Japan, Taiwan, & Beijing’s designs for a unipolar Asia

If Tokyo compromises on PM Takaichi’s statement on Taiwan, it will establish a precedent for other regional powers on how they must engage with China on the Taiwan question

The rapidly deteriorating diplomatic row between Japan and China over a potential “Taiwan contingency” is an important precursor of how China may react to countries and leaders that express opinions deemed unfavourable by Beijing in the years to come.

If China is able to solidify its hegemonic position in East Asia, it may encounter fewer challengers across the rest of Asia. If China is able to solidify its hegemonic position in East Asia, it may encounter fewer challengers across the rest of Asia. (AP)

As China’s power grows, along with its ambitions regarding Taiwan, Beijing is increasingly intolerant of regional powers that openly support Taiwan. This growing assertiveness coincides with diminishing confidence in American security assistance for Taiwan, creating a sense of insecurity among China’s neighbours. As China rapidly establishes its position on the world stage, the implications of the Tokyo-Beijing diplomatic row could have implications far beyond Japan, potentially ensuring many countries self-censor themselves when it comes to the Taiwan question.

Here’s what happened. The standoff between Tokyo and Beijing started on November 7, when Sanae Takaichi, Japan’s newly elected and hawkish Prime Minister (also its first woman PM), addressed Japan’s parliament. She stated that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could be classified as a “survival-threatening situation”, which, under Japanese law, could potentially trigger a military response from Tokyo. She explained that a Chinese blockade or seizure of Taiwan, located close to Japan and crucial for its shipping routes, could qualify as such a threat. The statement did not seem to be an official policy declaration from Japan; rather, it was a two-sentence response to a parliamentary question. Except, the statement was made by the PM herself.

Tokyo had sent a senior diplomat, Masaaki Kanai, to Beijing to meet his Chinese counterpart. This was done to talk things out, but Beijing was not impressed. It wants the Japanese PM to withdraw her statement.

This does follow a pattern. In 2010, China limited the export of crucial minerals to Japan, and in 2017, Chinese State media encouraged boycotts of South Korean companies after South Korea deployed American missiles in its defence system.

These developments have broader geopolitical implications. For one, Beijing is trying to make an example of Japan. By economically and diplomatically punishing Tokyo, Beijing is effectively telling other States that support Taiwan, openly or otherwise, that Beijing will not take “Taiwan contingency talks” lightly — that there will be consequences for such support to Taiwan, even if it is merely verbal. Beijing is acutely aware that other countries have limited options unless Washington firmly supports Taiwan. It is important to note that American diplomatic and security guarantees in the Indo-Pacific are historically among the weakest today. Thus, if Tokyo compromises today, it could establish a precedent for other regional powers on how to engage regarding Taiwan in the days ahead.

Second, there is little doubt that East Asia and Southeast Asia are critical testing grounds for China’s rise to hegemony in Asia. East Asia, in particular, represents an important battleground for China’s ambitions to establish a unipolar Asia. Given its geographical proximity to China, the region serves as an ideal starting point for Beijing to create a demonstration effect — showcasing its influence and legitimacy, and building allegiances. Successfully asserting dominance here could pave the way for China to expand its hegemony across the region. In other words, East Asia and Southeast Asia are where China will put its unipolar action plan into practice.

If China is able to solidify its hegemonic position in East Asia, it may encounter fewer challengers across the rest of Asia. Conversely, if it fails to dominate its neighbourhood, its claims to global superpower status could appear somewhat hollow. Controlling the official narratives regarding Taiwan in its own neighbourhood is a crucial aspect of this challenge.

The stakes are high for all parties. For Takaichi, leader of a minority party in the Japanese parliament who is known for her conservative nationalist views and Japan First policy, yielding to China’s pressure would mark a poor start to her prime ministerial career. If Takaichi fails this test, it will not only have implications for her term as PM but will have larger regional geopolitical implications. If China is unable to get her to retract her statement, this could embolden other States in making similar statements.

For Taiwan, the implications are even graver: American security assistance has never been this suspect. China’s military is reported to have the ability to take over Taiwan in the not too distant future, and more and more countries are reluctant about openly offending China by diplomatically or politically supporting Taiwan.

Given that Japan has historically been one of Taiwan’s important regional supporters, the loss of that support — if followed by similar action by other, less powerful nations — could place Taiwan in harsher straits.

Happymon Jacob is distinguished visiting professor of Shiv Nadar University, the founder-director of Council for Strategic and Defense Research, and editor, INDIA’S WORLD magazine. The views expressed are personal