The US-India “friendship” seems to have descended into a theatre of the absurd. Less than a month after signing the Graham Act, which threatens India (among other countries) with a 100% tariff for buying Russian oil, President Donald Trump has struck a deal to buy Russian diesel for the US. What must India do in such a context?
The temptation in New Delhi is to read this as hostility and wait for it to pass. The truth is less flattering. US secretary of State Marco Rubio says American tariff and immigration policies are not directed at India but apply globally. Rubio’s global application claim is not strictly accurate. From August 2025 to February 2026, India paid 50% tariff on its exports to the US, half of it a penalty for Russian oil, and more than most other countries paid. After an interim agreement on February 6, this was reduced to 18%, and India also agreed to stop buying Russian oil. But seven months later, negotiations over a trade deal have “plateaued”, and the Graham Act sanctions hang over New Delhi’s head. Perhaps we should take him at his word. The implication, however, is hardly reassuring: India is simply not being given the consideration it believes its strategic partnership deserves.
Days ago, the US blocked major Indian IT firms from new green-card sponsorship. US Vice President JD Vance even likened Indian workers to “foreign indentured servants”, a phrase that recalls the 19th- century plantation economy. India’s ministry of external affairs called it “unwarranted” and “deeply offensive”, which it was. Along with the anti-immigrant sentiment, anti-Indian sentiment has been rising in the US.
{{/usCountry}}Days ago, the US blocked major Indian IT firms from new green-card sponsorship. US Vice President JD Vance even likened Indian workers to “foreign indentured servants”, a phrase that recalls the 19th- century plantation economy. India’s ministry of external affairs called it “unwarranted” and “deeply offensive”, which it was. Along with the anti-immigrant sentiment, anti-Indian sentiment has been rising in the US.
{{/usCountry}}US policy involving India’s neighbourhood, especially Pakistan, is equally galling. After repeatedly claiming to have brokered the May 2025 ceasefire, on June 17, Trump called Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi, who was in Canada for the G7, and pressed him to stop in Washington for a lunch he was hosting for Pakistan’s army chief Asim Munir. Modi refused. Washington appeared oblivious to the political sensitivities involved in asking India’s elected PM to join a lunch with Pakistan’s army chief.
Meanwhile, Washington and Beijing have built what they call a “constructive relationship of strategic stability”, which looks increasingly like a G-2. The logic that made India a useful counterweight to China for the US is fading. Furthermore, Quad has not met at summit level in 2025 or 2026, and this American-led grouping is clearly faltering.
New Delhi’s response has been “strategic patience”. Modi has met Trump face-to-face just once in the past 16 months, at the G7 in June. External affairs minister S Jaishankar has described the US as an “insensitive partner” on the issue of terrorism and pursuing self-centred trade strategies. The most recent Trump-Modi phone conversation was, in Modi’s words, “productive” — lacking the “good friends” framing of the past.
The time has come for New Delhi to show by actions rather than mere words that India matters. India’s options are limited because the dependence runs mostly one way. The US is India’s largest export market and a key source of technology, capital and remittances, so open retaliation costs Delhi more than Washington. The Indian imperative has been not to seek a break with Washington, but to signal its unhappiness. New Delhi chose to signal its displeasure with the 50% tariffs last year by invoking the strongest pillar of the relationship — defence — when defence minister Rajnath Singh’s visit to Washington in August 2025 was postponed. The minister was scheduled to renew a key defence pact with the US, which eventually happened in October, in Kuala Lumpur. Taking a cue from this, the message will have to be carefully calibrated so as not to provoke a response that could hurt India, yet loud enough to be heard in tone-deaf Washington. Options range from tariffing farm exports such as almonds and apples from the US to going slow on Boeing acquisitions, defence, and LNG purchases. India should also enhance regulatory action on US tech giants.
On defence, India can slow the pipeline on additional P-8Is and Javelin co-production, and MQ-9B drone purchase, and also cut back some of its joint exercises with the US. Some of this can and should be done without any announcement. It must hedge by continuing Russian oil purchases and enhancing ties with Japan, Australia, the EU and the Gulf States to balance against the US-China relationship. India may have to pay a price if it does all this, but the alternative has a price too.
Every slight absorbed without consequence is a data point for the next decision in Washington. A country that is considered only when it is useful should make itself too costly to overlook.
Manoj Joshi is a distinguished fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. The views expressed are personal
(This piece is part of the HT debate series. The title of this debate is “What should India do about a difficult U.S.?” The opposing side of the debate can be accessed here)