The visit of Afghanistan’s acting minister of industry and commerce, Nooruddin Azizi, to India from November 19–23, 2025 is the second Taliban ministerial-level trip to New Delhi in less than two months. It echoes a deliberate, incremental expansion of economic engagement between the two countries, conducted within the narrow space that India has carved out. The strategy is cooperation without political recognition of the Islamic Emirate. India has been pursuing this pragmatic policy towards Afghanistan, compelling it to be proactive rather than merely observe the region's geopolitical developments.
The immediate context is practical rather than ideological. Since mid-2024, Pakistan has frequently imposed restrictive transit conditions and temporary border closures, disrupting Afghan exports of carpets, fresh and dry fruit, and medicinal herbs. Independent estimates place Afghan trader losses in the tens of millions of dollars in the past year alone. With the Wagah–Attari route effectively closed to direct India–Afghanistan trade since 2021, the Chabahar corridor has become the only viable large-scale alternative. In 2024–25, bilateral trade through Chabahar and the air-cargo channel reached approximately $900 million, resulting in India's first modest trade deficit with Afghanistan.
Azizi’s programme includes meetings with commerce and industry minister Piyush Goyal, participation in the India International Trade Fair, and discussions with the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The focus of his visit is on three operational objectives:
* Increasing the volume and predictability of trade via Chabahar and the linked Iranian rail network.
{{/usCountry}}* Increasing the volume and predictability of trade via Chabahar and the linked Iranian rail network.
{{/usCountry}}* Attracting Indian private-sector investment in light manufacturing, food processing, and mining.
* Exploring transport links that would connect Afghanistan more effectively to Central Asian markets through Indian-supported infrastructure.
The Central Asia angle is the most significant longer-term element. India has consistently promoted the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) as a multimodal route linking Mumbai with Europe via Bandar Abbas/Chabahar, Iran, and Central Asia. For Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the INSTC offers a shorter path to the Indian Ocean than existing routes through China or Russia. Afghanistan forms a critical 600–800 km segment of that corridor. Existing road sections from Herat to Turkmenistan and from Mazar-e-Sharif toward Uzbekistan are usable, but rail gaps remain, and security along the routes, while improved since 2022, is not yet taken for granted by shippers or insurers.
From Kabul’s perspective, deeper integration with the INSTC would reduce dependence on Pakistan, generate transit revenue, and create incentives for domestic stability along key highways. From New Delhi’s standpoint, a functioning southern corridor to Central Asia diversifies India’s energy and mineral sources and provides a limited counterweight to Chinese infrastructure dominance in the region. Neither side frames the project in overtly geopolitical language, but the strategic implications are understood.
Constraints remain substantial. International banks are reluctant to handle transactions involving Afghan entities because of sanctions and the absence of a recognised government. Insurance premiums for cargo transiting Afghanistan are high. Customs procedures on the Iranian side are slow, and the Chabahar–Zahedan railway is not yet complete. India has secured periodic US sanctions waivers for Chabahar operations, but these are project-specific and time-bound. Direct flights between Kabul and Delhi have resumed on a limited basis, yet trade settlement remains indirect and costly.
Within Afghanistan, the Taliban authorities have prioritised economic deliverables over the past 18 months. Mining contracts, agricultural exports, and electricity transit fees are now central to regime revenue. Indian firms, with their historic familiarity and relatively low political risk profile in Afghan eyes, are logical partners in several of these sectors. During the visit, specific proposals under discussion reportedly include joint ventures in cement production, talc and lapis lazuli processing, and solar energy equipment assembly.
The approach both governments have adopted is deliberately modest and transaction-based. India continues to channel humanitarian assistance. over one million tonnes of wheat has been delivered since 2021 through international organisations. Technical teams meet regularly in Dubai or Doha to resolve trade facilitation issues. Visa regimes for Afghan business visitors have been eased quietly. None of this amounts to recognition, but it creates a working relationship that produces measurable results.
Azizi’s visit will not yield dramatic breakthroughs. It is more likely to produce agreements on trade fair participation in 2026, a possible memorandum on investment protection for small and medium enterprises, and renewed commitments to expedite cargo movement through Chabahar. These are incremental steps, yet they matter. In a region where grand corridors often remain on paper, steady, low-profile progress on freight volumes and private-sector contacts may prove more durable than high-level declarations.
For India, the policy balances strategic interest in Central Asian connectivity with the political necessity of avoiding premature recognition of the Taliban. For Afghanistan, cooperation with India offers economic breathing space and a hedge against over-dependence on any single neighbour. The relationship is pragmatic, limited, and carefully calibrated, but it is also expanding at a pace that would have seemed improbable three years ago.
This article is authored by Pravesh Kumar Gupta, associate fellow (Eurasia), Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi.