A realistic pivot in India, Turkey ties
Ankara should realise the potential in a robust relationship with New Delhi and recalibrate its relations with Islamabad
Operation Sindoor has brought into relief Pakistan’s ties with Turkey. Though 80% of Pakistan’s weaponry comes from China, Ankara has been a key strategic partner of Islamabad, which became evident when it was found that many of the drones fired into India were of Turkish make. The pushback has been swift: Turkish goods, services and tourism were targeted as Indian travel platforms and service providers suspended services. On Thursday, the aviation ministry cancelled the security clearance to Celebi Aviation, a Turkish firm that provides ground services at nine airports in India, and Jamia Millia Islamia, Maulana Azad National Urdu University, and JNU have cancelled academic agreements with Turkish educational institutions.

These actions reflect the current public mood, which is hostile to all actors viewed as supporting Pakistan’s use of terrorism as a strategic weapon against India, post the Pahalgam massacre. However, it should not be forgotten that Turkey is not just the Turkish State, which under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has turned Islamist and pivoted close to Pakistan, but also its people, and civil society; like India, it is defined by its civilisational values. New Delhi’s Ankara policy has historically acknowledged the contradictions inherent in India-Turkey relations and nuanced its approach accordingly. Bilateral trade between the two countries, estimated at $10.4 billion during 2023-24, favours India and both nations have worked on building a trade, economic, and cultural relationship, punctuated by multiple visits and interactions by their top leaders.
The Ankara-Islamabad relationship is rooted in Pakistan’s quest for a model to build a modern State. Its army dictators saw a desirable model in Turkey, which allowed a major say for the armed forces in public affairs even though the country has been an electoral democracy since it built itself as a modern nation State from the debris of the Ottoman Empire and the World Wars. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, perceived the army as an institution that would protect the secular values of the new republic. This changed under Erdogan, a populist and an Islamist, who dreams of Turkey re-emerging as a pole of the Islamic world, mirroring the Ottoman Empire’s sway over West Asia until World War I. Here, Turkey competes with Saudi Arabia and Iran, and in pursuit of his goals, Erdogan has invested heavily in soft power and in countries such as Pakistan, an ideological ally and a major buyer of Turkish armaments. India, on its part, has aligned with Turkey’s rivals Greece and Armenia, backing their claims against Ankara.
Still, in recent years, India and Turkey have attempted to address the Pakistan irritant in their relationship to build robust ties that acknowledge their respective ambitions as emerging powers in a multipolar world. Ankara should realise the potential of a deeper economic relationship with India and recalibrate its relationship with Pakistan accordingly. Delhi has successfully pursued this path with countries in the Arab world such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which had once aligned their interests solely with Pakistan. In fact, Ankara could offer counsel to Islamabad to abandon its territorial ambitions regarding Jammu and Kashmir as well as its patronage for terror groups to further its strategic interests in the subcontinent and cease to be a rogue nation. And, for itself, Ankara should stop viewing Kashmir from a Pakistani vantage point and recognise it for what it is, a Muslim majority region that is an integral part of India.