The city police were ill-prepared and ill-equipped to counter an attack by well-trained terrorists, says the Ram Pradhan Committee report that probed if there were any lapses that led to the 26/11 terror attacks or during the attacks.
“The committee has not found any serious lapses in the conduct of any individual officer,” the report says.
However, it points out what went wrong:
1) There was no proper analysis of available intelligence inputs.
2) The instruments to deal with terror attacks — police force and equipment — were not efficient.
3) The counter-terror operations lacked visible leadership.
While the report makes it clear that there was no specific intelligence alert on an attack on November 26, 2008, it points out that central intelligence agencies sent out 26 alerts between August 2006 and October 2008, with specific references to the Taj hotel and CST. In a reported published on December 2, 2008, HT had said that the Maharashtra government had not acted on alerts sent out by R&AW.
The report criticises the police for poor assessment of such alerts.
{{/usCountry}}The report criticises the police for poor assessment of such alerts.
{{/usCountry}}Hasan Gafoor, the then Mumbai police chief, has been indicted for his failure to provide “overt and visible leadership”. It also states that Gafoor should have handled the command centre (it was handled by Rakesh Maria, JCP, crime).
Gafoor, who was transferred as DGP (housing) soon after 26/11, is also accused of not following the Standard Operating Practice, which specifies who will do what in a crisis.
Though the report does not name him, the Home department led by RR Patil has got brickbats for the government’s lack of seriousness that led to poor police preparedness. “The police responded to attacks efficiently but in a manner they use for a typical law-and-order problem,” the report says.
The report also rules out any conspiracy in the killing of three police officers — Hemant Karkare, Ashok Kamte and Vijay Salaskar.