How to win the war of narratives in times of conflict
The information domain has become a frontline in modern combat, where fake news is weaponised to create an alternate reality. This has consequences for national security
As India looks back on Operation Sindoor, much of the attention is on the physical damages caused by the kinetic strikes conducted by India and Pakistan. Indian media headlines inform that nearly 20% of Pakistan Air Force infrastructure has been destroyed by precision strikes and more than 100 terrorists killed. Daily press briefings focused on the employment of drones, missile strikes, and the damage caused to military infrastructure and civilian population.
While this was undoubtedly the worst bout of fighting between India and Pakistan since the Kargil War of 1999, it was also one in which a fierce parallel battle was playing out in the information space. This was the battle of perceptions conducted across television screens, media outlets, and social networks. The information domain has become a frontline in modern combat, where fake news is weaponised to create an alternative reality.
Within hours of the Indian strikes, the Pakistani military’s media wing, the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), attempted to shape a counter-narrative to India’s claims of targeting only terror camps. In press briefings, the ISPR stated that Indian missiles had struck only civilian areas — including mosques, homes, and even a school — killing dozens of civilians.
Simultaneously, pro-Pakistan social media accounts flooded platforms with triumphant claims of five Indian jets downed an S-400 system destroyed, and even assertions that Pakistan had hacked Indian missile systems mid-flight. Videos were put out showing that the Pakistan Air Force had attacked the Srinagar airbase. Investigations revealed it was old footage from a 2024 sectarian riot in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Pakistani claims of downing Indian aircraft were amplified by Pakistani social media users sharing pictures of previous Indian Air Force jet crashes in Rajasthan in 2024 and Punjab in 2021. Both crashes had been widely reported earlier. An old video from September 2019 showing Pakistani soldiers raising a white flag on the Line of Control was re-shared by Pakistani handles with the false claim that it showed Indian Army troops surrendering.
These are only a handful of false claims that overwhelmed social media and clouded public understanding. Pakistan attempted to show that it was the victim of Indian aggression and was fighting back valiantly. Some reputable international media outlets fell for this story, with their reporting initially focusing on the downing of Rafale jets, rather than the bigger picture that was unfolding.
Misinformation was not restricted only to the Pakistan side. Indian social media activists shared dramatic visuals of burning buildings and explosions, falsely labelled as Bahawalpur or Kotli, which were clips from conflicts in Gaza and Syria. One positive measure India took was a proactive stance in countering fake news. The Press Information Bureau’s fact check unit worked in overdrive, issuing rebuttals on social media to debunk false narratives related to the operation.
One of the most troubling aspects of the information war was the role played by some sections of traditional media. Far from being the gatekeepers of truth, many mainstream television channels became amplifiers of misinformation. Unlike social media, these platforms are still widely regarded as credible sources, and their fall into sensationalism is not just a failure of journalistic norms and ethics but also undermines national credibility.
Apart from the narrative front, there was also a digital assault. According to Indian cybersecurity officials, over 1.5 million cyber-attack attempts were launched against Indian digital infrastructure in the week following Operation Sindoor. The attacks came from Pakistan’s State-backed hackers and hacktivists from Turkey, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
The attacks focused on critical infrastructure, including ports, airports, power grids, and transportation services like Indian Railways and airlines. Telecom services, notably BSNL, were targeted, alongside fintech platforms such as UPI and digital wallets, stock exchanges, major Indian conglomerates, and defence Public Sector Undertakings with their MSME vendors. The attacks lacked technical depth, and to India’s credit, 99.99% of them were either neutralised or rendered ineffective. However, the intensity and coordination of this cyber barrage signal a clear warning that future conflicts will see simultaneous escalation in both the physical and digital domains.
Information dominance has become a critical pillar of national security. Public perception, both domestic and international, can influence strategic decision-making, military operations, diplomatic fallout, and notions of victory and defeat. Often, the default option adopted in fighting the information war is to block those social media accounts that are spreading fake news or are critical of the government. While this may achieve immediate control, there are several adverse implications. Excessive censorship invites speculation, fuels conspiracy theories, and amplifies rumours, thus resulting in the very outcome it aims to prevent.
However, when trusted media institutions distort reality or fail to vet content rigorously, they inhibit India’s ability to project a legitimate picture to its people and the global audience. What is needed is a coherent strategy to win the war of narratives. This strategy must fuse real-time fact-checking, cyber defence, narrative control, and public engagement into a unified national framework. Credibility is key to shaping perceptions, and this must always be protected.
Operation Sindoor has been a resounding success for India, but it has also offered lessons that go beyond the very visible airstrikes. India must invest in information dominance with the same seriousness it accords to military hardware.
Lieutenant General (retired) Deependra Singh Hooda is the co-founder of the Council for Strategic and Defence Research and a senior fellow at the Delhi Policy Group. The views expressed are personal
