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Challenges for India in a changing West Asian order
For India, the question is how to protect its strategic partnership with Israel amid new leadership.
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Israel’s political landscape is shifting as former military chief Gadi Eisenkot moves closer to forming a government and potentially ending Benjamin Netanyahu’s dominance. An agreement on key parliamentary appointments marks a breakthrough, but assembling a coalition remains the greater challenge.
Eisenkot has agreed with Naftali Bennett, Yair Golan, Avigdor Liberman and Yair Lapid on senior positions in the 26th Knesset. Former minister Matan Kahana is proposed as Speaker and Liberman as chair of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. Roi Folman and Liran Avishar Ben-Horin are proposed for the Arrangements and Finance committees. Eisenkot announced the agreement on X.
The arrangement gives the opposition influence over the parliamentary agenda. It also reflects compromise: Bennett and Liberman initially favoured Lapid for Speaker, while Eisenkot wanted the post for his Yashar party.
For India, the question is how to protect its strategic partnership with Israel amid new leadership. Washington, Europe, Arab nations, China and Pakistan will also assess the transition. Trump’s weakened position and closeness to Netanyahu add uncertainty.
The 120-member Knesset is fractured: Likud has 27 seats, Netanyahu’s bloc 53, Eisenkot’s opposition grouping 48 and Arab-led parties 19. His Yashar party has 21 seats. President Isaac Herzog received recommendations from 67 lawmakers for Eisenkot, 46 for Netanyahu and seven for neither. On November 8, he invited Eisenkot to form a government within 28 days, with a possible 14-day extension.
The arithmetic does not settle the coalition question. Liberman reportedly wants Eisenkot to seek ultra-Orthodox support rather than depend on Arab lawmakers. But this conflicts with the promise to end blanket military-service exemptions for ultra-Orthodox Jews. Arab parties, including Ra’am and the Joint List, could help secure a majority, although some Jewish partners oppose such dependence. Disagreements over Gaza, religion, conscription and Netanyahu’s future remain. The agreement does not guarantee a government.
India’s relationship with Israel extends beyond the rapport between Netanyahu and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Defence, intelligence, drones, cybersecurity, agriculture and research underpin an institutional partnership. New Delhi should engage Eisenkot and the wider political spectrum, stressing that cooperation rests on national interests, not individual leaders.
Eisenkot’s military background could sustain defence cooperation, although his approach to Iran, Gaza and the Palestinians may require adjustment. The 2026 Israel-US-Iran confrontation has heightened Gulf risks, threatening energy supplies, shipping and Indian nationals. A leadership change may alter diplomatic tone more than security calculations.
India must maintain channels with Israel, Iran, Washington and Gulf capitals, prioritising de-escalation and safe navigation. Eisenkot has not unequivocally endorsed Palestinian statehood, but a government less dependent on hardliners might ease humanitarian restrictions, release Palestinian Authority revenues and restrain settlements. India should uphold a negotiated two-state solution and oppose actions undermining peace.
India’s Arab-world interests cannot be subordinated to its relationship with Israel. Reduced tensions and renewed normalisation would benefit the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. Gulf States will judge whether Eisenkot can offer a less volatile Israeli partner without asking them to abandon Palestinian statehood. Regional stability is vital to India’s energy security, trade and diaspora.
China may view the transition as an opportunity to recalibrate relations with Israel. Its partnership with Iran complicates that effort, although Beijing retains commercial interests in Israel. An Eisenkot government may explore economic and technological engagement with China, constrained by American sensitivities, Israeli security concerns and Beijing’s proximity to Tehran.
China seeks influence across West Asia without direct involvement in its conflicts. India must monitor Beijing’s presence in Iran and the Gulf and ensure it gains no diplomatic leverage in Israel at New Delhi’s expense.
A post-Netanyahu government may diversify ties with Japan, South Korea and ASEAN in manufacturing, Artificial Intelligence, cybersecurity, agriculture and defence technology. Instability and sensitivities over Palestine could constrain outreach. India should consolidate its relationship with Israel and promote Indo-Pacific cooperation, positioning itself as a bridge rather than viewing Israel’s Asian engagement as competition.
Pakistan will assess the change, although recognition of Israel remains unlikely without progress towards Palestinian statehood. Islamabad links normalisation to a just settlement, reflecting domestic politics and ties with the Islamic world. A less polarising Israeli leadership could permit indirect engagement through Gulf States. Pakistan may use the Palestinian issue to reinforce its Arab-world standing while balancing China ties and dependence on Gulf economies. Any shift would reflect expediency, not a fundamental policy change.
India’s engagement with Tel Aviv must rest on its own national interests, not Islamabad’s positioning.
Trump’s closeness to Netanyahu adds uncertainty. Weakened by the midterm setback, he has less political room but retains leverage through military aid, intelligence and diplomacy. He may accommodate Eisenkot if US priorities are met, or use Washington’s influence over differences on Iran, Gaza and China. The alliance will endure, but personal equations may no longer determine every decision.
The European Union may welcome better humanitarian access to Gaza and restraint on settlements, but will judge the government by its policies. India should coordinate where interests converge, retaining diplomatic independence.
A post-Netanyahu Israel will test India’s diplomatic maturity, not the rationale for engagement. New Delhi must protect its partnership, sustain Arab ties, maintain dialogue with Iran and support Palestinian peace. Eisenkot’s rise could open a new chapter, but his government’s composition and durability remain uncertain.
India must remain a trusted Israeli partner while preserving strategic flexibility and avoiding entanglement in regional rivalries.
(The views are expressed are personal)
This article is authored by KS Tomar, senior political analyst and strategic affairs columnist, Shimla.
