Ukraine war: Does China see an opportunity in the US-Russia rift?
China has closely engaged with Russia, supported its security interests, endorsed its opposition to the Nato, and chosen not to oppose Russian invasion at the UNSC.
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) deliberations on Friday indicate that China may be emerging as the net beneficiary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the rupture in ties between the US and Russia, in three significant ways - in both the immediate and medium-term context.
China’s geopolitical and strategic value
One, China’s geopolitical and strategic value has increased for all sides. For Russia, as it battles Ukrainian forces on the ground but also western powers led by the US in the theatre of international diplomacy and global economy, Beijing is possibly the only other big power it can hope to rally towards its point of view. China has closely engaged with Russia, supported its security interests, endorsed its opposition to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato), and chosen not to oppose Russian invasion at the UNSC. It also remains Russia’s most formidable economic partner at a time when economic sanctions from the West - both the US and Europe - will leave Moscow searching for alternatives.
At the same time, Beijing has been careful not to be seen as fully endorsing Russian actions, especially because it has, on the global stage, sought to portray itself as a champion of the idea of territorial integrity and sovereignty of states and oppose military intervention by big powers. The West, sensing this opportunity, has sought to wean China away from its outright support to Russia to a position of neutrality - which was reflected in the US willingness to tone down the content and language of its Security Council resolution, in return for China’s abstention during the vote on the resolution.
In an earlier procedural vote on the issue at the UNSC, China had voted along with Russia. This is also why statements from Washington have been focused on urging Beijing to be a responsible stakeholder, and the only question that President Joe Biden did not answer in his press conference on Thursday, was about China’s role. At any other time, Biden may have taken a more aggressive position against China’s support for Russia, which was most starkly reflected in the Xi Jinping-Vladimir Putin statement earlier this month where both countries took on the US-led international order.
Beijing: A competitor and an adversary
While this must not be read as a moment of rapprochement between the West and China - there are no illusions that Beijing remains a competitor and an adversary, and is closer to Moscow than it has been since the 1960s - a window of engagement and collaboration appears to have opened up. Beijing, thus, is in a position of being a close partner for Moscow and a valued interlocutor for Washington at this moment.
Two, China is also seeing the limits of western power. Despite the fact that the US has created a formidable unified platform with Europe to oppose Russia’s actions, the western response has revealed clear limitations. Neither the US nor any European country is willing to put boots on the ground to fight for Ukraine even as it faces a siege from Russia from all sides. This has to do with both the domestic politics in all these countries, especially the US, where the appetite for military involvement in any theatre is non-existent at the moment, and the fact that, at the end of the day, Ukraine matters far more to Vladimir Putin than to those in power in Washington, London, Paris Brussels, or Berlin.
The Taiwan factor
Observers believe that China will keep the lessons from the current moment in its calculus if and when it approaches a decision on Taiwan. A debate has broken out in the US strategic community on whether Beijing will see Ukraine as a precedent and feel emboldened to pursue its aggressive ambitions in Taiwan, or whether the context is different and US response to any aggression vis a vis Taiwan will be different from its response to Ukraine.
But in either case, Beijing would not be mistaken if, at this moment, it can see that West’s appetite to take on a big power on the ground is limited. Beijing can also see how difficult it has been for the West to mount a unified economic sanctions regime against Russia - given the dense ways in which China and US economy are integrated, it will be even more difficult to do so when it comes to Beijing than it was vis a vis Moscow.
Wither Indo-Pacific strategy?
And finally, the US-Russia rupture has shifted focus to Europe from Indo-Pacific. Observers such as Elbridge A Colby, a former Pentagon official who played a key role in drafting the US national defence strategy in 2018, have been warning that the US has a deficit in terms of its capabilities to fight on two fronts, and must force European countries to take on more responsibilities even as it focuses on Indo-Pacific.
Others cite the example of Iraq and Afghanistan, where entry into the former distracted US from the latter back in 2003, to suggest that American capabilities to focus on two fronts are limited. While it would be a mistake to underestimate US capabilities or discount the hostile mood that now exists against China across the political aisle in Washington, for now, the diversion from the Indo-Pacific will suit China just fine.
Given the fluidity of the situation in Ukraine, as well as in international politics, it would be premature to establish any long-term trends that will emerge from the current conflict. But with its unique position and formidable power, Beijing may well have the last laugh as Washington and Moscow embark on what can possibly be a prolonged conflict in Eastern Europe.
