MEA needs more hands on deck quickly. It must consider surge hiring

Without a surge in foreign policy capacity, we will only have great ideas but tardy implementation, resulting in a perennially underperforming policy.

March was a busy month for Indian diplomacy. The first week featured an Italy State visit, the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting, the Raisina Dialogue, and as many as 33 bilateral engagements. The pace continued in April with the visit of the King of Bhutan to India, the 100th meeting under the G20 framework, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) defence minister’s meeting, and a mammoth rescue operation from war-torn Sudan. May likely will bring more action.

Over the last several months, India’s diplomatic efforts have garnered global attention, which is admirable (Hindustan Times)

Over the last several months, India’s diplomatic efforts have garnered global attention, which is admirable. But converting this potential energy into tangible outcomes requires focusing on one crucial and underrated aspect: State capacity. Indian foreign policy finds itself at a unique moment. Many analysts believe that we are in between world orders. China’s hostile and rapid rise, the global financial crisis, networked politics, and, most recently, the Covid-19 pandemic, have transformed international politics. While the world has moved far away from the Washington Consensus, its replacement is not yet apparent.

This interregnum will continue to throw up opportunities for a fast rising middle power, such as India. Consider these recent events. India is chairing the G20 this year. The Union government has invested a lot of energy in this forum. Simultaneously, India must also do its bit to convert the promise of the vital Quad framework into reality, and balance its responsibilities at the SCO. On the economic front, since India has chosen to stay out of some new multilateral trade groupings, several bilateral trade agreements need to be carved out. Meanwhile, the Ukraine-Russia war continues, and India, as a distant power with good relations with the two actors, might play a role in future negotiations. On the technology front, the Indian government wants to internationalise its digital public infrastructure stack. Moreover, in a world where geopolitical considerations have regained significance, foreign policy will be crucial for ensuring the movement of trade, technology, and human capital.

In short, foreign policy is now a high-stakes game. While much needs to be done, the gap between these expectations and policy capacity has only grown wider. Without increasing policy capacity immediately, many promising initiatives will not deliver the expected results. Even if we succeed in some initiatives, we will end up dropping the ball on many others. The lack of adequate State capacity might show up in unexpected ways. As in a whack-a-mole game, plugging one failure will only mean weaknesses will surface elsewhere.

What does a lack of foreign policy capacity mean? It is well-known that the intake into India’s foreign service is woefully short of its requirements.

But there’s more to it. In a 2019 article titled, India’s Foreign Policy Capacity, scholars Kanti Bajpai and Byron Chong examined “the analytical, operational, and political competences of India’s Foreign Service at three levels — the individual, organisational, and systemic.” They assessed the resulting nine elements of policy capacity and found that despite being staffed by skilful and highly talented individuals, the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) has weak organisational capabilities. Specific problem areas were: “The critical mass of capable IFS officers; the infrastructure for collecting and processing information; the international organisation of MEA; and the extent of communication with governance partners and the public.”

After considering alternatives, the authors recommend a dramatic increase in entry-level recruitment for the IFS through the civil service examination. While that may well be a long-term solution, what India needs now is a “surge hiring” strategy. The current geopolitical moment has thrown up opportunities and challenges that need to be addressed on priority.

The external affairs ministry, in fact, was the first Union ministry to experiment with a broader lateral entry for government officers in 2015. It also opened up positions in its policy planning and research division for people in academia and the private sector. However, these tentative trials seem to have lost steam. The underlying reason may be some internal resistance from foreign service officers, who see such attempts as a threat to their career progression.

The surge-hiring strategy should try a different approach. It should attempt to hire a much larger number of people below ambassadorial positions. This way, the cadre protection impulse can be side-stepped. Instead of targeting joint-secretary levels, two fellowships could be attempted: One for fresh graduates, and another for young professionals working within and outside the government. Given the growing prominence of technology and economic issues as foreign policy domains, this approach would help build institutional knowledge within the ministry. More importantly, the surge should target staffing for the headquarter functions in Delhi for managing various engagements and new initiatives.

Past attempts at lateral hiring were advertised as single posts in the unreserved category. By opening up a larger number of positions concurrently, the government could retain existing norms on reservations and quotas.

Finally, the surge-hiring strategy should have a sunset clause and a well-defined recruitment target. If it is conceptualised as a non-recurring measure keeping the current geopolitical situation in mind, it could resonate with the Opposition and Parliament.

With the Agnipath experiment of the defence ministry, the idea of short-term employment within the government has gained some ground. It is no longer an anathema. Without a surge in foreign policy capacity, we will only have great ideas but tardy implementation, resulting in a perennially underperforming policy.

Pranay Kotasthane is chairperson, high tech geopolitics programme, Takshashila Institution The views expressed are personal