Two developments in Asia have recently put Elon Musk’s technology ventures in an unusual spotlight. China has approved a string of brain-computer interface (BCI) devices as its firms seek to establish themselves in a field closely associated with Musk’s Neuralink. In Japan, telecom operator Rakuten Mobile is preparing to launch satellite-to-cell services with US-based AST SpaceMobile, providing an alternative to Musk’s Starlink in satellite-based mobile connectivity.
At first sight, brain chips and satellite communications have little in common. Nor are China and Japan pursuing the same strategy. China’s push into BCIs is about building indigenous capability and securing an early position in a technology whose commercial and technological architecture is still taking shape. Japan’s approach is different. Rakuten’s partnership with AST SpaceMobile offers diversification rather than technological self-reliance. Despite these differences, both developments show how competition over frontier technologies is becoming increasingly intertwined with geopolitical rivalry, with national-security considerations shaping technological choices.
In China’s case, the approval of BCIs also points to the changing significance of first-mover advantage. Traditionally understood in commercial terms — intellectual property, market share, network effects, standards, and switching costs — its consequences increasingly extend into the geopolitical realm. Firms and countries that establish technological ecosystems early can also influence the patterns of dependence that subsequently develop around them. The Rakuten case reflects a different logic: diversifying the supplier base to reduce the risks associated with excessive dependence on a single provider. China seeks to build capabilities early and reduce the risk of future strategic dependence; Japan seeks to diversify before dependence on a particular provider becomes difficult to reverse.
Recent geopolitical experience explains this shift. Globalisation created efficient networks, allowing production, technology and infrastructure to become concentrated in particular firms, countries and critical nodes. But semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, critical minerals, and digital infrastructure have demonstrated the risks that can accompany such concentration. When an economy becomes heavily dependent on a limited number of suppliers, technological ecosystems, or geographical nodes, commercial dependence can acquire strategic significance. The concept of “weaponised interdependence” captures this possibility: Networks that facilitate economic exchange can also create asymmetric leverage when access to critical nodes can be restricted or exploited.
{{/usCountry}}Recent geopolitical experience explains this shift. Globalisation created efficient networks, allowing production, technology and infrastructure to become concentrated in particular firms, countries and critical nodes. But semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, critical minerals, and digital infrastructure have demonstrated the risks that can accompany such concentration. When an economy becomes heavily dependent on a limited number of suppliers, technological ecosystems, or geographical nodes, commercial dependence can acquire strategic significance. The concept of “weaponised interdependence” captures this possibility: Networks that facilitate economic exchange can also create asymmetric leverage when access to critical nodes can be restricted or exploited.
{{/usCountry}}China’s BCI push needs to be understood against this backdrop. The headline-grabbing question isn’t whether Chinese companies can challenge Neuralink. The more consequential issue is China’s push to build capabilities while the technology is still evolving. BCIs remain far from being a mature mass-market industry. Their technological pathways, regulatory regimes, standards and eventual commercial applications are still developing. That uncertainty is what makes early entry strategically significant. Rather than waiting for foreign firms to establish the dominant technological architecture and subsequently attempting to catch up, China has an opportunity to help shape the industry while its contours are still being defined. The potential advantages extend well beyond being first to market. Early deployment can generate clinical experience, data, engineering know-how and specialised talent. It can create networks connecting universities, hospitals, regulators, investors and manufacturers. Firms participating early may acquire intellectual property and influence standards, creating advantages that later entrants may find difficult to replicate. China’s experience in electric vehicles, batteries, solar equipment, and drones has already demonstrated the importance of combining technological learning with manufacturing scale and dense supplier ecosystems. What makes BCIs different is the attempt to build such capabilities while the contours of the industry are still being defined. First-mover advantage, in this setting, can become an instrument for reducing future strategic dependence.
Japan’s satellite story illustrates a different approach to managing technological dependence. Rakuten is not attempting to construct a Japanese alternative to Starlink. Its partner, AST SpaceMobile, is itself American. The significance lies instead in diversification. Satellite-to-cell technology could become an important complement to terrestrial telecommunications networks, particularly in remote locations and during disasters. If such infrastructure becomes critical, dependence on a single provider can create concentration risk even when that provider comes from an allied country. Multiple technological pathways and suppliers can, therefore, contribute to resilience without requiring complete domestic self-sufficiency.
This distinction matters because strategic autonomy is too easily equated with producing everything at home. No major economy can become self-reliant across every frontier technology. Different dependencies require different responses. Some may justify indigenous technological capability; others can be managed through diversified suppliers, reliable partnerships, or redundant infrastructure. Technological dependence does not automatically become strategic dependence. It becomes strategically consequential when a technology is critical, alternatives are limited, and disruption or denial could impose unacceptable costs. The real national-security challenge is determining which dependencies can be managed and which need to be reduced before they become entrenched.
For India, this is an important question. Its initiatives in semiconductors, Artificial Intelligence, telecommunications, and other critical technologies demonstrate growing recognition that technological capability and national security are intertwined. But India cannot and need not develop every technology domestically. The more demanding task is to develop the institutional capacity to identify strategically consequential frontier technologies early, anticipate the dependencies they could create, and decide where to build indigenous capability, where to diversify, and where international partnerships offer the better option. Waiting until a technology has become indispensable can leave countries trying to diversify only after technological ecosystems, standards and supply chains have become difficult and expensive to dislodge.
Musk provides the common thread connecting two striking developments in Asia, but the larger story is not about one entrepreneur. It reflects a shift in how governments think about technology and national security. The strategic contest is moving upstream: from managing dependencies after they become vulnerabilities to anticipating, shaping and diversifying them before they become entrenched. The technological choices countries make today may determine not merely who leads tomorrow’s industries, but who ultimately depends on whom.
G Venkat Raman is professor at the Indian Institute of Management, Indore. The views expressed are personal