Space has been an active military domain since the Cold War. Today more than 70 countries operate satellites and there is increasing developing capabilities having both civil and military applications. The two nuclear armed States, India and Pakistan are part of this global expansion. Their space programmes are increasingly investing in space related capabilities moving beyond a regional competition. And due to presence of external actors like China and the US, a South Asia focused space governance would have limited impact on the region.
Operation Sindoor in May 2025 exposed important limitations in India's space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) architecture. During the operation, India was using older Cartosat satellites alongside commercial imagery from Maxar Technologies to support targeting which was a resource taking process. The absence of sufficient real-time satellite imagery meant that targets had to be verified through secondary intelligence channels which was slowing the decision-making process, thus highlighting gaps in India's ability to support military operations with continuous, real-time space based surveillance.
The operational lessons from Operation Sindoor reinforced India's efforts to strengthen its military space architecture. In September 2025, defence minister Rajnath Singh released India's first Joint Military Space Doctrine in Kolkata, declaring space as a warfighting domain after land, sea, air and cyberspace. The doctrine marked a shift in the role of satellites from supporting assets to strategic military capabilities and focused on four operational priorities:
Stronger ISR on Indian borders and the Indian Ocean Region
{{/usCountry}}Stronger ISR on Indian borders and the Indian Ocean Region
{{/usCountry}}Secure and jam-resistant military communications
Space domain awareness to monitor satellites and orbital debris
The development of both defensive and offensive counterspace capabilities.
The Space Based Surveillance (SBS) satellite network are to be equipped with Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), hyperspectral imaging and advanced electro-optical sensors deployed across Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and Geostationary Orbit (GEO) that is a multi-layer architecture designed to eliminate any space tech issues. Out of these 52 satellites, ISRO will build 21 of the satellites and the remaining 31 to be contracted to private companies including Tata Advanced Systems and Ananth Technologies in a push toward an Indian made commercially diversified space-industry.
The constellation will operate across low, medium, and geostationary orbits, meaning delays in even part of the programme could affect overall coverage and performance. As a result, the success of SBS-3 will depend not only on its technological aspect but also on whether India's private space industry can deliver such a complex project within the required timelines
Managing this alongside ISRO's existing civilian and commercial launch queue is a logistics task. India's defence record suggests that the programmes of this scale typically face delays of one to three years beyond projected timelines and cost increment is common. The scheduling, technological readiness of the privately built satellites, and the integration of the completed constellation into a joint operational framework will be a complex and time-consuming process. These challenges will need to be focused before India can achieve full operational capability. While India's priority is to expand and integrate a self-built military space architecture, Pakistan has accelerated its programme through sustained Chinese support. The two countries are addressing similar security concerns through very different approaches.
Pakistan's recent expansion in space has been closely tied to Chinese support. Between January 2025 and April 2026, SUPARCO (The Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission) launched six Earth-observation satellites; PAUSAT-1, PRSC-EO1, PRSC-S1, HS-1, PRSC-EO2 and PRSC-EO3 using Chinese launch vehicles, satellite platforms and Chinese technical assistance. The foundations of this acceleration were laid in 2022 through a multi-launch agreement between SUPARCO and the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC), the commercial body of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC).
PRSC-EO1, PRSC-EO2 and PRSC-EO3 provide electro-optical imaging, while HS-1 adds hyperspectral sensing capable of detecting differences in terrain and materials under camouflage. Operating in sun-synchronous orbits, the satellites provide regular coverage of key areas, including Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control, major Indian military installations and parts of the northern Indian Ocean. Pakistan describes these satellites as civilian Earth observation systems for agriculture, disaster management and environmental monitoring but their dual-use nature gives them a clear military edge by supporting surveillance, target identification and field assessment. Pakistan has also expanded its navigation capabilities through the launch of Pak-SBAS in February 2026 by improving positioning accuracy for both civilian and military usage. At the same time, SUPARCO's budget has increased from approximately PKR 6 billion in 2025-26 to a reported PKR 11-12 billion in 2026-27 which is a near-double indicating government focused support for its space programme.
This partnership has enabled Pakistan to expand its capabilities rapidly, but it also reflects that military space architecture continues to rely on Chinese infrastructure and support. During Operation Sindoor, Pakistani forces relied on Chinese satellite systems, including PRSS-1 and PRSC-EO1, for additional imagery and communications support. China's role extends beyond satellite access. Chinese launch services, BeiDou navigation, satellite technology, engineer training through the Chinese Academy of Space Technology (CAST) and bilateral cooperation continue dependency of Pakistan's space programme on China.
The India-Pakistan space competition is no longer shaped by the two countries alone. Commercial satellite companies and strategic partnerships are becoming increasingly important in shaping the future of the subcontinent. The growing use of commercial imagery raises new governance questions. There are no agreed rules on whether private companies should continue providing imagery to both sides during a conflict, how governments may influence access to such data, or how commercially supplied intelligence should be treated during a military crisis. To reduce this dependence, India has begun investing in domestic firms such as Pixxel, whereas Pakistan continues to rely largely on Chinese Infrastructure.
Alongside commercial actors, strategic partnerships are also reshaping the regional space landscape. India has expanded cooperation with the US and France through initiatives such as TRUST, the NASA-ISRO NISAR mission and the upcoming TRISHNA satellite project, strengthening its technological base and Earth observation capabilities. These partnerships show that military competition in space is no longer confined to India and Pakistan alone. External powers and commercial companies are becoming part of the region's space architecture, making future governance more complex than a purely bilateral issue.
India and Pakistan are expanding their military use of space at a fast speed which needs to be managed. Both countries increasingly depend on satellites for intelligence, surveillance, navigation and military communications, yet there are no bilateral rules and regulations. In nuclear deterrence theory, the stability of mutual assured destruction rests on both sides. In space, those red lines do not exist. There must be agreed understanding of what constitutes a hostile act against space assets.
This governance gap has become more concerning as external actors as well as commercial companies play a larger role in the region's space landscape raising the probability of future crisis involving multiple actors. Furthermore, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit, but offers little guidance on issues that increasingly shape military competition today, including dual-use satellites, commercial imagery and counterspace activities. Without a bilateral or international legal framework, supported by stronger international norms, the risk of misunderstanding and unintended escalation in space will continue to grow.
India's Joint Military Space Doctrine and Pakistan's recent expansion of its space programme show that both countries are making space an increasingly important part of their security strategies. This is part of a wider global shift towards the military use of space, but in South Asia it creates a distinct governance challenge.
Unlike the nuclear domain, there are no bilateral mechanisms to manage incidents in space, reduce the risk of escalation or establish a shared understanding of what constitutes a hostile act. Existing international law also provides only limited guidance on issues that are now shaping the military competition. The growing involvement of external powers and commercial satellite providers makes this challenge even more complex.
The issue is, therefore, not simply the expansion of military space capabilities, but the absence of rules to manage them. A dedicated framework for managing incidents involving military satellites, and mutual understanding of the issues such as electronic interference, close satellite approaches and the military use of commercial imagery, would help reduce the risk of misunderstanding during a crisis. Such steps would not resolve every challenge, but they would provide a starting point while international norms for global space continues to develop.
(The views expressed are personal)
This article is authored by Soumya Awasthi, fellow, Centre for Security Strategy and Technology & Naman Singh, intern, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.