Hutong Cat | What's in a name? Geopolitical power
China's bid to rename cities in territories that aren't its own is an exercise in generating 'anxiety'
In July 2017, Indonesia made a diplomatic move that could have made China proud in some part of the multiverse: Jakarta renamed part of the South China Sea (SCS) — within the Indonesian exclusive economic zone but claimed by Beijing — as the North Natuna Sea.
The renamed maritime area is located north of the Natuna Islands at the southern end of the SCS but within China's “nine dash line”.
The "nine dash line" is an internationally contested demarcation, which Beijing brandishes to lay sweeping claims to almost the entire resource-rich SCS: According to estimates, more than 80% of it.
China’s response to Jakarta's move was terse.
“The so-called change of name makes no sense at all and is not conducive to the effort to the international standardisation of the name of places,” Geng Shuang, then Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, responded in Beijing, indicating that the change could impact “the current hard-won sound situation in the SCS”.
It “…makes no sense at all..” Really?
Three months earlier, a fuming China had renamed several places in Arunachal Pradesh (AP) — which Beijing claims is South Tibet or “Zangnan” in Chinese — on its map, a day after Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, concluded his visit to the northeastern Indian state.
The announcement was made on April 13, 2017, following a nine-day high-profile visit to AP by the Dalai Lama.
Since then, Beijing has done the same twice more in the Indian state: Once in December 2021, and most recently, earlier this month.
The 2017 announcement included six Arunachal locations while the second batch in 2021 comprised 15 locations.
This time, China’s ministry of civil affairs released the changed names as well as precise geographical coordinates of the 11 places in early April.
It included two residential areas, five mountain peaks, and two rivers in AP and also listed the administrative districts, the state-run tabloid Global Times reported on April 3.
“Looking at the list of 11 places, most of them are unknown or remote areas. Three are close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) — namely Pangchen, a village in the Zimithang Circle which has a historical background during the 1962 border war with China; then Chakmutse Gangri, near Taksing in Upper Subansiri and finally Goyul Thang, a tiny flat ground near Kaho on the river Lohit,” Claude Arpi, India-based Tibet expert wrote on his blog which he also shared with HT.
“Except for Pangchen village, these places are small and unknown even to most Arunachalis,” Arpi wrote.
A chart in Chinese characters, Tibetan and Pinyin transliteration of the 11 new names was released “in accordance with regulations on geographical names issued by the State Council”, China's cabinet of ministries.
"This is not the first time China has made such an attempt. We reject this outright," Arindam Bagchi, external affairs ministry spokesperson said in New Delhi.
“AP is an integral, inalienable part of India. And attempts to assign invented names will not alter this reality,” he added.
What prompted China to rename places in AP this time? At least two immediate reasons seem likely besides Beijing’s continuous attempts to assert sovereignty in disputed areas.
One, the announcement was made days before home minister Amit Shah visited the state to inaugurate the “Vibrant Villages Programme” (VVP).
The VVP, with a financial allocation of ₹4,800 crore from 2022-23 to 2025-26 will provide funds for “…development of essential infrastructure and creation of livelihood opportunities in 19 Districts and 46 Border blocks (in) 4 states and 1 UT (union territory) along the northern land border of the country,” the Press Information Bureau (PIB) had then said in a statement.
In the first phase, 663 villages were part of the programme.
China’s decision seemed to be directly linked to the VVP, an effort by New Delhi to match Beijing’s rapid development of its villages under the “Xiaokang” (moderately prosperous) scheme to modernise villages along the border.
The second reason could be that it was Beijing’s angry response to Washington recognising the McMahon Line as the international boundary between India and China — a demarcation that Beijing has never acknowledged — and also putting it on record that AP is an integral part of India in March.
“This bipartisan resolution expresses the (US) Senate’s support for unequivocally recognising the state of Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part of India, condemning China’s military aggression to change the status quo along the Line of Actual Control, and further enhancing the US-India strategic partnership and the Quad in support of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” Senator Bill Hagerty who along with Senator Jeff Merkley introduced the resolution in the Senate said in March.
The name changes were “a timely countermeasure against US’s recognition of the McMahon Line as the international boundary between China and India, as well as a major action to undermine India's illegal territorial claims over the ‘South Tibet’,” Nian Peng, director of Haikou-based Research Centre for Asian Studies (RCAS), said.
“It could consolidate national sovereignty and enhance the administrative jurisdiction of the disputed territories controlled by China. It could also strengthen the PLA's (China's People's Liberation Army) military deployment along the Line of Actual Control,” Nian said.
Renaming places in another country as a “countermeasure” against a third country or assuming that renaming places in a contested region could “consolidate national sovereignty” may seem meaningless.
Why then does China do it at all whether in Arunachal, or the SCS, or even in Russia, where it recently standardised names of eight cities in Chinese including the name of Vladivostok?
