International comparisons are inevitable after something like the test launch of the Agni 5. The stale and pointless one was between the capabilities of India and China. The more interesting one was made between India and North Korea. It is the latter which underlines the different trajectory of India within the international system. New Delhi’s goal is not to be the country that can shock the world with missile tests or to have the largest and fastest rockets. Those are primitive desires — and out of sorts with a long-standing ambition to position India as a responsible power-in-the-making.
The broader international community, in effect, argued that India testing an intercontinental ballistic missile didn’t matter because New Delhi has shown a total commitment to non-proliferation. India developing a nuclear-cum-missile programme for its defence purposes was hardly a surprise — that is something that goes back five decades. But unlike a North Korea or an Iran, India’s purpose was not to overturn the existing international order or blackmail its wealthier parts. This larger commitment of earning a seat at the high table of power through, in part, responsible behaviour was underlined in a recent speech by foreign secretary Ranjan Mathai on how India was enforcing and implementing an export control regime. The latter, an abstruse facet of nonproliferation, is a vital prerequisite to joining key international technology control regimes like the Wassenaar Convention and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Entering these groups is necessary for India, as it will give the country access to thousands of high-end technologies. This knowhow is already becoming necessary for many of India’s key economic and strategic sectors including space, precision manufacturing, defence, pharmaceuticals and software. It will also lay to rest the last of the nuclear apartheid that India has faced since its first nuclear test in 1971.
India’s adherence to a minimum nuclear deterrent — to keeping its arsenal large enough to avoid encouraging a foreign first strike but small enough to avoid an arms race — is a crucial part of its being a responsible power. Which is why India need not worry about the Agni 5 being technically inferior to its Chinese or Russian equivalents. That hardly matters as long as it serves as a deterrent. China needs an arsenal that has to worry about not only India, but also Russia, the US and even Japan’s non-weaponised nuclear capability. India has only China and Pakistan in its sights. Which is a more telling statement about the foreign policies of the two countries.our takeour take
{{/usCountry}}India’s adherence to a minimum nuclear deterrent — to keeping its arsenal large enough to avoid encouraging a foreign first strike but small enough to avoid an arms race — is a crucial part of its being a responsible power. Which is why India need not worry about the Agni 5 being technically inferior to its Chinese or Russian equivalents. That hardly matters as long as it serves as a deterrent. China needs an arsenal that has to worry about not only India, but also Russia, the US and even Japan’s non-weaponised nuclear capability. India has only China and Pakistan in its sights. Which is a more telling statement about the foreign policies of the two countries.our takeour take
{{/usCountry}}