Space formally enters wars

This article is authored by Lt Gen PJS Pannu (Retd), former deputy chief, IDS and author of Taramandal Sangram.

On September 15, 2026, as I happened to step into the Space Defence and Security Summit, Paris, as part of the World Space Business Week, the statement of US air force secretary Troy Meink was already in public debate where he had declared a day earlier that the US Space Force has “on-orbit space control weapons” capable of defending the Joint Force against hostile action. A day later, Space Force Chief Gen Douglas Schiess reinforced the disclosure. Neither official publicly identified the weapons or their technical characteristics. What has changed, therefore, is not that America suddenly acquired space weapons, but that Washington has now acknowledged that weapons capable of conducting space-control missions are already on orbit.

Space (Unsplash)

On the same day, at a discussion at the Space Defence and Security Summit, Paris, I met Richard L. Palmer, Director, Capability & Resource Integration, Directorate of US Space Command. He admitted that US has weapons in space and would deter any country that undermines US space and national security. Following this on September 23, the UK Chief of Air Staff Harv Symth proclaimed “No one wants a war in space; we are positioned to deter this”

For decades, nations insisted that space was being used for peaceful purposes even as satellites became indispensable to military power. That ambiguity has now become harder to sustain. This is a significant moment—not because space suddenly became militarised, but because a major power has openly acknowledged an operational weapon capability in orbit. Space warfare should not be imagined simply as missiles flying between satellites. It encompasses several forms of attack.

Non-kinetic attacks may be even more important. Electronic warfare can jam or spoof satellite navigation and communications. Cyber operations can attack satellite command-and-control networks and ground stations. High-powered lasers can temporarily dazzle or permanently damage satellite sensors. Satellites themselves can conduct close approaches, inspection and potentially hostile manoeuvres. These capabilities are often harder to attribute than a missile launch.

The US Space Force's 2025 Space Warfighting framework explicitly categorises counterspace operations into orbital warfare, electromagnetic warfare and cyberspace warfare, including orbital and terrestrial strikes, space-link interdiction and active and passive defence.

The US is not alone. China has developed a sophisticated space architecture supporting intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, navigation and precision strike. US assessments identify Chinese direct-ascent ASAT capabilities, sophisticated satellite manoeuvring and technologies that could potentially be used for counterspace operations.

Russia retains significant expertise in military satellites, electronic warfare, lasers and orbital manoeuvring. Russian satellites have conducted close approaches to other spacecraft, while Moscow has also demonstrated anti-satellite capabilities. The distinction between a satellite designed to inspect another spacecraft and one capable of attacking it can, therefore, become strategically ambiguous.

Pakistan's space capability is considerably smaller and is centred largely on communications, remote sensing and the SUPARCO ecosystem. Its strategic importance, however, should not be measured only by the number of satellites it owns. Pakistan can potentially obtain space-enabled military effects through cooperation, commercial imagery, foreign launch services and partnerships with China. For India, therefore, the relevant question is not simply how many Pakistani satellites exist, but how effectively can Pakistan integrate space support with its military operations?

The answer to space weapons cannot be to put every satellite inside an armour-plated shell. Satellites are inherently vulnerable. The first defence is proliferation: Instead of relying on a few exquisite satellites, build distributed constellations. If one satellite is attacked, others continue the mission.

The second is redundancy—multiple communications paths, alternative navigation systems, terrestrial networks and airborne systems. The third is manoeuvrability and deception: Satellites should possess sufficient propulsion and operational flexibility to evade threats where possible. The fourth is cyber and electromagnetic protection—encrypted command links, authentication, frequency agility, anti-jamming techniques and resilient ground infrastructure.

Finally, nations require continuous space situational awareness (SSA) and military needs Space Domain Awareness (SDA). Knowing where every relevant object is—and understanding its behaviour—is becoming as important as knowing the location of aircraft and ships. India's ISRO already maintains a substantial SSA programme, including conjunction assessment and monitoring of space debris.

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty remains the foundation of space law. Article IV prohibits placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit, but it does not constitute a blanket prohibition on every conventional weapon in space. It also prohibits military bases and weapons testing on the Moon and other celestial bodies. Articles VI and VII establish state responsibility and liability for national space activities and damage.

This legal gap is increasingly important. The world has rules against certain categories of weapons, but not a comprehensive treaty banning all counterspace weapons. The result is a dangerous grey zone in which states can develop capabilities while arguing that they remain consistent with existing law. The challenge is, therefore, not merely to “demilitarise” space. Satellites already perform essential military functions. The more realistic objective should be to prevent warfare from destroying the space environment on which all nations depend.

India needs a doctrine built around one principle: Space security through resilience, deterrence and responsible behaviour.

India's 2023 Space Policy provides the framework for expanding national space capabilities, while the Defence Space Agency has already conducted exercises such as Antariksha Abhyas to examine military space contingencies. The government has also indicated that a Joint Military Space Doctrine is being developed as part of India's wider move towards multi-domain operations.

India should now build five pillars. First, Space Domain Awareness: develop a world-class national surveillance network covering LEO, MEO and GEO. Second, resilient constellations: Combine government, military and commercial satellites so that no single attack can blind or silence the nation. Third, credible counterspace deterrence: India should retain the technological ability to respond to hostile interference while maintaining a declared policy of responsible use and avoiding unnecessary debris-producing attacks. Fourth, space-cyber integration: Every military space doctrine must treat satellites, ground stations, data links, AI systems and cyber networks as one interconnected combat ecosystem. Fifth, a national space command architecture: Military space operations require unified command, trained personnel, rapid decision-making and close integration with the Army, Navy, Air Force, ISRO, industry and intelligence agencies.

The Ukraine war has demonstrated the extraordinary value of commercial satellite communications and imagery. Future conflicts will go further. A commander may depend on satellites for navigation, targeting, missile warning, communications, surveillance, weather and battle-damage assessment—all within seconds.

The next war may begin not with a missile crossing a border, but with a satellite link disappearing, a navigation signal being spoofed, an optical sensor being blinded or a cyberattack entering through a ground station.

The great strategic paradox is that every nation wants military advantage in space, while every nation also depends upon space remaining usable. The task before the international community—and particularly emerging space powers such as India—is to prepare for conflict without making conflict in space inevitable.

The future of warfare will not be war on Earth versus war in space. It will be one integrated multi-domain war in which events in space, cyber-space, the electromagnetic spectrum, air, land and sea continuously influence one another.

The nations that understand this convergence earliest will possess not merely better satellites, but a fundamentally different way of fighting.

(The views expressed are personal)

This article is authored by Lt Gen PJS Pannu (Retd), former deputy chief, IDS and author of Taramandal Sangram.