E-Paper
Priority listing of disability matters
This article is authored by Anchal Bhatheja, research fellow, Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, New Delhi.
The Supreme Court’s circular dated December 29, which places cases relating to persons with disabilities in the priority listing sequence—after admitted matters, fresh matters, bail matters, post-notice matters, freshly adjourned matters and settlement cases. This step marks an important moment in India’s evolving understanding of access to justice. What appears to be an administrative rearrangement is, in fact, rooted in constitutional doctrine, statutory mandate, and long-standing judicial precedent.
At its core, the circular acknowledges a critical reality: procedural delay is not neutral. For persons with disabilities, delay often operates as a form of exclusion, undermining substantive equality and dignity.
Disability-related litigation is frequently time-bound. Disputes concerning reasonable accommodation in examinations, appointments or promotions in public employment, or access to educational institutions are governed by rigid institutional timelines. If courts intervene after an examination cycle, recruitment process, or academic year has concluded, the right in question ceases to have practical meaning.
Procedural delay in such cases does not merely inconvenience litigants; it extinguishes entitlements. This is particularly stark in matters arising under Sections 16, 17, 20 and 21 of the RPwD Act, which deal with inclusive education and non-discrimination in employment. Priority listing acknowledges that time is a substantive component of disability justice, and that procedural neutrality can entrench inequality where structural disadvantage exists.
The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 establishes a comprehensive rights framework backed by enforceable obligations. Section 12 mandates that the State ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities, including procedural accommodation. Section 3(3) prohibits discrimination unless it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, reinforcing that denial of access through delay is itself discriminatory.
Several provisions impose time-bound duties on the executive. Section 40 requires the State to notify accessibility standards; Section 42 mandates accessible information and communication technologies; Section 44 and 45 emphasise infrastructural accessibility. These are not aspirational directives but statutory commands.
A striking example is Section 42, pursuant to which the BIS18702 accessibility standards for digital offerings were notified, with a deadline of May 10, 2023. Despite this, compliance across government portals, recruitment platforms, educational websites and public service delivery systems remains uneven. Where deadlines are ignored, courts become the principal mechanism for enforcement.
Judicial intervention has repeatedly been necessary to operationalise the RPwD Act. In Vikash Kumar v. UPSC, the Supreme Court has upheld reasonable accommodation and laid down contours for its implementation. In Rajive Raturi v. Union of India, the Supreme Court issued continuing directions on accessibility of public infrastructure, recognising that statutory mandates were not being implemented without judicial oversight. In Pragya Prasun v. Union of India, the Court intervened to ensure implementation of digital accessibility standards in the banking sector.
However, judicial oversight itself depends on timely hearings. When such matters are not listed expeditiously, non-compliance persists unchecked. Priority listing strengthens the judiciary’s role as an implementation-forcing institution, particularly during periods when executive action lags behind legislative intent.
Despite the constitutional mandate under Article 39A and the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, legal aid frameworks remain poorly equipped to deal with disability-specific claims.
There is no dedicated disability legal aid scheme under the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA). Panel lawyers are often unfamiliar with the RPwD Act, its subordinate rules, or the concept of reasonable accommodation. As a result, disability cases are frequently framed as routine service or education disputes, stripped of their rights-based and discrimination-related dimensions.
Communication barriers further restrict access. Legal services authorities rarely provide sign language interpreters, accessible documentation, or procedural support for persons with intellectual or psychosocial disabilities. Intake processes are not disability-sensitive, and legal aid clinics are seldom physically or digitally accessible.
Coordination failures exacerbate the problem. There is minimal institutional linkage between legal services authorities, State Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities under Section 79 of the RPwD Act, and welfare departments. Consequently, many rights violations never enter the judicial pipeline at all.
The access-to-justice gap is compounded by a systemic lack of training. Disability law occupies a marginal place in legal education and continuing professional development. Many lawyers lack working knowledge of RPwD provisions, reasonable accommodation jurisprudence, or even basic communication protocols when dealing with disabled clients.
Judicial training faces similar constraints. While courts adjudicate disability rights cases, there is no uniform, mandatory training on disability jurisprudence, accessibility obligations, or procedural accommodation. This affects how urgency is assessed, how interim relief is structured, and whether accessibility concerns are treated as central or incidental.
Priority listing partially mitigates these deficits by institutionalising urgency. When disability matters are consistently heard earlier, they receive greater judicial attention, which over time improves doctrinal clarity and institutional sensitivity.
The Supreme Court’s circular introduces predictability and certainty into disability litigation. A defined place in the listing hierarchy allows litigants and lawyers to anticipate timelines, seek interim relief strategically, and avoid irreversible harm.
Predictability also strengthens institutional confidence. For persons with disabilities, trust in the justice system is shaped not only by judgments, but by whether institutions respond to delay, dependency, and exclusion with procedural seriousness. Priority listing signals that disability rights are not residual claims awaiting attention, but integral to constitutional governance.
In recalibrating how disability matters move through the judicial system, this circular reflects a fundamental insight: Rights that are not heard in time do not operate in practice. Priority listing, therefore, functions not merely as an administrative reform, but as a necessary condition for the effective implementation of disability law in India.
This article is authored by Anchal Bhatheja, research fellow, Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, New Delhi.
