J&K, or claims that it is only giving moral and diplomatic support to “freedom fighters” and not terrorists in J&K. Or even, that extremist violence in Kashmir is a result of India’s policy failures and its human rights violations.
If it continues to believe that by accusing India of terror activities in Pakistan -- including the Peshawar school attack -- and presenting dossiers to the United Nations will shift attention away from its own conduct and make the debate on terrorism in the sub-continent less one-sided, it will not make the policy changes required to open a dialogue with India.
Pakistan’s anti-terrorism credentials are hollow. Despite exhortations from many quarters, it has not tried those responsible for the Mumbai massacre. It allows Hafiz Saeed, a UN designated terrorist, to spout jihadi venom against India. It has not proceeded against those responsible for the Pathankot attack despite unprecedented Indian cooperation.
Pakistan has also used China to block the designation of Masood Azhar as an international terrorist by the UN Security Council. Imran Khan’s government has allowed the ordinance that listed Hafiz Saeed’s Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the Falah-i-Insaniyat Foundation (both on the UN terrorist list) as banned outfits, to lapse. Its inscription on the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has not induced Pakistan to weed out terrorist organisations from its soil despite its dire financial situation. The mounting radicalisation of Pakistani society, reflected in the demonstration of the street power of extremist outfits in locking down Islamabad in 2017 and forcing the government’s hand again in Asia Bibi’s case, the mainstreaming of extremist parties in the last elections, and the Islamisation of the judiciary, bode ill for our future relations with Pakistan.
India is right in insisting that dialogue and terrorism cannot co-exist. Previous dialogue rounds have been disrupted by terrorist attacks: in 2008 after Mumbai and, despite our delinking dialogue from terrorism in 2009 at Sharm el Sheikh and resuming talks in 2011, by subsequent killings on the Line of Control and attacks against our military installations. Those calling for an “uninterrupted and uninterruptible dialogue”-- a formula now appropriated by Pakistan -- should explain how any government can politically justify talks when Indian citizens get killed in cross-border attacks. Such a policy would also imply that India has no answer to Pakistan’s state-sponsored terrorism and, worse, would politically legitimise its use as a negotiating instrument against us. The example of US-Vietnam talks is inapposite because, unlike us, the US was not fighting for its territorial integrity. It was planning withdrawal from a distant conflict, and while talking, was raining bombs on Vietnam.
{{/usCountry}}India is right in insisting that dialogue and terrorism cannot co-exist. Previous dialogue rounds have been disrupted by terrorist attacks: in 2008 after Mumbai and, despite our delinking dialogue from terrorism in 2009 at Sharm el Sheikh and resuming talks in 2011, by subsequent killings on the Line of Control and attacks against our military installations. Those calling for an “uninterrupted and uninterruptible dialogue”-- a formula now appropriated by Pakistan -- should explain how any government can politically justify talks when Indian citizens get killed in cross-border attacks. Such a policy would also imply that India has no answer to Pakistan’s state-sponsored terrorism and, worse, would politically legitimise its use as a negotiating instrument against us. The example of US-Vietnam talks is inapposite because, unlike us, the US was not fighting for its territorial integrity. It was planning withdrawal from a distant conflict, and while talking, was raining bombs on Vietnam.
{{/usCountry}}Dialogue cannot always solve problems, as the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Russia-Japan territorial dispute, the Northern Cyprus issue and our own border differences with China show. Several unsuccessful rounds of negotiations were held on Kashmir even before the composite dialogue in 1997. A new round will also fail without Pakistan abandoning its endemic hostility towards India.
A change in government in Pakistan does not mean a change in Pakistan’s entrenched policies towards India. Imran Khan has not campaigned for improved relations with India in his political career. Rather, he lambasted Nawaz Sharif for friendly overtures towards India. Imran Khan’s closeness to the army means greater limits on his margin of maneuvers rather than new openings. His statements on Kashmir have been hardline, calling for self-determination in accordance with UN resolutions, condemning human rights violations there and making progress on other aspects of relations, including trade, contingent upon a resolution of the Kashmir issue. Not content with the crucial geopolitical gain of having a direct border with China through illegal occupation of POK and denying us contiguity with Afghanistan, Pakistan seeks to further change the status quo at India’s expense.
Imran Khan’s own Islamic leanings are well-established. His call for resuming political-level talks is a propaganda ploy to make him look like a peacemaker and India a rejectionist. He now intends making a fresh offer of dialogue after Indian elections in 2019, but to achieve what? Why he has to wait till 2019 to act on terrorism, when he can act now and open the road for a dialogue is unclear. The impasse in India-Pakistan relations can be broken, if India makes territorial concessions, or if Pakistan, in its own interest, recognises the futility of its inimical policies towards India and eliminates terrorism from its soil. Neither will happen. China will also impede any possible breakthrough in India-Pakistan relations in order to preserve its rising strategic stakes in Pakistan.
Kanwal Sibal is former foreign secretary.