E-Paper
Define the direction of the semiconductor race
This article is authored by Debika Dutta, columnist, Mangaldai, Assam.
Power is no longer located where most governments still assume it to be. For most of modern history it was measured in territory controlled, armies deployed, and natural resources secured. The twentieth century elevated oil into the central instrument of geopolitics. The 21st century has replaced it with something smaller in size but far more decisive in consequence: The semiconductor chip.
India has entered the semiconductor race with ambition and urgency, yet it still risks misunderstanding what the race represents. The national debate is largely focused on investment announcements, fabrication plants, and incentive schemes. These are necessary policy instruments, but they do not define the strategic outcome. The real issue is power, and semiconductors now sit at its centre. They are not simply an industrial sector; they are the infrastructure of modern state capability.
Every critical system of the contemporary world depends on them. Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems, missile guidance technologies, financial networks, telecommunications infrastructure, satellites, and advanced manufacturing processes all rely on semiconductor chips. Without them, digital economies slow, defence systems weaken, and technological progress loses momentum. The global semiconductor industry is projected to exceed one trillion dollars annually by 2030, but its importance cannot be understood through market size alone. Its significance lies in control over capability. The country that leads in advanced chips shapes the architecture of global power.
This reality explains why the assumptions of globalisation have weakened. For several decades, it was widely believed that economic interdependence would reduce geopolitical rivalry and stabilise supply chains regardless of political tension. That assumption has now broken down. The US has imposed restrictions on advanced semiconductor exports not as a commercial measure but as an instrument of strategic competition. China has committed more than $ 150 billion to semiconductor self-reliance because it views technological dependence as a national vulnerability. Japan, South Korea, and the EU have all strengthened State involvement in semiconductor ecosystems because they recognise that critical technologies are no longer governed by market logic alone. Across different political systems, a common conclusion has emerged that technological capability is now inseparable from national security.
India must interpret this transformation with clarity rather than incremental thinking. A semiconductor strategy cannot be reduced to financial incentives or isolated industrial projects. A fabrication facility is not an end point in itself. It is only one component of a wider ecosystem that includes advanced research institutions, materials science capability, design strength, skilled engineering talent, and institutional continuity that extends beyond political cycles. Without these foundations, industrial capacity does not translate into technological sovereignty.
At a deeper level, semiconductors sit at the intersection of economics and geopolitics. They determine not only productivity but also strategic autonomy. A nation that depends on external sources for critical chips does not fully control its technological trajectory. Its sovereignty is not removed through direct coercion but gradually constrained through dependency embedded in global supply chains.
Critics of India’s ambitions argue that the country has entered too late. Taiwan dominates advanced manufacturing, the US leads in design, and China is investing at an unmatched scale. From this perspective, the global hierarchy appears settled and India is destined to remain a secondary participant in a highly concentrated industry.
This conclusion holds only if technological power is assumed to be permanent. Historical experience suggests otherwise. Britain’s industrial dominance eventually declined. The US overtook it through sustained investment in science, higher education, and industrial infrastructure. Japan became a global technology leader within a generation. South Korea rose from economic fragility to semiconductor strength within a few decades. China’s rise demonstrates how quickly technological hierarchies can shift when innovation is treated as a matter of national strategy rather than market outcome. The lesson is not that success is guaranteed, but that resignation is a strategic mistake.
India’s real risk is, therefore, not lateness but constrained ambition. A semiconductor policy focused only on incentives and production targets may result in factories, but it will not necessarily generate influence. To convert industrial capacity into strategic power, India must integrate semiconductor policy with AI development, defence modernisation, higher education reform, scientific research investment, and trusted global partnerships. Technological capability cannot be separated from the ecosystem that supports it.
This is not an argument for self-sufficiency. No major economy controls every layer of semiconductor production. Strategic autonomy does not imply isolation. It implies ensuring that no external actor can define the upper limits of national technological progress. In a fragmented global order, resilience matters more than autarky.
The global power structure is therefore undergoing a quiet but fundamental shift. Power is no longer defined solely by territory or military strength. It is increasingly defined by technological capability and the ability to influence supply chains, standards, and dependencies. Countries that lead in these domains will shape outcomes far beyond their borders, while those that lag will operate within constraints set by others.
India still retains important advantages, including a large engineering workforce, a rapidly expanding digital economy, and a clear political ambition to move up the global value chain. However, these advantages matter only when they are translated into sustained capability over time. The semiconductor challenge is not merely industrial; it is strategic in nature.
History rarely announces turning points at the moment they occur. Their significance becomes clear only in hindsight. The semiconductor revolution is one such turning point. Future historians are unlikely to remember which country offered the largest subsidy or built the most fabrication plants. They will remember which nations understood early that silicon was never simply about silicon.
It was about power, and in the century now unfolding, power will belong not to those who merely participate in the semiconductor race, but to those who define its direction.
This article is authored by Debika Dutta, columnist, Mangaldai, Assam.
