Strategic autonomy bid binds India and France
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's upcoming visit to France will highlight the strong bilateral relationship between the two countries.
Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi’s visit as a guest of honour for France’s National Day on July 14 will be an occasion to showcase the strength and the depth of the bilateral relationship. France and India established a strategic partnership in 1998, but ties really gained traction in the past decade, with dense cooperation initiated or enhanced on a wide range of issues, including in sensitive and sovereign domains, buttressed by a flourishing defence trade cooperation that placed France as India’s second-largest arms supplier after Russia.

The visit will also be an occasion for both countries to reaffirm how a shared quest for strategic autonomy is guiding this partnership. A common understanding of the concept of strategic autonomy has been central to the two states’ foreign policies since the late 1940s. In the French context, former President Charles de Gaulle wanted more autonomy vis-a-vis the United States (US). One direct application of this was the decision by France to leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) military command structure in 1966, though it remained a member of the alliance. In addition, de Gaulle pleaded for a dialogue with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR); recognised in 1964, the People’s Republic of China, and also argued for the need for Paris to maintain control over the strike capacity of its nuclear weapons.
Following Independence, India, under then PM Jawaharlal Nehru, espoused a similar conviction in absolute sovereignty to maintain complete autonomy in international affairs, put into practice through the doctrine of non-alignment and neutralism from great power politics. India also developed its own indigenous nuclear programme with the aim to develop energy and strategic autonomy. While contributing to the creation of the Non-Alignment Movement, India also remained a member of the British Commonwealth, negotiated defence equipment procurement from the United Kingdom and the US and later developed a strong partnership with the USSR.
Like their predecessors, PM Narendra Modi and President Emanuel Macron have fostered strong links with major powers without becoming overly dependent on any one of them, and managed to keep aloof from Cold War-type blocs competition. Both countries are de facto more integrated in collective defence or security frameworks than they used to be 70 years ago, but Modi’s India remains formally opposed to joining a military alliance, while Macron’s France is frequently critical of NATO.
Both countries have complex, often misunderstood, relationships with the US. They both aspire to a degree of independence from Washington policies, while being aware of their reliance on the US for defence and security. Aspirations of strategic autonomy, therefore, led both states to pursue closer, but not exclusive, ties with Washington, while also developing ties with states that have been at odds with the US, such as Iran or Russia.
Both also have a shared ambition to be balance shapers, not followers. They favour a multipolar international order – one that allows no single power to be dominant and offers New Delhi and Paris the prospects of a major role in shaping the global agenda.
To help them achieve their ambitions and to diminish their dependence on great powers, France and India both strive to build new, flexible partnerships. Indian policy has focused on a network of strategic partnerships characterised by defence cooperation but steers clear of integrating forces and war plans. Similarly, France is also closing ranks with selected partners to complement collective commitments within NATO or the European Union, via bilateral mutual defence clauses, and ad-hoc issue-based coalitions.
Finally, a shared understanding that strategic autonomy and sovereignty is only possible with strong indigenous capacities, has led to Indo-French cooperation in nuclear and space research from the 1950s onward. From India’s perspective, there has been a willingness to diversify its procurement sources, beyond Russia, and France has, on the other hand, viewed arms sales as part of a strategy of cultivating its own strategic space. Modi’s upcoming visit to Paris is expected to further India’s quest for equipment diversification and defence indigenisation, through the sale of Dassault Rafale-Maritime fighters, Scorpene class submarines, and agreements on technology transfer.
Strategic convergence between France and India is therefore obvious, but there are some limitations too. First, although Macron is keen on championing French history and advancing French soft power, it does not parallel the ideological revivalism of India as a civilisational state.
Second, in terms of military readiness, India has not hesitated to employ force against combative neighbours such as China and Pakistan, but has exercised remarkable constraint, eschewing external interventions. By contrast, France has deployed its troops in numerous missions and operations, through the EU, NATO, and ad-hoc coalitions.
However, the real stress test for Franco-Indian strategic cohesion lies in their respective assessment of relations with other major powers such as China and Russia. In April, Macron sparked a major controversy when he re-invoked the idea of strategic autonomy following his visit to China, calling on the EU from steering clear of “crises that are not ours.” Similar sentiments could be a source of concern for Delhi.
A push for strategic autonomy has also led to dissonance in respective positions on the war in Ukraine. France has condemned Moscow and extended political, financial, humanitarian and military support to Ukraine, as well as called on fence sitters to take sides in this conflict of global implications. Despite its improving ties with the US and Europe, India has resisted such pressure.
A shared historical struggle to maintain strategic autonomy in a complex geopolitical landscape has helped both powers develop a degree of trust and a pragmatic partnership. Modi’s visit to Paris is therefore another important milestone to consolidate the Franco-Indian special relationship, but whether it will morph into an alliance remains an open question.
Mathieu Droin is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Nicolas Blarel is associate professor of international relations at Leiden University. Rajesh Basrur is an independent scholar based in Mumbai, India; and Adjunct Professor, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, Brisbane. Jyotsna Mehra is a foreign affairs analyst based out of India and France. She was associated with India’s Ministry of External Affairs as a Consultant. The views expressed are personal and are the summary of a longer report published by the CSIS.
