India faces a unique, and complex, China problem. Contemporary India’s most important relationship may be the one with the US, but the most consequential one is with China. Washington’s ability and willingness to support its strategic partnership with India during times of crisis will depend on the prevailing circumstances, but China is a strategic challenge to India no matter the circumstances.
If Washington and Delhi team up against Beijing in the region, China’s challenge to India will get sharper; but even if they don’t, the China challenge to India will get sharper, albeit slowly but steadily. If you balance China’s power militarily, it will respond with even greater military strength; if you don’t, it will still offset your power. In other words, no matter what, India’s China problem is here to stay. That being the case, India’s China strategy needs to be tailored to meet the long term.
The recent thaw in Sino-Indian relations is encouraging and useful, but it must be understood that India’s China challenge is a constant in Southern Asian geopolitics, regardless of this temporary respite. Consider this. The meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping at the 16th Brics summit in Kazan last October was widely seen as a significant icebreaker. There have also been some positive developments in the past month, including visits by defence minister Rajnath Singh and external affairs minister S Jaishankar to China, discussions on reviewing the Russia-India-China grouping, and China allowing Indian devotees to travel for the Manasarovar pilgrimage. And yet, China’s active and unprecedented level of military support to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor suggests that underlying tensions and strategic competition remain very much in place. In fact, the nature of Sino-Pakistan cooperation has shifted significantly, with a more pronounced and coordinated effort to jointly contain India in the region even if not articulated as such by either power.
However, given the current geopolitical context, it makes perfect sense for India to avoid worsening its relationship with China. For one, the only power that has been genuinely serious about balancing China’s growing influence and assertiveness and has the capability to do so — the US — is today displaying a worrying lack of seriousness in addressing that structural challenge. It may even strike a deal with China and agree to live with a G-2 throwing its allies and partners under the bus. Secondly, the fast-growing bonhomie between China and Russia must also bother us. If the China-Russia partnership continues to exploit the lack of US interest in the global balance of power, it won’t be long before its implications significantly impact the South Asian regional equilibrium. The Russian decision not to stand solidly by India during the April Indo-Pak standoff is not a function of Pakistan’s proximity to Russia, but it is a subset of China’s growing proximity with Russia. To be sure, if Russian and Chinese interests in South Asia align, India will have much to be concerned about. China will eventually pose a challenge to Russia in its backyard, but Moscow seems to consider that as a problem for later.
{{/usCountry}}However, given the current geopolitical context, it makes perfect sense for India to avoid worsening its relationship with China. For one, the only power that has been genuinely serious about balancing China’s growing influence and assertiveness and has the capability to do so — the US — is today displaying a worrying lack of seriousness in addressing that structural challenge. It may even strike a deal with China and agree to live with a G-2 throwing its allies and partners under the bus. Secondly, the fast-growing bonhomie between China and Russia must also bother us. If the China-Russia partnership continues to exploit the lack of US interest in the global balance of power, it won’t be long before its implications significantly impact the South Asian regional equilibrium. The Russian decision not to stand solidly by India during the April Indo-Pak standoff is not a function of Pakistan’s proximity to Russia, but it is a subset of China’s growing proximity with Russia. To be sure, if Russian and Chinese interests in South Asia align, India will have much to be concerned about. China will eventually pose a challenge to Russia in its backyard, but Moscow seems to consider that as a problem for later.
{{/usCountry}}Whichever way you look at it, it is in Delhi’s interest not to allow the bilateral relationship to slide into an active conflict. Amid the Trump-induced global geopolitical unpredictability, maintaining a stable relationship with Beijing will provide Delhi with a degree of predictability, which is essential for navigating the numerous fault lines in regional and global geopolitics. In an environment marked by unpredictability and unilateral tariffs from Trump’s America, it makes strategic sense for India to ensure calm on its borders with China and to maintain uninterrupted trade relations with it because when in doubt, States must hedge. A relatively stable relationship with China (and the return of the RIC) is also crucial for India to prevent the China-Pakistan axis from actively undercutting Moscow’s closeness to Delhi. Finally, it is also in India’s interest to ensure a constructive working relationship with China in the various multilateral forums both sides participate in. Even if none of India’s minilaterals with Russia and China deliver anything useful, India must continue to engage them, for geopolitical loneliness can be more costly than the boredom of tiresome summitry.
And yet, such a temporary relief from an active conflict with China should in no way be mistaken for a stable or lasting détente with Beijing which is a structural impossibility for a variety of reasons. Among other things, four key factors will continue to keep tensions active between China and India: One, the growing power differential between Beijing and Delhi and its impact on China’s attitude towards India; two, the deepening military and geopolitical collusion between China and Pakistan; three, the risk of flare-ups over the Dalai Lama succession issue in the coming months and years, and; four, China’s efforts to shift the balance of power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region against Delhi.
What India can realistically expect from China is, at worst, a lack of active conflict and, at best, a managed rivalry. Permanent peace is an illusion, unless there are fundamental changes in China’s approach to India. But the absence of lasting peace shouldn’t become an obstacle to pursuing temporary reliefs.
Happymon Jacob is the founder and director of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research and the editor of INDIA’S WORLD magazine. The views expressed are personal.