General Musharraf knew how his ideas would be received in India. “It’s a bombshell” he said, as we changed tapes half way through the interview I did last week. “They won’t like it.” The General was right but we need to ask ourselves if our response has been wrong. I fear we’ve dismissed the Pakistani President’s proposals far too quickly, without bothering to look into them or consider the consequences of rejection. We could end up ruing at leisure the adverse effects of our hasty nyet.
At the core of General Musharraf’s proposals are the concepts of self-governance and joint management. In his language, “self-governance is more than autonomy (the present relationship between Srinagar and Delhi) but less than independence (what many Kashmiris want).” What he seems to be suggesting — if you paraphrase his full meaning — is that India and Pakistan will keep the part of Kashmir they control — independence being firmly ruled out — but under their joint management self-governance is devolved to the Kashmiris.
Although the General calls this a dilution of sovereignty it’s not. It’s a throw back to the relationship between Srinagar and Delhi prior to 1952. But Pervez Musharraf has to make this palatable to Kashmiris, many of whom are furious he’s moved away from the UN resolutions and self-determination. If describing self-governance as a dilution of sovereignty (“but not it’s undermining”, he adds) makes it easier, so be it.
More importantly, self-governance would apply to the full state of Jammu and Kashmir as it existed in 1947. This means it would be implemented as much on his side as ours, including the Northern Territories. Additionally, the ‘border’ within old Kashmir state would be open and thus irrelevant. So, in a very real sense, the LoC would cease to divide Kashmir (Musharraf’s position) yet still demarcate the line between Indian and Pakistani Kashmir (our position).
{{/usCountry}}More importantly, self-governance would apply to the full state of Jammu and Kashmir as it existed in 1947. This means it would be implemented as much on his side as ours, including the Northern Territories. Additionally, the ‘border’ within old Kashmir state would be open and thus irrelevant. So, in a very real sense, the LoC would cease to divide Kashmir (Musharraf’s position) yet still demarcate the line between Indian and Pakistani Kashmir (our position).
{{/usCountry}}Now, we may not like this or may not want to follow ideas enunciated by a military dictator. Or may be we don’t believe Pakistan has a say in the matter. But the General is only doing what we agreed he should and he’s simply fleshing out ideas we applauded when first outlined.
In September 2004 Dr. Manmohan Singh and General Musharraf agreed to explore possible options for a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the Kashmir issue. In April 2005 General Musharraf told Indian editors a solution had to be found between three parameters — no LoC, no changing of boundaries and make borders irrelevant — and we praised his sagacity. Yet now, when General Musharraf starts to explore options and produces one squarely within those parameters, we’ve thrown up our hands in horror and cried foul!
Recall for a moment our rhetoric. So often has he promised to think out of the box it must be our Prime Minister’s pet phrase. In May 2004 he went further. “Short of secession, short of re-drawing boundaries”, he told Jonathan Power, “the Indian establishment can live with anything”. So when Musharraf is jumping out of the box and his ideas have nothing to do with secession or cartographic adjustments why are we reluctant to consider them? Why have we dismissed them out of hand?
In Pakistan the answer is India isn’t serious about a solution. It’s simply stringing the General along. That’s why many Pakistani papers accuse him of capitulation, betrayal and compare him to Neville Chamberlain in 1939. India, they say, only wants an end to terrorism so it can sort out Kashmir on its own terms. Musharraf, they conclude, has fallen into its trap. Yet there are two questions we should answer before slamming the door. Do we need Pakistan’s help to sort out Kashmir? I presume we do otherwise why engage in a peace process and agree to explore options. Secondly, can we expect better from Musharraf’s successor, whoever that might be? This time the answer is no. If Musharraf is criticised for ‘offering’ too much his successor is bound to give less.
Meanwhile, there’s a danger that in western eyes Musharraf will be seen as the man striving for a solution whilst India presents itself as the recalcitrant stick-in-the-mud second party. Yet all the while Musharraf’s idea is only an opening gambit. It’s not a take-it-or-leave-it position. It has to be discussed and negotiated. From our standpoint, it can be improved.
This is why we have everything to gain if we take Musharraf seriously and a lot to lose if we don’t. But is anyone in Delhi listening?
(A collection of Karan Thapar’s ‘Sunday Sentiments’ columns has been published as a book by Wisdom Tree )