Young Suryanarayana is a life that has been cut in its prime. He was the victim of a bigoted doctrine taught in Pakistan for nearly three decades; for the Taliban are only another manifestation of the Islamist drive of General Zia-ul-Haq. The Indian died in a terrorist act after his abductors demanded that all 2,500 Indians in Afghanistan vacate immediately. It was an absurd demand and no government would ever have agreed to it.
There are no second guesses where this demand has originated from. Pakistanis have been whining about the Indian presence in Afghanistan, which they assume is their private fief. They even sent the American counsellor to wag his finger at South Block when we decided to open consulates in Afghanistan.
Invariably the questions asked are, could Suryanarayana’s life have been saved and does the government have a policy on hostage negotiations? The answer to the first question is difficult but undoubtedly all governments have a policy and a mechanism for dealing with such crises. There is the Crisis Management Group in Delhi as well as the Cabinet Committee on Security, which immediately meet in such situations.
Governments invariably proclaim they will not negotiate with terrorists. The dilemma is that lives of innocents are at stake. It is easier for closed or autocratic regimes to stick to this principle than it is for democracies with a free press functioning in real time.
What actually happens is that some negotiations invariably begin to take place. This is necessary both to secure the release of hostages and to prepare one’s team of hostage negotiators and commandos, if required, to flush out the terrorists. Negotiators need to buy time to find out more about the nature of the hijack or abduction — is it by an individual? Is he demented, a criminal or an ideologically motivated person? They need to know the number of terrorists, their origin, the languages they speak, arms held by them and their demands. There’s need for intelligence inputs and for monitoring conversations and movements. All this takes time and patience and there’s never a stipulated moment laid down in a manual that prescribes when to strike a deal or launch a raid.
{{/usCountry}}What actually happens is that some negotiations invariably begin to take place. This is necessary both to secure the release of hostages and to prepare one’s team of hostage negotiators and commandos, if required, to flush out the terrorists. Negotiators need to buy time to find out more about the nature of the hijack or abduction — is it by an individual? Is he demented, a criminal or an ideologically motivated person? They need to know the number of terrorists, their origin, the languages they speak, arms held by them and their demands. There’s need for intelligence inputs and for monitoring conversations and movements. All this takes time and patience and there’s never a stipulated moment laid down in a manual that prescribes when to strike a deal or launch a raid.
{{/usCountry}}It is ultimately a matter of judgment for there may not be second chances and things could go horribly wrong. It is, of course, easier to deal with a situation on the home turf rather than on hostile territory, as we discovered in Kandahar. Besides, governments react differently to different events. An Entebbe type of raid is not possible all the time. There have been occasions in the last few months when the French and the Italians have paid ransoms to Iraqi terrorists to secure the release of their nationals. President Carter’s plans, in 1980, to rescue American hostages in Tehran was an abject failure. Thereafter, Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan and his running mate, George Bush (Sr), struck a deal with the Ayatollahs with the help of Israelis and the French Intelligence chief, Comte Alexandre de Marenches, who organised their meeting at the Ritz in Paris in October 1980. The complex deal was that the Reagan administration would give cash and sell arms to Iran in return for which US hostages would be released only after the 1980 elections. India has also negotiated the release of Rubbaiya Syed. Negotiations, therefore, are not excluded. It is what you give in return and in what manner that is important and can also be disastrous.
In the Suryanarayana case, there have been the usual accusations from the opposition spokesman about governmental failure. This is thoughtless criticism, which adds nothing to the image of the Opposition. There have been demands for the government to provide security to all Indians working in Afghanistan. This is an impossible and an impracticable demand. No government anywhere can provide foolproof security in a country like Afghanistan. But Indian job-seekers going there need to be explicitly briefed about the risks.
The Taliban had no intention of letting Suryanarayana get away alive after they made their absurd demand. When the Indian media picked up the story, the Taliban knew its moment had come and it was going to make waves on India’s electronic and print media. This was going to be a major spy-war victory for the terrorists. Besides, this is not the only time terrorists have struck in this manner. This leads us to another dilemma.
Should the media report this story at all and, if so, how much and in what manner? Sensational images of a wailing family and relatives or gory blood-spattered faces are what the terrorists look for each time because they want to spread terror.
Four Indians were killed in Udhampur by terrorists the same day, but it was not front-page news. Instead, the Taliban story was the lead item. Is it because of the novelty factor and because there was a sense of déjà vu in the Kashmir story? Would this not lead to copy cat strikes in Afghanistan, which is precisely what the Taliban want? Should not such negotiations be carried out away from spotlight — after all, lives are at stake?
Maybe had the media exercised judicious self-restraint, allowing the Indian team to quietly reach Zabul or at least establish contact with the Taliban and their mentors, Suryanarayana may have been alive today. We will never know.