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Israel Army admits ‘complete failure’ in Hamas Oct 7 attack: 'IDF failed’
The attack killed hundreds of Israelis and triggered a bloody war in Gaza killing at least 48,000 Palestinians.
The Israeli military has acknowledged a ‘complete failure’ in preventing the October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas-led militants in an internal probe into the assault released on Thursday
The attack killed hundreds of Israelis and triggered a bloody war in Gaza that lasted for almost a year and a half, killing at least 48,000 Palestinians and several Israeli soldiers.
"October 7 was a complete failure, the IDF (military) failed in fulfilling its mission to protect Israeli civilians," the official said on condition of anonymity, AFP reported.
"Too many civilians died that day asking themselves in their hearts or out loud, where was the IDF," the official added.
The official said the army had not maintained "a comprehensive understanding of the enemy's military capabilities" and that it was "overconfident" in its knowledge.
A central misconception was that Hamas, which seized control of Gaza from the Palestinian Authority in 2007, was more interested in governing the territory than fighting Israel, the inquiry found. The military also misjudged the militant group's capabilities.
What are the main findings of the report?
Military planners had envisioned that, at worst, Hamas could stage a ground invasion from up to eight border points, the official said. Hamas had more than 60 attack routes during the attack.
Intelligence assessed in the aftermath of the attack has shown Hamas came close to staging the offensive on three earlier occasions but delayed it for unknown reasons, the official said.
The official said that in the hours before the attack, there were signs that something was amiss, including when Hamas fighters switched their phones over to Israeli SIM cards.
The perception that Hamas did not want war guided decision-makers away from taking action that might have thwarted the attack.
The Israeli military official said intelligence shows that Yahya Sinwar, a mastermind of the October 7 attack who was killed last October, had begun planning it as early as 2017.
With the military off guard on a holiday weekend, Hamas launched a heavy wave of rockets that allowed thousands of fighters to burst through the security fence or fly over it on hang gliders. They knocked out surveillance cameras and quickly overwhelmed hundreds of soldiers stationed along the border.
From there they advanced to key highway intersections and attacked troops dispatched to the area, including some senior officers, disrupting the military's command and control, according to a second military official, who also spoke on condition of anonymity.
For the first three hours after the attack, Hamas fighters marauded through border communities and a music festival with little resistance.
That was when most of the 251 hostages were taken and most people were killed, the official said. The official said the chaos led to friendly fire incidents, although he said there were not many, without disclosing a figure.
It took hours for the military to regain control and days until the area was fully cleared of militants.
The report blamed the military for being overconfident in its knowledge and not showing enough doubt in its core concepts and beliefs. It did not place blame on any individual soldiers or officers but is likely to pave the way for a reckoning in the military and eventual dismissals.
Some high-ranking officers have already resigned, including the former head of military intelligence and Israel's top general, Lt. General Herzi Halevi, who steps down next week.
