India needn’t worry about the US-Pak relationship
Pakistan may have at one time been America’s “most allied ally”. But its two-faced policy on terrorism and betrayal in Afghanistan left a deeper impression on the American psyche than Pakistanis, and possibly even Indians, realise
The recent flurry in the United States (US’s) diplomatic engagement with Pakistan is not the “reset” in the troubled relationship that Pakistanis are hoping for. The two countries are witnessing a diplomatic re-engagement after months of American neglect of Pakistan. But the US view of Pakistan as the frenemy that caused the American defeat in Afghanistan has not changed. Nor has the perception that, when the chips are down, Pakistan will stand on China’s side rather than that of the US.
Pakistan may have at one time been America’s “most allied ally”. But its two-faced policy on terrorism and betrayal in Afghanistan left a deeper impression on the American psyche than Pakistanis, and possibly even Indians, realise. Moreover, the Cold War, during which Pakistan was a US partner, is long over and the rise of China has led to a much stronger India-US partnership. India, which is seen by Pakistanis as its “permanent enemy”, is now America’s partner of choice not only in South Asia, but also the Indo-Pacific. It will take much more than a few high-level visits by Pakistani civil and military officials to restore American trust in Pakistan, which remains strategically aligned with Washington’s new peer competitor, Beijing.
The recent diplomatic engagements between the US and Pakistan are part of an American attempt to re-engage with a nuclear-armed country that does not always fulfil western expectations, but is not openly hostile either.
A high-profile meeting between secretary of state Antony Blinken and foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the announcement of a $450-million sale for the maintenance of Pakistan’s F-16 fleet, and the first official visit of a Pakistani army chief to the Pentagon in seven years created the illusion of a return to old patterns of cordiality.
But there is no sign that the US is considering directing large amounts of economic or military aid towards Pakistan. Despite the recent cataclysmic floods, American relief aid to Pakistan is under $100 million. By way of comparison, the last time Pakistan was hit by devastating floods, in 2010, the US provided over $500 million in assistance.
India raised strong objections to the recent American decision to approve $450 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) for the maintenance of Pakistan’s F-16 fighter jets. Compared to the $20 billion in defence trade between India and the US, this amount is minuscule. It is standard American policy to ensure that any defence equipment sold to another country is provided with a “life cycle maintenance and sustainment package”. In any case, Pakistan will have to pay for the maintenance of its fighter jets with its funds, unlike in the past, when the US armed Pakistan under its concessional Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programme, involving US funding. That will be a burden on Pakistan, given its continuing economic crisis.
The Pakistani security establishment seeks to re-engage with the US because it prefers American military equipment and technology. Although Pakistan and China are described as “iron brothers”, their economic and security partnership has not helped Pakistan bolster its security or enhanced economic growth.
From America’s perspective, it can take advantage of Pakistan’s compulsions. The US does not wish to ignore Pakistan, which Americans worry about for its nuclear arsenal, its close alignment with China, it providing safe haven to myriad Islamist terrorist groups, and its insistence on causing mischief for the US and its partners such as India.
The new US relationship with Pakistan is likely to be a downsized version of the past. There is no need for bases to spy on the erstwhile Soviet Union, as in the 1950s or 1960s, no anti-Soviet jihad to fight in Afghanistan from a Pakistani bridgehead, and no large-scale US military deployment across the Durand Line to supply and support. There is limited American need for intelligence cooperation, and advanced drone technologies have reduced the dependence of yesteryears. The realisation that Pakistan is no longer a US ally is now accepted wisdom in Washington.
Although the US is Pakistan’s largest trading partner, trade in goods and services between the two has never exceeded the current figure of $6.6 billion annually. This is comparable to US-Morocco trade in goods and services and is hardly a trickle in the annual US trade volume of $5 trillion. That should serve as a reminder of the relative importance of Pakistan in America’s current hierarchy of priorities.
Pakistani expectations of a return to the good old days of alliance with the US will certainly remain unfulfilled. Indians, on the other hand, should not be overly concerned about a downsized and modest US-Pakistan relationship. For India, American leverage over Pakistan is preferable to total Chinese hegemony.
Aparna Pande is director of the Washington-based Hudson Institute’s Initiative on the Future of India and South AsiaThe views expressed are personal
