Can India preserve its multipolarity? | Number Theory

Both the Indian government and public opinion have not seen relations with the US and Russia as an either-or choice

Donald Trump’s 25% tariffs on India were bad enough for bilateral ties, but the US president has made it worse with an additional 25% on account of India’s oil purchases from Russia, which Trump now sees as the aggressor in the Ukraine war. Both the Indian government and public opinion have not seen relations with the US and Russia as an either-or choice. Here are three charts that explain this argument.

Bloomberg photo

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  Most Indians have a favourable opinion of both US and Russia

  In large parts of the West, even after the Cold War, Russia has often been seen as an adversary, especially after the 2022 Ukraine war. In as many nine European countries for which data is available before the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and for present year, including Germany, France, UK and Italy, the share of respondents who viewed Russia unfavourably on average increased by 17 percentage points. Indians, however, have had equally favourable views of both Russia and US, and this has not changed even in the aftermath of the Ukraine war. The perception statistics have been taken from the Pew Surveys, which although based on a narrow sample of respondents it is often treated as broadly indicative of public opinion trends due to its rigorous methodology, cross-country comparability, and they are also the only widely comparable statistic of this variety.
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  Indians favourably viewing both Russia and US are not entirely unjustified

  Are Indians being inconsistent in being equally favourably disposed towards both US and Russia. Not really. The apparent dichotomy can be explained by looking at India’s deep strategic ties with Russia and its extremely important commercial ties with the US which are, or were at least till the latest Trump disruption, now also becoming more and more strategic in nature. Data from SIPRI shows that Russia (rather Soviet Union) used to supply more than three-fourth of India’s weaponry from the 1970s till early 2000s. However, over the last decade, India has steadily diversified its defence sources, tapping into Western partners like the US, France and Israel.
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  Indians, like their government, did not really think Trump would upset this multipolar approach

  Trump singling out India for its oil imports from Russia – China is a bigger importer but has faced no additional tariffs from the US – has left both the Indian establishment and public opinion shocked. This is very different from the public perception about Trump prior to these developments. Pew’s surveys show that 52% of Indians earlier in 2025 they trust Trump “to do the right thing” in world affairs. To be sure, this survey was conducted before the latest wave of India-US trade tensions and tariff threats. Close behind, 44% express confidence in Vladimir Putin—a testament to India’s enduring strategic comfort with Russia even in public perceptions domestically, despite global censure over Ukraine. By contrast, just 24% of respondents trust China’s President Xi Jinping. To be sure, even Trump had a very rhetoric vis-à-vis Putin and Russia until very recently and had a much more accommodative stance than many other US leaders in both the Democratic and Republican establishment. As India tries to pivot towards its multipolar approach—India has reached out to China, Russia and Brazil in various forums at the highest levels—and at the same time also tries to undo what looks like serious damage to its ties with the US, it would be negotiating an uncharted territory where previous trusted relationships have turned sour and new relationships are being pursued despite lower level of trust vis-à-vis China and its leadership which has much more leeway than Indian in the geopolitical camp opposed to the US.