Bill Hayton, associate fellow at the Chatham House Asia-Pacific programme and author of books on China and Vietnam, said the practice of renaming places in disputed areas is an effort to “inculcate a sense of anxiety about the perceived loss of territory”.
“This dates back at least to the 1920s. Much of these claims are specious and demonstrate some misunderstandings of East Asian history. These misunderstandings have left a dangerous legacy in the modern era,” Hayton said.
Now, China tries to assert territorial claims in whatever way they can, Hayton said adding: “Renaming disputed features or naming unnamed features in disputed areas has become common in the SCS.”
China claims nearly the entire SCS but is locked in a dispute over the ownership of islands and reefs with several maritime neighbours including the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia besides Vietnam and Taiwan (which Beijing says is a breakaway region.)
In 2020, for example, China gave names to 80 geographical features in the disputed SCS including features in the Paracel and Spratly islands; these include 25 islands, shoals and reefs and 55 oceanic mountains and ridges.
The last such exercise was carried out in 1983, when China named 287 features in the area.
“It seems to be a way that Chinese officials can appear to be doing something to support China’s territorial claims. In reality, it’s a meaningless gesture but it makes them feel good,” Hayton said.
Meanwhile, life goes on as usual in Indonesia’s North Natuna Sea.
In January this year, Jakarta deployed a warship, maritime patrol aircraft and drone to monitor a Chinese coast guard vessel in the region, Laksamana Madya Muhammad Ali, Indonesian navy chief, told Reuters.
Not just any coast guard vessel but the CCG 5901, the world’s largest coast guard vessel, dubbed, according to reports, “the monster”.
The renaming was a bit pointless, Jakarta must have realised.
Sutirtho Patranobis, HT’s experienced China hand, writes a weekly column from Beijing, exclusively for HT Premium readers. He was previously posted in Colombo, Sri Lanka, where he covered the final phase of the civil war and its aftermath, and was based in Delhi for several years before that
The views expressed are personal
In July 2017, Indonesia made a diplomatic move that could have made China proud in some part of the multiverse: Jakarta renamed part of the South China Sea (SCS) — within the Indonesian exclusive economic zone but claimed by Beijing — as the North Natuna Sea.
The renamed maritime area is located north of the Natuna Islands at the southern end of the SCS but within China's “nine dash line”.
The "nine dash line" is an internationally contested demarcation, which Beijing brandishes to lay sweeping claims to almost the entire resource-rich SCS: According to estimates, more than 80% of it.
China’s response to Jakarta's move was terse.
“The so-called change of name makes no sense at all and is not conducive to the effort to the international standardisation of the name of places,” Geng Shuang, then Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, responded in Beijing, indicating that the change could impact “the current hard-won sound situation in the SCS”.
It “…makes no sense at all..” Really?
{{/usCountry}}It “…makes no sense at all..” Really?
{{/usCountry}}Three months earlier, a fuming China had renamed several places in Arunachal Pradesh (AP) — which Beijing claims is South Tibet or “Zangnan” in Chinese — on its map, a day after Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, concluded his visit to the northeastern Indian state.
{{/usCountry}}Three months earlier, a fuming China had renamed several places in Arunachal Pradesh (AP) — which Beijing claims is South Tibet or “Zangnan” in Chinese — on its map, a day after Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, concluded his visit to the northeastern Indian state.
{{/usCountry}}The announcement was made on April 13, 2017, following a nine-day high-profile visit to AP by the Dalai Lama.
{{/usCountry}}The announcement was made on April 13, 2017, following a nine-day high-profile visit to AP by the Dalai Lama.
{{/usCountry}}Since then, Beijing has done the same twice more in the Indian state: Once in December 2021, and most recently, earlier this month.
{{/usCountry}}Since then, Beijing has done the same twice more in the Indian state: Once in December 2021, and most recently, earlier this month.
{{/usCountry}}The 2017 announcement included six Arunachal locations while the second batch in 2021 comprised 15 locations.
{{/usCountry}}The 2017 announcement included six Arunachal locations while the second batch in 2021 comprised 15 locations.
{{/usCountry}}This time, China’s ministry of civil affairs released the changed names as well as precise geographical coordinates of the 11 places in early April.
{{/usCountry}}This time, China’s ministry of civil affairs released the changed names as well as precise geographical coordinates of the 11 places in early April.
{{/usCountry}}It included two residential areas, five mountain peaks, and two rivers in AP and also listed the administrative districts, the state-run tabloid Global Times reported on April 3.
“Looking at the list of 11 places, most of them are unknown or remote areas. Three are close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) — namely Pangchen, a village in the Zimithang Circle which has a historical background during the 1962 border war with China; then Chakmutse Gangri, near Taksing in Upper Subansiri and finally Goyul Thang, a tiny flat ground near Kaho on the river Lohit,” Claude Arpi, India-based Tibet expert wrote on his blog which he also shared with HT.
