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In a crisis, Delhi and DC display maturity
Since the Pannun controversy, both governments have sought to preserve ties through a mix of signals and actions. Crisis management shows commitment
The controversy around the alleged plot to assassinate Gurpatwant Singh Pannun offers a window into how Delhi and Washington DC behave in a moment of crisis. The United States (US) administration knew of the plot at least since July and the Indian government knew that the US knew something at least since August. How have they acted since then?
Take the Americans first. The US conveyed two messages to India — figure out who did this, fix accountability and never do this again on our soil. But this was kept private with no leaks till the week the indictment was unsealed.
Meanwhile, the US wholeheartedly supported India’s G20 presidency. It hosted external affairs minister S Jaishankar in Washington DC, with senior White House and State Department officials hailing the relationship. Secretary of state Antony J Blinken and secretary of defense Lloyd J Austin came to Delhi for the 2+2 dialogue. The US also hosted commerce and industry minister Piyush Goyal, as both countries launched an innovation handshake and worked on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.
Once the indictment was unsealed, the US issued tough but measured statements that did not directly charge the Indian government but underlined the seriousness of the allegations and welcomed the formation of an investigation committee. It then sent Jon Finer, the US principal deputy NSA, to Delhi. There was a last-minute change in Finer’s schedule, but he made it a point to both attend Jaishankar’s speech at the Carnegie India Global Tech Summit (GTS) and then offer his own comments on the maturity and strength of the bilateral ties. GTS also saw the presence of the national security council tech czar Tarun Chhabra, the deputy envoy for critical and emerging technology, Seth Center, and the commerce department’s key official on export controls, Thea Rozman Kendler. Finer and India’s deputy NSA Vikram Misri reviewed the progress on the initiative of critical and emerging technologies (iCET) and broadened its scope; within days, the US, South Korea and India entered into a trilateral partnership in the domain.
When it became public that President Biden wouldn’t be able to make it to India for Republic Day, US NSA Jake Sullivan told HT that this was due to scheduling demands, Joe Biden and Narendra Modi shared a close personal bond and had a vision of both countries as the closest of partners, and work to fulfil that vision will continue in defence, space, technology and other domains. This was a rebuke to sceptics interpreting the rescheduling as a “snub”. Sullivan himself will head to India in January or February for the ICET annual review.
Now look at what India has done since July-August. On the allegations itself, Delhi has adopted a measured public stance, recognising American inputs as a matter of concern and setting up a committee. It has also kept the hyper-nationalism of parts of its base under control. But beyond that, there has been much greater political ownership of the relationship with the US. Jaishankar has publicly and repeatedly thanked the US for its role during the G20 summit. He has indicated that on tech, the heart of today’s geopolitics, India had made its choice — the West. He has repeatedly signalled an understanding of the value of trust. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s foreign affairs cell chief Vijay Chauthaiwale, at GTS, declared unequivocally that the strategic relationship with the US will deepen.
India has also been more open in publicly recognising China as a shared challenge. Look no further than Rajnath Singh’s comments at the 2+2 summit where an Indian defence minister, perhaps for the first time, publicly spoke of how India and the US find themselves “in agreement on strategic issues, including countering China’s aggression”. Quad working groups are intensifying cooperation across domains quietly and India and the US are cooperating in the Pacific Islands.
In September, Bloomberg reported that after the US discreetly asked India what it could and would do in case of a conflict across the Taiwan Straits, the Indian chief of defence staff had commissioned a study to assess war scenarios. Last week, for the first time, India, the US and Taiwan did a cybersecurity workshop together; both economic and educational linkages with Taipei are deepening; and a mobility agreement is in the works. This isn’t to suggest that India will play an active role in any conflict or that there is any causal link to the recent controversy. But greater Indian engagement with Taiwan, while good for India itself, also sends a signal.
Or take West Asia. Even if DC’s actions derive from its complicated relationship with Israel, Delhi and Washington broadly have a common assessment: Hamas attacks were pure terror, Israel had a right to defend itself; massive civilian casualties have eroded goodwill for Tel Aviv; Israel’s endgame isn’t clear; the only sustainable way out is a two-State solution; and the big prize remains normalisation between Israel and its neighbours.
None of this is to underplay the challenge at hand. As more details emerge in the public domain, there will be more embarrassment and perhaps, defensiveness in Delhi and more outcry in the West. The reputational hit to India is deep. It is unclear what level of public accountability the US is seeking and what level India will be comfortable with. There may be adverse implications for intelligence cooperation. And while the US system doesn’t think India’s top political, national security and foreign policy leadership was directly complicit, it is feeling uncertain about the kind of power India wishes to be or the future of the relationship if another set of actors are in power.
But those at work to undermine the relationship are bound to be disappointed. The US is banking on India to institute correctives and will sustain and deepen ties. India knows that this action was reckless and that it will have to take steps to recover trust. If the crisis passes, both governments can pat themselves on the back.
The views expressed are personal
