BRICS 2026: India’s summit and the push for dialogue in a fragmented world

Shishir Gupta said the summit showed that India can maintain relationships across competing geopolitical camps without reducing its foreign policy to a choice.

At a time when wars, rivalries and economic insecurity are reshaping global politics, India’s hosting of the expanded BRICS summit in New Delhi emerged as a major diplomatic moment. In a conversation on Point Blank, Hindustan Times Executive Editor Shishir Gupta argued that the summit demonstrated India’s ability to convene powerful and often adversarial countries around the same table—and to steer a conversation on peace, security, technology and the future of the Global South.

One of the most closely watched aspects of the summit was Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India after a seven-year gap.

Speaking with senior anchor Aayesha Varma, Gupta described the New Delhi gathering as more than a symbolic photo opportunity. His central argument was that BRICS has become an increasingly important platform for the non-Western world, especially as the traditional international order faces pressure from the Ukraine war, prolonged instability in West Asia and conflict around Gaza and the Red Sea.

The summit, he said, showed that India can maintain relationships across competing geopolitical camps without reducing its foreign policy to a choice between one bloc and another.

And as for the criticism about the vegetarian menu at BRICS? Well, that's just an example of how not just minds are polarised, but stomachs too.

A gathering in a world at war

The BRICS summit took place against an extraordinary international backdrop. The Russia-Ukraine war has continued to dominate European security concerns, while the Middle East remains caught in a wider cycle of confrontation involving Iran, Gulf states, Israel, the United States and Iran-backed armed groups. Disruption to key maritime routes and concern over energy supplies have added an economic dimension to these conflicts.

The presence of countries with sharply divergent interests was particularly notable. Iran and Gulf Arab states have had deep political and security differences. Saudi Arabia has faced attacks from the Iran-aligned Houthi movement, while the UAE is closely linked to the United States’ regional security architecture. Yet representatives of these countries participated in the same forum and agreed to a joint declaration.

For Gupta, this was the real diplomatic achievement: creating a setting where rival powers could engage without allowing their disagreements to derail the wider agenda.

He compared BRICS’ role in the non-Western world to that of the G7 among Western powers. The comparison does not mean BRICS is a formal military or ideological alliance. Instead, it highlights the grouping’s growing role as a forum for major emerging economies and regional powers seeking greater influence over global governance, finance, technology and security debates.

India-China engagement: Beyond summit symbolism

One of the most closely watched aspects of the summit was Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India after a seven-year gap. Gupta said the bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Xi was substantive and should not be dismissed as mere summit-level optics. However, he also stressed that any assessment of a possible India-China thaw must remain cautious.

The core issue, from India’s perspective, is the boundary. Gupta underlined that India’s position has remained clear: the unresolved boundary question must not be allowed to damage the broader relationship, but peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control are essential for progress in other areas.

The India-China border dispute is not an abstract diplomatic issue for New Delhi. Tensions along the frontier have repeatedly affected political trust, military preparedness and economic engagement between the two Asian powers. Gupta pointed to past episodes in which high-level engagement was followed by friction on the border, including the 2014 Chumar incident during Xi’s India visit, the Doklam standoff and the 2020 transgressions in eastern Ladakh.

That history explains India’s caution. Economic engagement, political contact and long-term strategic dialogue may all be desirable, but they cannot be insulated indefinitely from instability at the border.

Gupta’s reading of the meeting was that China appeared interested in improving ties, while India remains open to moving forward if border stability is maintained. He described India and China as competitors rather than inevitable military adversaries. The distinction matters: competition can be managed through diplomacy, communication and rules, whereas adversarial relationships tend to be driven by escalation and mistrust.

The real test, therefore, will come after the summit. Observers will be watching whether the political signals from the top leadership are followed by sustained restraint on the border, stronger military communication mechanisms and a reduction in incidents that can quickly revive tensions.

BRICS and the search for peace

The summit also focused attention on the role that India and China could play in conversations surrounding ongoing wars. Gupta argued that the BRICS platform provided an opportunity to harmonise positions around the need for peace, restraint and dialogue.

On Ukraine, India has consistently called for a negotiated resolution and maintained communication with both Russia and Western partners. Gupta noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed openness to India and China supporting efforts to end the war. India’s message, he said, has been that this is not a time for war but for peace.

Whether BRICS can directly bring about a settlement remains uncertain. The Ukraine conflict involves territorial claims, military realities, NATO-Russia tensions and domestic political pressures that cannot be resolved through a summit declaration alone. However, the presence of Russia, China and India in the same forum gives BRICS an important role as a channel for diplomatic messaging and potential mediation support.

The urgency is equally evident in West Asia. Gupta warned that the conflict has expanded far beyond its initial dimensions. What began with concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme and regional confrontation has spread into the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Suez Canal route and critical energy infrastructure.

Maritime disruptions in these areas can have consequences far beyond the region. They affect oil supplies, shipping costs, insurance premiums, food prices and global trade flows. For India, which depends heavily on seaborne trade and imported energy, stability in these waterways is a direct economic and strategic concern.

Gupta argued that India and China have the capacity to play a constructive role because both maintain working relationships with Iran while also engaging Gulf countries and the United States. Their influence may be limited, but their diplomatic access gives them a potential role in urging restraint.

Iran, UAE and the value of dialogue

One of the summit’s most striking outcomes was the inclusion of Iran and the UAE in a common declaration. Gupta viewed this as evidence that New Delhi was able to manage sensitive differences and create space for practical cooperation.

The significance lies in the wider regional context. Iran and the UAE have faced recurring tensions, shaped by security competition, regional conflicts and the UAE’s strategic partnerships with the United States and other Gulf states. Any escalation between Iran and Gulf countries risks harming energy security, trade and broader economic stability.

Gupta suggested that the summit created an environment in which both sides could find common ground, or at least avoid turning their differences into open confrontation. The presence of Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister added another layer of importance, bringing together key regional stakeholders with direct interests in the future of Gulf security.

This does not mean longstanding rivalries have disappeared. But diplomacy often begins not with a final settlement, but with the ability to keep adversaries talking.

India’s multi-alignment strategy

A key theme of Gupta’s assessment was that India is not pursuing an anti-American bloc through BRICS. Instead, New Delhi is practising strategic multi-alignment: maintaining relations with Russia and China through platforms such as BRICS, while deepening defence, technology and economic ties with the United States and its partners.

He pointed to India’s defence engagement with GE Aerospace, including the supply of F404 engines for Tejas fighter aircraft and progress on technology-transfer arrangements connected to the F414 engine. These developments illustrate the wider point: India’s engagement with BRICS does not preclude strategic cooperation with Washington.

This balancing act is central to India’s foreign-policy approach. New Delhi seeks to protect its autonomy, expand its economic and technological options and remain relevant across competing power centres. The BRICS summit, in Gupta’s view, was a visible demonstration of that approach.

The larger outcome of the New Delhi summit may not be an immediate breakthrough in Ukraine, West Asia or India-China relations. Its importance lies in something more foundational: India showed that it can assemble rival powers, shape conversations among them and advocate a more representative international order at a time when the existing one is under strain.