The revelations by Pakistan's nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan show that Pakistan, China and North Korea, for political, strategic and economic motives, functioned as catalysts for systematic horizontal proliferation of technology and material related to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).
While successive governments of Pakistan since Zia ul-Haq's time were either active participants in, or connived at, these horizontal proliferation activities, companies in Western Europe, North America, Canada and Southeast Asia contributed to Pakistan's illegal sale of nuclear technology and nuclear material.
It is inconceivable that the highly competent intelligence agencies of the Western democracies did not have an inkling of the ongoing skullduggery.
The campaign against the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq resulted in the US and major Western powers tolerating Pakistan's nuclear weaponisation and its acquisition of nuclear technology, missile technology and nuclear material.
Khan's revelations also exposed the irrelevance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in terms of its stipulations or its capacity to enforce these stipulations. North Korea, Iran and Libya are signatories of the NPT, but they still carried on the acquisitions of WMD material illegally.
The successful illegal transactions of horizontal proliferation by Pakistan and other countries clearly bring out either the inefficiency or negative political influences affecting safeguard and inspection procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). That the IAEA, which has been perfecting its safeguard arrangements since the late 1960s, still needs to draft and implement additional protocol for safeguarding nuclear facilities, emphasises its shortcomings.
{{/usCountry}}The successful illegal transactions of horizontal proliferation by Pakistan and other countries clearly bring out either the inefficiency or negative political influences affecting safeguard and inspection procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). That the IAEA, which has been perfecting its safeguard arrangements since the late 1960s, still needs to draft and implement additional protocol for safeguarding nuclear facilities, emphasises its shortcomings.
{{/usCountry}}India's reaction to this critical development has been very measured and restrained. The government of India declared it to be a very dangerous and pernicious development. India has also clarified that it does not consider this phenomenon of horizontal proliferation a bilateral India-Pakistan issue. India correctly assesses that it is an issue affecting regional security and that it has international implications in terms of nuclear security and safeguards.
It is clear that the major nuclear powers of the world under the leadership of the US would not only be taking remedial action against the phenomenon of horizontal proliferation engineered by Pakistan but would be putting in place measures and regimes to prevent such proliferation in future.
Some of these measures are bound to affect India's nuclear programmes for peaceful purposes as well as India's nuclear weapons status in terms of future developments. President George W. Bush indicated what these measures and remedial safeguards would be in a speech at the National Defence University in Washington.
Among others, he suggested that proliferation security initiatives which he announced a few months ago should be expanded to cover covert transactions including shipments and transfers of nuclear material and technologies.
He also suggested that the expanded proliferation security initiative should be implemented with structured and greater cooperation between the intelligence agencies, military services and law enforcement agencies, including Interpol, to cover illegal non-governmental proliferators.
Another of his suggestions was strengthening of the international legal system and international controls governing proliferations.
He proposed that the 40-member Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse to sell enrichment and re-processing equipment and technology to any state that does not already possess full-scale functioning equipment and re-processing plants. (Since India already possesses such equipment and has independent technological capacities in this regard, this suggestion may not pose any threat to Indian interests. Nevertheless, the suppliers group would continue to be restrictive about nuclear supplies to India).
An important suggestion that President George Bush made was that the IAEA be given a mandate to cover banned nuclear activities around the world and report the violations to the UN Security Council. This will impose the UN Security Council's political and security jurisdiction on violators of non-proliferation stipulations.
Bush also suggested that an additional protocol be provided and implemented by the IAEA requiring all states to declare details of their nuclear activities and facilities and that the agency should inspect these facilities and apply full-scope safeguards.
He recommended that only such countries as sign this protocol be allowed to import equipment for their nuclear programmes.
While assessing the possible impact of these measures, which are quite likely to become part of international law and international regimes on nuclear issues, one must note the fact that India does not fall under the category of signatories of the NPT, nor has it acquired its nuclear and missile capacities clandestinely.
India is also unique in that its nuclear and missile capacities are essentially indigenous. An additional fact is that India has an impeccable record of preventing horizontal proliferation to other countries.
Despite these facts, impending prospects are India remaining under pressure on its nuclear weapons status. As far as the US and its nuclear weapons allies remain categorical in their commitment to the provisions of the NPT and its derivative international regimes, the fundamental objective of the US would be to persuade India to cap its nuclear and missile weapons capacities and then to roll back and eliminate these capacities.
As India has not violated any international treaty or agreements, this objective would be pursued through a process of insistent negotiations. India would certainly be pressurized to sign the proposed additional protocol which would involve its making public practically all its nuclear activities and facilities and its allowing international inspections.
Bush's proposal that only those countries that sign this additional protocol be allowed to import nuclear equipment, technology and material would also impact on India.
So it would not be enough if India wishes to import nuclear material and equipment for peaceful purposes under International safeguards with the IAEA. It would become mandatory for India to abide by the provisions of the additional protocol with intrusive and expanded jurisdiction.
It is obvious that India cannot blindly accept this additional protocol and make public those nuclear and technological facilities, which are involved in India's nuclear weapons and missile programmes. Even countries like Russia that have been providing equipment and material for India's peaceful nuclear facilities for the generation of power would be under pressure to pull back from this cooperation.
The prospects for India are to move towards complete self-reliance regarding its nuclear and missile military technologies instead of depending on external inputs and at the same time tighten technology management and export control.
(The writer is a former Indian foreign secretary)