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From Mao’s editorials to influencer operations and algorithmic framing

India’s foreign ministry criticised Chinese influencers for filming in poor neighbourhoods of Dhaka and falsely presenting the footage as New Delhi. 

Published on: Nov 16, 2026, 10:19:08 IST
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Language and semantics in international relations play a crucial role in how countries deal with each other. Body language, tone, demeanour etc. all thus become crucial aspects to study. When it comes to China, it has never accorded India equal and mutual respect, and history offers a long sequence of examples that make the pattern unmistakable. The latest instance is the campaign in which Chinese influencers filmed in poorer neighbourhoods of Dhaka and presented the footage to Chinese audiences as New Delhi, complete with derogatory commentary on hygiene, housing, and living conditions. India’s ministry of external affairs (MEA) called out the activity as the peddling of false narratives and urged authorities in Beijing and Dhaka to act.

Social media influencing (Pexels)
Social media influencing (Pexels)

MEA has criticised the Chinese influencers for a coordinated campaign of false narratives after Bangladeshi media exposed them livestreaming from Dhaka’s poorer neighbourhoods while presenting the footage as New Delhi. The episode, documented in a Prothom Alo investigation that identified Chinese nationals operating for months in areas such as Uttara and Tekpara,in Bangladesh, involved derogatory commentary on hygiene, living conditions, and even claims that local tea was prepared with cow urine. The content was broadcast on Douyin and WeChat to Chinese audiences.

This is not an isolated social-media stunt. It fits a longer pattern of Chinese efforts to portray India as chaotic, dirty, underdeveloped, and expansionist. From the Mao era onward, official propaganda has treated India less as a peer and more as a problematic neighbour whose democratic model and regional ambitions require constant management. The mediums have changed, from People’s Daily editorials to nationalist tabloids, Weibo amplification, influencer livestreams, and now large language models; but the underlying intent has remained consistent: shape perceptions, contrast China’s system favourably, and limit India’s attractiveness as a destination for capital and influence.

In 1959, amid the Tibetan uprising, Mao personally shaped the tone. On May 6 that year, People’s Daily published “The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru’s Philosophy,” an editorial Mao revised. It accused Nehru and the Indian bourgeoisie of seeking to maintain Tibet as a buffer, inheriting British expansionist strategies, and interfering in China’s internal affairs. Mao viewed Nehru as the successor to colonial policy, aiming for a “great Indian empire” by filling the vacuum left by the British. Internal notes from Lhasa reinforced the line that Indian “expansionists” were irreconcilable and that the border dispute was a pretext for opposition. A later People’s Daily piece on October 27, 1962, “More on Nehru’s Philosophy in the Light of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question,” returned to the same themes, framing India’s position as imperialist ambition. Mao’s private remarks to Soviet leaders were blunter still: In the question of Tibet, “we should crush him.” These were not reactive outbursts but calculated framing that cast India outside the socialist camp and as an unreliable actor.

State media has sustained the approach. State-controlled outlets such as Global Times and Xinhua have repeatedly highlighted Indian economic shortfalls, infrastructure gaps, military limitations, and governance issues, especially during border standoffs or periods of economic competition. Coverage often stresses poverty, sanitation challenges, and policy failures while underplaying India’s poverty reduction or infrastructure gains. During Operation Sindoor last year, Indian authorities blocked the X accounts of Global Times and Xinhua for blatant disinformation. Freedom House and other monitors have tracked how Chinese state narratives reach Indian audiences through local-language social media and partnered content. The tone is rarely one of mutual respect; it is one of managed rivalry and selective critique.

Chinese social platforms have added a layer of racialised stereotyping. On Weibo and Douyin, content routinely generalises Indian tourists or selective clips into claims of unhygienic behaviour, moral deficiency, or civilisational backwardness. Spikes in Indo-phobia have accompanied rising travel and business exchanges, with calls to restrict entry and recycling of old incidents into broad national character judgments. Platforms enforce rules unevenly against such material. Analysts note that India serves as a convenient benchmark: Large enough to matter for Chinese self-image, yet lagging in per-capita metrics in ways that flatter domestic narratives of superior governance.

The Bangladesh operation illustrates the shift to more agile digital methods. The Chinese influencers could have visited India, but their operators purposely moved to Dhaka, hired local guides, and produced industrial-scale livestreams that deliberately mislabelled locations. The creation and dissemination of such content repeatedly is due an ideological contest for China: When UNDP data show India sharply reducing extreme poverty under a democratic system, it undercuts Beijing’s claim that only its model delivers results. Portraying India (and South Asia more broadly) as permanently blighted by slums and disorder also serves a practical purpose, signalling to investors and travellers that the environment is unattractive. Similar selective editing of western influencer clips has targeted Indian tourism. The goal is not accuracy; it is narrative dominance.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) extends the same logic into new territory. Chinese models such as DeepSeek, Alibaba’s Qwen, and Moonshot’s Kimi have been shown in multiple tests to refuse, deflect, or insert official positions on sensitive issues including Arunachal Pradesh, the 1962 war, and Aksai Chin. Responses often cite “beyond my current scope” or reframe according to Chinese territorial claims. European audits, including from Estonian intelligence and independent labs, document propaganda insertion, stronger bias in Chinese-language outputs, and spillover effects even on non-China topics. Chinese regulations require alignment with “socialist core values.” Because open Chinese models are increasingly adopted in India and elsewhere for cost reasons, negative social-media portrayals of Indian conditions can enter training corpora and shape downstream answers on investment climate, governance, or development. The result is a quieter, more persistent channel than any single editorial or livestream.

The pattern is unlikely to end. Historical propaganda, state-media campaigns, platform racism, influencer operations, and AI alignment all serve overlapping objectives: protecting China’s developmental narrative, discouraging capital from flowing to a democratic rival, and limiting India’s regional standing. Mediums evolve, print to television to social video to foundation models, and tactics adapt to platform incentives, visa regimes, and open-source adoption. What remains constant is the view of India as an actor whose rise requires active management through information tools. Understanding this continuity matters more than any single episode. The MEA’s recent statement correctly identifies one operation; the larger task is recognising that similar efforts will reappear, in new forms, for the same strategic reasons, for which India needs to be prepared to act.

(The views expressed are personal)

This article is authored by Sriparna Pathak, professor, China Studies and International Relations, Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat.