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Quad leaders set to meet in Manila, some lingering doubts persist

Still, the debate around the Quad and its continued relevance has increased, with scepticism about the grouping’s future boiling down to a few key concerns.

Published on: Nov 16, 2026, 15:31:51 IST
By , WASHINGTON
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After a two-year gap, the leaders of India, America, Australia and Japan will meet in the Philippines for the Quad Leaders Summit. Despite the scepticism that greeted the revival of the four-nation grouping in 2017, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, has established itself as a lasting presence in the Indo-Pacific. A maritime domain awareness initiative established by the four nations has taken off, alongside new coast guard exercises, humanitarian relief efforts in Papua New Guinea and Myanmar and plans to build a port in Fiji. In September, the coast guards of all four countries sailed together on an Indian vessel from Chennai to Perth, Australia, as part of an expanded set of security missions.

Anti-riot police officers gather near the hotel where US President Donald Trump is expected to stay during his visit to attend the Asean Summit and Quad leaders’ summit in Manila (AP Photo/Aaron Favila)
Anti-riot police officers gather near the hotel where US President Donald Trump is expected to stay during his visit to attend the Asean Summit and Quad leaders’ summit in Manila (AP Photo/Aaron Favila)

Yet, all is not well with the Quad as the four leaders prepare to meet in Manila. America’s relations with each of the other Quad nations have been strained. Tensions over trade, Russian oil purchases and the Trump administration’s cosy relationship with Pakistan’s leadership have weighed on the US-India partnership. Washington has also pushed allies such as Japan and Australia to make trade concessions and increase defence spending, creating considerable friction.

The Trump factor and China’s shadow

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Then, there is the question of the Trump administration’s policy towards China. Beijing’s economic and military rise, which has made it Asia’s most powerful state, drove the revival of the Quad in 2017 and its later elevation to a leader-level dialogue in 2021. Under former president Joe Biden, China was the “pacing challenge” that defined American Indo-Pacific strategy, and Washington elevated the Quad as a centrepiece of its effort to balance China.

The Trump administration’s policy has been more complex: competitive, yet focused on conciliating with Beijing and avoiding major conflict. America’s 2025 National Security Strategy hinted at this change by dropping references to China as a strategic competitor, a description used frequently in earlier documents. At times, this desire to maintain stability with China has left American allies in the lurch. Japan, for example, was disappointed by Washington’s lukewarm support during an escalating war of words with China over the future of Taiwan. Observers argue that the Quad has been another casualty of this shift — left to languish as President Trump pursues accommodation with China and is preoccupied with conflicts in Ukraine and Iran. Notably, no Quad leaders’ summit has taken place since September 2024, which critics cite as evidence of flagging US interest and ambition in the grouping. The last one was on September 21, 2024, when Biden hosted the leaders’ summit in his hometown, Wilmington, Delaware.

“My own belief is that once an institution is leader-led, as it was in the Biden administration, then it’s very difficult to sustain momentum without that direct leadership. I think the other leaders can sense a lack of ambition and maybe even interest from the President in these gatherings. It is interesting to note that the president sometimes appears less interested in multilateral settings like the G7 and meetings with the EU or NATO,” said Kurt Campbell, who served as deputy secretary of state and Indo-Pacific policy czar under Biden.

Dylan Johnson, assistant secretary of state for global public affairs, countered the view that the US’s interest in the Quad was declining. “This is an utterly ridiculous take. Secretary Rubio has formally met with the Quad foreign ministers five times in the past two years — with three meetings in the past six months. The Secretary’s first official call in office was to the Quad. We have regular monthly Quad sherpa calls and meetings. And we are working to formalise a Quad Leaders Summit at ASEAN next week. Fake News!” said Johnson, responding to a news story suggesting that interest in the Quad was declining.

An Indian official agreed. “Too much is being made of the fact that the leaders-level summit hasn’t happened for two years. The Quad foreign ministers have met several times. A lot of the real work happens in those meetings as well as at the working level. Leaders essentially bless that progress during their meetings. There’s a lot going on,” said the official, speaking to HT on condition of anonymity.

Delivery gaps and the ‘Squad’ challenge

Still, the debate around the Quad and its continued relevance has increased, with scepticism about the grouping’s future boiling down to a few key concerns.

First, critics have long asked a fairly simple question: What has the Quad actually achieved? The agenda stretched from securing undersea cable infrastructure to sponsoring solar projects and a cancer moonshot initiative until just a few years ago. Critics said trying to do a little bit of everything had left the Quad stretched thin with actual delivery seen as uneven. Take the Quad’s flagship effort to supply vaccines at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2021. The project faced production hurdles and distribution delays, ultimately falling short of the ambitious 1.2 billion doses that the grouping pledged to deliver by 2022.

