The Supreme Court on Thursday underscored the stringent safeguards under the Wildlife (Protection) Act and asked the Uttar Pradesh government to examine the nature of permissions claimed by YouTuber Elvish Yadav and his associates in a case alleging misuse of snakes and snake venom.
A bench of justices MM Sundresh and N Kotiswar Singh said that the primary concern before it was whether any lawful permission existed for the use of snakes in a video shoot, and if so, whether such permission could ever extend to the extraction of venom.
“We will send a very bad message outside if a person like you, who is otherwise popular, is allowed to use a hapless victim which is voiceless,” observed the bench, stressing that wildlife protection rules are “very clear” and strictly enforced.
“Did you deal with the snake or not? Can you go to the zoo and play with animals there? Will it not be an offence? You cannot say that you will do whatever you want,” the bench told Yadav’s counsel.
The case relates to allegations that Yadav misused snakes and snake venom for a YouTube video and was involved in organising rave parties where foreigners were allegedly supplied snake venom and other intoxicating drugs.
{{/usCountry}}The case relates to allegations that Yadav misused snakes and snake venom for a YouTube video and was involved in organising rave parties where foreigners were allegedly supplied snake venom and other intoxicating drugs.
{{/usCountry}}The bench made it clear that its immediate concern was the alleged handling of snakes. “The only question in our mind is about the snake. The rules there are very clear. Even if you spot a snake near you, you cannot kill it. You have to inform the wildlife officers. So, how come you had snakes?” the court asked.
When Yadav’s counsel, senior advocate Mukta Gupta, claimed that permissions had been taken for the video, the bench responded: “Can there be a permission for a video? And what about venom? Even if you had permission for a video, can you extract venom? We do not think that can ever be allowed.”
At this stage, counsel for Uttar Pradesh sought time to verify the permissions that Yadav’s side claimed to have been obtained in the case. The bench granted time and posted the matter for March, directing the state to examine the nature and validity of such permissions.
Gupta advanced four broad submissions. First, she argued that in view of the bar under Section 55 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, no court could take cognisance of an offence on a police report and that proceedings must be initiated through a complaint by a competent authority such as the Director of Wildlife Preservation or the Chief Wildlife Warden.
Second, she contended that the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act could not be invoked in the absence of recovery of any scheduled substance. “There is no recovery from me. No possession. No consumption. No link,” she argued, adding that the alleged NDPS invocation was based only on 20 ml of liquid and a report of antibodies, not venom. “Criminal law cannot be expanded by investigative imagination,” she told the court.
Third, she submitted that a related case filed in Gurugram by the complainant’s brother had resulted in a closure report. Fourth, she questioned the applicability of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, calling it “preposterous”.
On the factual allegations, Gupta maintained there was “no rave party”, no guests, and no recovery from Yadav. She said the charge sheet relied on a YouTube video in which Yadav was allegedly seen pressing and rotating snakes. According to her, the video was from a song shoot by one Faizal Puriya, in which Yadav made only a guest appearance after “proper permissions”, and the snakes were healthy and later released. She argued that the nine snakes examined were found, as per medical reports, not to be poisonous.
In August 2025, the Supreme Court granted an interim stay on trial court proceedings against Yadav in the same case. Yadav challenged the Allahabad high court’s May 2025 order dismissing his petition against the charge-sheet and summoning order. The high court refused to interfere, observing that the statements in the FIR and charge-sheet would be examined during trial.