A new trend has quietly emerged within Bangladesh’s Islamist politics in the aftermath of the 13th national parliamentary election. In a change, the Islamist parties, who have usually been active in defending traditional gender norms, are now expanding their female student wings and women’s factions. As per reports, the Islamic Movement of Bangladesh, a Right-wing Islamist political party, has completed its preparations to launch a separate female student wing to establish its organisational presence among women. The party had already established its 34-member women’s unit in March 2025. Similar developments can be observed with Khilafat Majlis, another Islamist political group, which is leveraging its pre-existing constitutional bodies, the Bangladesh Islamic Women's Council and Bangladesh Islamic Students' Council. This is being done to integrate women directly into its central executive council to project a more sophisticated, rights-oriented political apparatus that has previously organised street agitations over identity issues like the hijab protests. On the other hand, Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis (BKM) has launched a membership recruitment drive by starting the activities of its women's and students' division. In this regard, the party’s executive head, Maulana Mamunul Haque, has called for joining the women's division through a social post. This indicates how Islamist parties are trying to broaden their appeal to women and female students, who have long been relegated to the backseat in Islamist organisational politics.
The answer to this emerging trend lies at the intersection of several factors, the first being shifting demographic and developmental realities in the country. Women now constitute nearly half of the country's electorate, with over 62.8 million registered female voters whose growth rate outpaces that of men. Winning elections or expanding political influence has become increasingly difficult without mobilising female voters. The explosive growth of female enrolment in both secular universities and the country’s vast madrasa network, coupled with Bangladesh's high smartphone penetration of about 90% and cheap internet access, has produced a literate, digitally connected class of young women. By launching platforms like the female student wings of Islamic Movement or digital recruitment drives via online forms, as recently deployed by Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis, Islamist parties are co-opting this tech-savvy, educated female middle class.
Another major potential factor facilitating this new trend is a direct consequence of the visible effect pioneered by Bangladesh's Jamaat-e-Islami (the country's largest Islamist party), compounded by survivalist anxieties arising from inter-party rivalry. Jamaat-e-Islami has proved empirically, for decades, that a highly disciplined and multi-layered female cadre sustains organisational viability and electoral results in the country’s political ecosystem. Women constitute nearly 40% of Jamaat’s total workforce, with half a million female rukons (members) and approximately 400,000 activists, including doctors, teachers, and homemakers. Furthermore, Jamaat’s ability to translate this demographic mobilisation into tangible institutional power, as reflected in clinching eight nominated reserved seats for women in the 13th parliamentary elections or bagging a record high 68 seats in the same, serves as a catalyst for competitive mimicry. Given that the post-election landscape is fragmented with several Islamic parties competing for a finite pool of religiously conservative and ethnic voters, unorganised women voters and youth in particular become a major vulnerability for these Islamist parties. As a result of the political reality, Islamist parties are moving away from loosely connected local networks and toward more centralised, disciplined organisational frameworks. For example, Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis is resuscitating its paralysed Mahila Majlis into a centralised women’s wing after 20 years of inactivity. This move aims at enforcing central party discipline on independent grassroots networks and to prevent the party base from being poached by better-organised contenders. These would also provide the Islamist factions a tool with which they can survive, as evident during the Sheikh Hasina regime. As lawsuits and detention of male leaders became a strategy of the state apparatus, the field presence, independent campus committees, and continuity of operation of the female cadre of Jamaat turned out to be significant for the party's survival. Consequently, the Islamist factions realise that not matching Jamaat's organisational template means conceding important field space and future parliamentary representation to their closest political rivals.
{{/usCountry}}Another major potential factor facilitating this new trend is a direct consequence of the visible effect pioneered by Bangladesh's Jamaat-e-Islami (the country's largest Islamist party), compounded by survivalist anxieties arising from inter-party rivalry. Jamaat-e-Islami has proved empirically, for decades, that a highly disciplined and multi-layered female cadre sustains organisational viability and electoral results in the country’s political ecosystem. Women constitute nearly 40% of Jamaat’s total workforce, with half a million female rukons (members) and approximately 400,000 activists, including doctors, teachers, and homemakers. Furthermore, Jamaat’s ability to translate this demographic mobilisation into tangible institutional power, as reflected in clinching eight nominated reserved seats for women in the 13th parliamentary elections or bagging a record high 68 seats in the same, serves as a catalyst for competitive mimicry. Given that the post-election landscape is fragmented with several Islamic parties competing for a finite pool of religiously conservative and ethnic voters, unorganised women voters and youth in particular become a major vulnerability for these Islamist parties. As a result of the political reality, Islamist parties are moving away from loosely connected local networks and toward more centralised, disciplined organisational frameworks. For example, Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis is resuscitating its paralysed Mahila Majlis into a centralised women’s wing after 20 years of inactivity. This move aims at enforcing central party discipline on independent grassroots networks and to prevent the party base from being poached by better-organised contenders. These would also provide the Islamist factions a tool with which they can survive, as evident during the Sheikh Hasina regime. As lawsuits and detention of male leaders became a strategy of the state apparatus, the field presence, independent campus committees, and continuity of operation of the female cadre of Jamaat turned out to be significant for the party's survival. Consequently, the Islamist factions realise that not matching Jamaat's organisational template means conceding important field space and future parliamentary representation to their closest political rivals.
{{/usCountry}}This calculated institutional expansion signals that Bangladesh’s Right-wing parties have upped the ante for spreading Islamist ideology to establish broader societal influence. This awakening that pushes leaders of these parties to suddenly mobilise women and female students is not so much a sudden ideological enlightenment towards the progressive side; it is all about electoral realism and structural survival. Bangladesh’s Islamist movements have learned a blunt lesson that they can no longer afford to keep women out of politics. Bangladesh is home to more than 50 Islamic political parties and factions, whereas only 13 Islamist political parties are registered with the Bangladesh Election Commission. As major Islamist organisations extend their outreach, smaller parties may also follow suit to strengthen their social and political base.
Recent socio-political developments in Bangladesh have already contributed to the growing visibility of religious radicalism, heightened intolerance, and the mainstreaming of hardline Islamist actors. As these party networks gain traction, Islamist ideas may find their way into university campuses and households, potentially reshaping the country's socio-political and religious landscape.
(The views expressed are personal)
This article is authored by Mohammed Shoaib Raza, doctoral candidate, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.