Indonesia, China, the BRI and fresh controversies
Authored by - Sriparna Pathak, associate professor, Chinese Studies and International Relations, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat.
A decade ago, when Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), then known as the One Belt One Road (OBOR), there were several takers across the world and the case was no different in Southeast Asia, despite the fact that several Southeast Asian countries have maritime disputes with China in the South China Sea. Xi Jinping’s pet project, the BRI, often hailed as the project of the century was seen as being a benign economic project to increase trade and investments in countries and across regions. Beijing’s so-called commitment to the principles of non-interference while giving loans became an additional lure.
China has invested roughly $166 billion in Southeast Asia, second only to what it has invested in sub-Saharan Africa. However, there has been increasing dissatisfaction with the BRI among the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nation. From Indonesia to Malaysia to Thailand, government officials have often complained about China’s usage of debt-trap diplomacy and predatory lending.
Recently, Indonesian Prime Minister Prabowo Subianto visited China and met Xi Jinping. It was his first overseas trip, right after he was elected as President this year in March, and he made his first state visit to China after officially taking office. As mentioned in the official statement from China’s side, this reflects the great importance President Prabowo Subianto attaches to developing China-Indonesia relations, and demonstrated the high level and strategic nature of bilateral relations. The Chinese side also mentioned how the two sides need to keep high quality Belt and Road cooperation. It added that Indonesia is ready to work with China to continue high-quality Belt and Road cooperation to improve what is known as the five pillars of cooperation between Indonesia and China. The five pillars include strengthening all round cooperation through industrial chains in infrastructure, energy and mining, medicine, agriculture, housing, joint maritime development, food security and poverty reduction.
The Indonesian side’s statement also mentions the BRI, and stated that the two sides will promote high quality Belt and Road cooperation, and that Indonesia applauds the achievements of the Indonesia-China Belt and Road cooperation. The statement adds that both the sides continued to promote mutually beneficial cooperation between the BRI and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). There are several glaring differences between the official statements of the two sides, which reflects what each side holds as priority for itself. For example, the Indonesian side mentions “mutually beneficial” thrice in the statement, while China mentions it twice. Indonesia mentions it in the context of not just overall development of the bilateral relationship but also in the context of synergies between the BRI and the AOIP and in the context of mineral cooperation. In the past, Indonesia has had a concern around environmental degradation from large infrastructure projects. The Chinese side mentions “mutually beneficial” once, in the context of the overall relationship of the bilateral relationship, and once in the context of the South China Sea.
The bigger and possibly the biggest controversy in recent history of the bilateral has been the statement on maritime cooperation, issued by the joint statement released by the Chinese side. The Chinese side’s version of the joint statement reads, the two sides reached important common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims and agreed to establish an Inter-Governmental Joint Steering Committee to explore and advance relevant cooperation based on principles of ‘mutual respect, equality, mutual benefit, flexibility, pragmatism, and consensus building’, pursuant to their respective prevailing laws and regulations”. The statement gives the impression that Indonesia now recognises China’s nine dash line, a claim that Jakarta has long refused to acknowledge. Both sides are signatories of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and Indonesia has a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), a small portion of which overlaps with China’s nine-dash line. Nevertheless, Indonesia has consistently refused to recognise the nine-dash line and has declined to engage in negotiations with China.
A week before the joint statement was released, Indonesia had expelled a Chinese coast guard ship that had entered its EEZ. This is not the first time this has happened, as Chinese fishing vessels and coast guard ships frequently intrude into Indonesian EEZ. Some fishing vessels have been detailed and coast guard ships have previously also been expelled.
On November 9, the same day that China released the joint statement in English, the Indonesian ministry of foreign affairs issued a document in Bahasa Indonesia on the statement. It stated that the two sides have agreed to establish maritime cooperation to support peace in the South China Sea and the focus is on economies, especially in fisheries. However, the cooperation will be carried out by the laws and regulations of each country, and that for Indonesia, its implementation must follow rules related to territory, international maritime law as well as regulations, without changing existing international obligations. It added that this cooperation does not mean that Indonesia recognises China’s nine-dash line claim which is considered to have no basis in international law and is contrary to the 1982 UNCLOS, and that Indonesia continues to maintain its sovereignty and sovereign rights in the North Natuna Sea.
While the discrepancies in the joint statements have caused much controversy, it is important to understand that this is nothing new for China. China’s economic outreach is never economic alone and has strategic implications. With Western countries led by the United States and European Union, have slapped up to 100% tariffs on some Chinese goods for malicious trade practices, China needs to recalibrate its export markets and will have to explore alternative markets. ASEAN fits the bill since China has already invested $166 billion there. Second, the pattern in China’s lure of economic benefits and then eventually a claim on sovereignty needs to be recognised. Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port’s lease to China for 99 years is a case in point. There is a similar case from India as well. At the heights of the Galwan crisis, in 2020, when India was desperately trying to restore status quo at the borders which the People’s Liberation Army infiltrated illegally, China in complete disregard of the Indian side’s concerns demanded India to focus on the betterment of economic ties. China’s economics is always strategically motivated and eventually aims at capture of other countries’ territories. The sooner like-minded countries compare notes and find patterns in Chinese behaviour, the easier it will become to push back against China’s sugar-coated economic lure which only aims to improve China’s polity and economy at the cost of partner countries’ sovereign and economic rights.
This article is authored by Sriparna Pathak, associate professor, Chinese Studies and International Relations, Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat.
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