Two elections in a week have created political uncertainty to the two capitals most consequential to India’s security calculus. While the US is preparing for a Democratic-controlled Congress in the wake of Republican losses in the midterm elections, Israel is considering the possibility of a government transition after Benjamin Netanyahu's coalition was unable to secure a parliamentary majority. Neither development in itself suggests a reversal of conventional foreign policy, but both have implications that go well beyond domestic politics. Their significance is particularly significant for the future of the Iran war, West Asia’s security architecture, and the strategic calculations of nations like India, which has key partnerships with Israel, the US, Iran and the Gulf States.
For India, the concern is beyond change of leadership in Israel or whether Trump will face a more hostile Congress. It is whether the evolving political situations in Jerusalem and Washington would affect the regional balance in which India’s security interests are interlinked. At a time when the war with Iran is ongoing, sea routes remain uncertain and regional connectivity projects are vulnerable to geopolitical instability, the repercussions could be significantly worse than the electoral arithmetic predicts.
The Democrat’s win in both chambers of the Congress poses the most urgent institutional obstacle to Trump's regional strategy. The results have handed Democrats control of congressional committees, parliamentary processes and the federal financial process. Notably, they have created an institutional framework for legislators to scrutinise the administration's military policies and demand greater accountability for its engagement in the Iran conflict. However, it would be premature to read this as a direct restriction on American military options. Trump remains commander-in-chief and possesses significant executive power over military operations. Moreover, the new Congress won’t take office until January 2027. Until then, the Republican-controlled Congress will remain in place.
The significance of the Democratic win extends beyond congressional oversight. The Iran war might be a huge flashpoint between the White House and Congress, especially if military activities continue, American losses rise or the economic consequences of war become more apparent. Democratic lawmakers may use public hearings, funding discussions and War Powers resolutions to investigate the administration’s goals, demand more transparency and dispute the logic of continuing military involvement. These measures would not automatically preclude Trump from authorising a military strike, but they might raise the political and institutional costs of maintaining a fight. The administration might, therefore, find itself fighting a two-front war, a conflict with Iran overseas and an increasingly unfriendly Congress at home.
{{/usCountry}}The significance of the Democratic win extends beyond congressional oversight. The Iran war might be a huge flashpoint between the White House and Congress, especially if military activities continue, American losses rise or the economic consequences of war become more apparent. Democratic lawmakers may use public hearings, funding discussions and War Powers resolutions to investigate the administration’s goals, demand more transparency and dispute the logic of continuing military involvement. These measures would not automatically preclude Trump from authorising a military strike, but they might raise the political and institutional costs of maintaining a fight. The administration might, therefore, find itself fighting a two-front war, a conflict with Iran overseas and an increasingly unfriendly Congress at home.
{{/usCountry}}The domestic political costs of the conflict could further complicate Trump's position. Rising energy prices, public spending on military operations and fears of another long-term US involvement in West Asia could create opposition from both sides. Especially since scepticism toward overseas military engagements is not a Democratic-only phenomenon. Sections of Trump's own America First constituency have traditionally questioned the economic and strategic rationale for extensive American involvement abroad. A convergence between progressive Democrats critical of the war and conservative Republicans sceptical of foreign intervention could create an unusual political alignment. Such a development would not necessarily end American military involvement, but it could make sustaining domestic support for an extended campaign increasingly difficult.
The changing political scenarios in US could also have implications for the US-Israel relationship. In September 2026, 46 of the 47 Senate Democrats voted in favour of a resolution calling for more scrutiny of settler violence in the West Bank. Although Republicans opposed the bill, the vote reflected growing Democratic concerns over aspects of Israeli policy. The possibility of a Democratic Congress starting in January 2027 might give these concerns a more institutional voice through legislative hearings, oversight proceedings and increased monitoring of military aid to Israel.
Within Republican circles, the discourse regarding Washington's alliance with Israel is also becoming increasingly apparent. Vice President JD Vance has also acknowledged growing public dissatisfaction with Washington's policy toward Israel. In a post-election statement on X, he pointed to requests to cease the conflict with Iran, address the cost of living, prioritise American interests, and re-think the US relationship with Israel as issues raised by those who backed Trump in 2024, but voted Democrat in the midterms. Vance did not clarify what a policy shift toward Israel would look like, but his comments suggest issues about the price and direction of US support for Israel are being aired more and more within the Republican Party itself. This is especially apparent when considering the growing prominence of the America First group that has questioned the costs of global military deployments and asked for more attention to domestic interests.
The repercussions for Israel would thus be more complex than a simple deterioration in bilateral relations. US military support, information-sharing and diplomatic backing remain vital for Israel’s security, and such institutional bonds are unlikely to dissolve with an election shift. However, a more polarised American political milieu may make it increasingly difficult to maintain bipartisan support. This emerging political divide will present a challenge for both Washington and Jerusalem, as they must prevent it from undermining the broader strategic partnership.
Israel's domestic political turmoil adds to the complexity of this changing strategic scenario. The Likud may be the largest party in the Knesset, but Benjamin Netanyahu's political grouping has failed to cobble together the 61 seats needed to form a governing majority in the 120-seat parliament. President Isaac Herzog chose opposition leader and former military chief Gadi Eisenkot to form the next government. Eisenkot was backed by 67 legislators, compared with 46 for Netanyahu, putting him in a better position to get the mandate to form the next government.
A change in leadership does not necessarily mean a major change in Israel’s security doctrine. Both Netanyahu and Eisenkot have consistently maintained their unwavering stances on national security, with a particular emphasis on the threat posed by armed groups operating against Israel, Hezbollah's military capabilities, and Iran's regional influence. Both are against the idea of establishment of a Palestinian State under the present circumstances. Their differences are more apparent in the areas of governance, institutional accountability, the military exemption granted to ultra-Orthodox communities, relations with the Palestinian Authority, and the diplomatic management of regional security challenges.
An administration led by Eisenkot may thus take a different political and diplomatic approach, focusing more on institutional stability, connections with Washington, and collaboration with regional partners. But it would be facing the same strategic challenges that have dictated Israeli strategy in recent years. The key issues will continue to be Iran’s military and regional networks, the security situation on Israel’s northern borders and the future of the Palestinian cause. Consequently, a change of administration would more likely impact the tactics and political priorities through which Israel achieves its security objectives, rather than leading to an abrupt transformation in its core security ideology.
For India, the distinction is critical. New Delhi’s relationship with Israel rests on long-term cooperation in defence, intelligence, counter-terrorism and technology and is not solely reliant on any individual Israeli political leader. A change in government may modify the diplomatic tone or the pace of some projects but the strategic underpinnings of the partnership are likely to endure. The bigger concern is how Israel’s domestic political shift intersects with its relationship with Washington and the broader regional security environment.
The evolving political developments in Washington and Jerusalem have to be viewed in the larger context of India’s interests in West Asia. New Delhi has strategic alliances with Israel and the US, but also has substantial economic, energy and connectivity interests with Iran and the Gulf countries. Its objective is consequently to preserve these relations without disputes between its partners that would compromise its strategic autonomy.
Beyond the rapport between Narendra Modi and Benjamin Netanyahu, the India-Israel relationship has now gained institutional traction. When Modi visited Israel in February 2026, the two countries upgraded relations to a Special Strategic Partnership for Peace, Innovation and Prosperity, enhancing collaboration in military, security, Artificial Intelligence, cybersecurity, semiconductors and space. This ensures continuity even if there is a change of Israel’s government. However, India’s relationship with Israel cannot be divorced from its relationship with Washington. A more politically divided US Congress may make certain areas of West Asia policy more controversial, especially military assistance to Israel and the Iran dispute. New Delhi is eager to continue its defence and technology cooperation with Washington, while also working with lawmakers from across the aisle.
Iran is another kind of challenge for New Delhi. India’s investment in Chabahar Port provides an alternative route to Afghanistan and Central Asia, reducing India’s dependence on transit routes through Pakistan. However, US sanctions have made it difficult for India to engage with Iran and created the problem of having both engagement with Iran and strategic partnership with US. This illustrates how Washington's policy towards Iran can have a bearing on India’s interest in the region.
The Gulf is also crucial for India’s economic and maritime security. Notably, India-GCC commerce stood at almost $ 178.63 billion in FY 2025-26 and nearly 10 million Indians are settled in GCC countries. The Strait of Hormuz is another crucial vulnerability, as disruption of this key energy artery might influence India’s oil supplies, shipping prices and overall economic stability. Any protracted clash between Iran, Israel and the US would, therefore, have repercussions far beyond the immediate battle. Hence, the domestic political transitions in both Israel and the US is bound to effect India’s immediate and long-term interests in West Asia.
The political developments in Washington and Jerusalem are a major moment for West Asia, but do not necessarily portend a rapid alteration of the regional strategic order. A Democratic-controlled Congress might ramp up criticism of US policy toward Iran and Israel, while a probable change of administration in Jerusalem could affect Israel's diplomatic approach, without fundamentally affecting its security goals.
The challenge for India would be to handle these political changes without losing sight of its larger regional objectives. We will continue to place importance on our defence cooperation with Israel, our strategic engagement with the US and our commercial and connectivity connections with Iran and the Gulf. Ultimately India’s advantage resides in maintaining strategic autonomy rather than being aligned to conflicting political factions. The real test of these elections will be to see whether the political changes that follow alter the balance of power in the region and India’s capacity to defend its interests
(The views expressed are personal)
This article is authored by Vaasu Sharma, doctoral candidate, University of Haifa, Israel and former research consultant, WION News.