The criticism has merit. In July 2025, the Quad foreign ministers did recognise that the group’s agenda had become unwieldy and trimmed it down to just four main areas: economic security, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and critical technology.

However, the Quad’s defenders argue the grouping has real achievements. The Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness initiative - launched by the Quad in 2022 - collects and distributes commercially-available maritime data and intelligence to regional countries. A new maritime surveillance initiative announced in May this year will add and expand that effort. The Quad is also helping the Pacific island nation of Palau upgrade its telecom infrastructure with a new Open Radio Access Network system expected to be operational by early next year.

A second criticism is that the Quad’s reluctance to take on an explicit defence and security focus had led to a decline in its importance. China has rapidly expanded its military capabilities in recent years by modernising its missile and nuclear arsenals. The PLA Navy now boasts the largest fleet in the world. Although the Quad is the only balancing coalition capable of handling China, critics argue that the grouping has studiously avoided the kind of joint defence activities that could balance China and stabilise the Indo-Pacific. The argument goes that the Quad risks being eclipsed by the Squad, which includes America, Japan, Australia and the Philippines, as the latter is a sharper, defence-focused coalition aimed at deterring China.

Supporters of the Quad said this critique misses the point by assuming members want an “Asian Nato”.

“The Quad and the Squad have different missions and different strengths. The Squad’s strength is that they are militarily much closer and can work much better together on a specific set of military challenges. The Quad’s strength is that its geographic spread across the entire Indo-Pacific and strategic weight is much greater. Therefore, their missions should be different and can even be complementary,” said Arzan Tarapore, a research scholar at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Tarapore argued that both groupings aim to achieve the same goal in different ways: send a deterrent signal to China without sparking conflict.

India’s security calculus in the Indian Ocean

A third criticism, especially from New Delhi’s perspective, is that the Quad’s existing military activities generate few benefits for India while complicating its security calculus. While the other Quad nations remain focused on Taiwan and the South China Sea, India’s sights are firmly set on the Indian Ocean and on Pakistan and China on its frontier.

Sarang Shidore of the Quincy Institute argued that India’s participation in the Quad’s military activities risks being misread by China and provoking further conflict.

Darshana Baruah at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Singapore disagreed. The annual Malabar defence exercises, attended by the four Quad nations, have improved India’s maritime preparedness as it faces a growing Chinese naval presence in its backyard.

“In just six years between 2019 and 2025, the Chinese navy has started exercising across the Indian Ocean region in a way they did not 10 years ago. India doesn’t need to go and pick a fight but I think it needs to be prepared. I am not sure the defence ecosystem is adequately prepared as Delhi continues to question China’s ability to sustain itself in the Indian Ocean, whereas Beijing has established itself as an Indian Ocean player,” Baruah argued.

Tarapore added that India’s participation in the Quad serves as a strategic deterrent.

“The most important thing to remember at a conceptual level is that the Quad’s greatest strategic utility is that it exists. It doesn’t even have to do a whole lot. But if meetings continue and if the agenda keeps inching forward, the fact that the Quad has been established as a framework that could be built upon and that could be activated as conditions worsen in the region has the greatest strategic effect in Beijing’s mind,” he said.

Even optimists about the Quad’s prospects conceded that the Trump administration’s actions have led to deep questions about whether Washington has the will, focus and stamina to stay invested in the Quad over the long haul. Should future American administrations follow the Trump administration’s lead of prioritising strategic accommodation with China, the group’s other members may question its continued relevance. The Quad’s future will also depend on whether Washington can repair the strained bilateral ties that form the foundation for the Quad, especially the US-India relationship.

“I do think that it is important that the Quad is coming back together again, but I think it would be difficult to overstate how much India has been scarred by the last two years. So they will be more wary of their approach inside the Quad. Two years ago, when we met in Delaware, it was India that largely led the way in the Quad. They had gone from being somewhat reluctant and occasionally careful to being the driving force behind the scenes. I think it is unlikely that they would want to play that role in the current circumstances,” observed Campbell.

  • Shashank Mattoo
    ABOUT THE AUTHOR
    Shashank Mattoo

    Shashank Mattoo is the Washington DC-based US Correspondent for Hindustan Times. Shashank covers the Trump administration, the India-US relationship and America's policies towards South Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific.Read More

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