“Except for Pangchen village, these places are small and unknown even to most Arunachalis,” Arpi wrote.
A chart in Chinese characters, Tibetan and Pinyin transliteration of the 11 new names was released “in accordance with regulations on geographical names issued by the State Council”, China's cabinet of ministries.
"This is not the first time China has made such an attempt. We reject this outright," Arindam Bagchi, external affairs ministry spokesperson said in New Delhi.
“AP is an integral, inalienable part of India. And attempts to assign invented names will not alter this reality,” he added.
What prompted China to rename places in AP this time? At least two immediate reasons seem likely besides Beijing’s continuous attempts to assert sovereignty in disputed areas.
One, the announcement was made days before home minister Amit Shah visited the state to inaugurate the “Vibrant Villages Programme” (VVP).
The VVP, with a financial allocation of ₹4,800 crore from 2022-23 to 2025-26 will provide funds for “…development of essential infrastructure and creation of livelihood opportunities in 19 Districts and 46 Border blocks (in) 4 states and 1 UT (union territory) along the northern land border of the country,” the Press Information Bureau (PIB) had then said in a statement.
In the first phase, 663 villages were part of the programme.
China’s decision seemed to be directly linked to the VVP, an effort by New Delhi to match Beijing’s rapid development of its villages under the “Xiaokang” (moderately prosperous) scheme to modernise villages along the border.
The second reason could be that it was Beijing’s angry response to Washington recognising the McMahon Line as the international boundary between India and China — a demarcation that Beijing has never acknowledged — and also putting it on record that AP is an integral part of India in March.
“This bipartisan resolution expresses the (US) Senate’s support for unequivocally recognising the state of Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part of India, condemning China’s military aggression to change the status quo along the Line of Actual Control, and further enhancing the US-India strategic partnership and the Quad in support of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” Senator Bill Hagerty who along with Senator Jeff Merkley introduced the resolution in the Senate said in March.
The name changes were “a timely countermeasure against US’s recognition of the McMahon Line as the international boundary between China and India, as well as a major action to undermine India's illegal territorial claims over the ‘South Tibet’,” Nian Peng, director of Haikou-based Research Centre for Asian Studies (RCAS), said.
“It could consolidate national sovereignty and enhance the administrative jurisdiction of the disputed territories controlled by China. It could also strengthen the PLA's (China's People's Liberation Army) military deployment along the Line of Actual Control,” Nian said.
Renaming places in another country as a “countermeasure” against a third country or assuming that renaming places in a contested region could “consolidate national sovereignty” may seem meaningless.
Why then does China do it at all whether in Arunachal, or the SCS, or even in Russia, where it recently standardised names of eight cities in Chinese including the name of Vladivostok?
Bill Hayton, associate fellow at the Chatham House Asia-Pacific programme and author of books on China and Vietnam, said the practice of renaming places in disputed areas is an effort to “inculcate a sense of anxiety about the perceived loss of territory”.
“This dates back at least to the 1920s. Much of these claims are specious and demonstrate some misunderstandings of East Asian history. These misunderstandings have left a dangerous legacy in the modern era,” Hayton said.
Now, China tries to assert territorial claims in whatever way they can, Hayton said adding: “Renaming disputed features or naming unnamed features in disputed areas has become common in the SCS.”
China claims nearly the entire SCS but is locked in a dispute over the ownership of islands and reefs with several maritime neighbours including the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia besides Vietnam and Taiwan (which Beijing says is a breakaway region.)
In 2020, for example, China gave names to 80 geographical features in the disputed SCS including features in the Paracel and Spratly islands; these include 25 islands, shoals and reefs and 55 oceanic mountains and ridges.
The last such exercise was carried out in 1983, when China named 287 features in the area.
“It seems to be a way that Chinese officials can appear to be doing something to support China’s territorial claims. In reality, it’s a meaningless gesture but it makes them feel good,” Hayton said.
Meanwhile, life goes on as usual in Indonesia’s North Natuna Sea.
In January this year, Jakarta deployed a warship, maritime patrol aircraft and drone to monitor a Chinese coast guard vessel in the region, Laksamana Madya Muhammad Ali, Indonesian navy chief, told Reuters.
Not just any coast guard vessel but the CCG 5901, the world’s largest coast guard vessel, dubbed, according to reports, “the monster”.
The renaming was a bit pointless, Jakarta must have realised.
Sutirtho Patranobis, HT’s experienced China hand, writes a weekly column from Beijing, exclusively for HT Premium readers. He was previously posted in Colombo, Sri Lanka, where he covered the final phase of the civil war and its aftermath, and was based in Delhi for several years before that
The views expressed are personal
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