Pakistan, a year after Operation Sindoor
Pakistan's domestic crisis has not abated and has even likely intensified. But many in Islamabad believe the current phase as a geopolitical sweet spot
The package of measures adopted against Pakistan after last year’s terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir, were collectively the strongest deployed against provocation by that country in recent times. Attention has mostly focused on the kinetic measures taken — Operation Sindoor in brief. In Pakistan, however, possibly a greater significance is attached to India placing the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance given the country’s many anxieties, both as an agricultural economy and as a lower riparian State.
These diplomatic-cum-military measures were far weightier than those taken after previous terrorist outrages, such as the attack on Parliament in December 2001 or the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 2008. Therefore, how should we evaluate the effectiveness of the steps taken after the Pahalgam attack?
The message sent to Pakistan was twofold. The first is that a strong military response will follow terrorist transgressions and apprehensions of a possible escalation won’t be a restraining factor. Second, that no aspect of India-Pakistan relations would be ringfenced from an adversarial dynamic: The Indus Waters Treaty that had been insulated from the vagaries of the relationship even during conditions of war, was placed in abeyance to underscore this very point.
Has the most recalcitrant of India’s neighbours registered these messages? In the past, a linear trajectory could be traced between Operation Parakaram (the military mobilisation undertaken after the Parliament attack of 2001) and General Pervez Musharraf’s commitment that Pakistan would not allow its territory to be used for terrorist activities against India. The Mumbai terror attack and the conscious abjuring of a military response in favour of diplomatic pressures, both bilateral and international, did contribute to an extent in isolating Pakistan and holding it to account for the sanctuary which terrorist groups enjoyed in its territory. Both outcomes, however, had their well-known limits.
How effective have been the post-Pahalgam measures by these yardsticks? Answers are necessarily equivocal since the overall context has changed significantly. The Parliament attack and the Mumbai terrorist attack were both framed by the global war on terror and the international responses reflected that. The events of 2025, however, took place when the war on terror had become an event of the past, and international response to the Pahalgam outrage was accordingly lukewarm. Countries took positions based on their own assessment and interests and not on account of a dominant narrative.
{{/usCountry}}How effective have been the post-Pahalgam measures by these yardsticks? Answers are necessarily equivocal since the overall context has changed significantly. The Parliament attack and the Mumbai terrorist attack were both framed by the global war on terror and the international responses reflected that. The events of 2025, however, took place when the war on terror had become an event of the past, and international response to the Pahalgam outrage was accordingly lukewarm. Countries took positions based on their own assessment and interests and not on account of a dominant narrative.
{{/usCountry}}Pakistan’s internal dynamics over the past year have also been noteworthy. The widely held perception in Pakistan that its military effectively stood up to India in Operation Sindoor has meant that the military’s domestic image, severely dented till then, improved dramatically. Alongside, there is the view that, diplomatically, Pakistan had also effectively countered India. That the issue of international or US mediation surfaced during the closing stages of the May 7-9 contestation, reinforced this perception among the Pakistan public.
{{/usCountry}}Pakistan’s internal dynamics over the past year have also been noteworthy. The widely held perception in Pakistan that its military effectively stood up to India in Operation Sindoor has meant that the military’s domestic image, severely dented till then, improved dramatically. Alongside, there is the view that, diplomatically, Pakistan had also effectively countered India. That the issue of international or US mediation surfaced during the closing stages of the May 7-9 contestation, reinforced this perception among the Pakistan public.
{{/usCountry}}Events thereafter have further consolidated this trend. Pakistan’s unlikely emergence as a serious mediator or, at the very least, a neutral platform in the US-Iran conflict has also meant a strengthening of relationships with many principal players — the US in particular. There is a general uptick in its image and profile. Consequently, many in Pakistan, looking back at the tumultuous 2020s, would characterise most of the first half of this decade as a low point in the country’s history.
By contrast, from 2025 onwards, many would see a distinct upswing in the country’s fortunes and may even view the current phase as a geopolitical sweet spot.
The irony in this is that Pakistan’s domestic crisis — of the economy, internal security and domestic political balance -- has not abated and has even likely intensified. Former Prime Minister Imran Khan remains incarcerated for almost three years now. The economy continues to totter and pressures from the Gulf crisis have been debilitating. The internal security situation remains precarious without a clear political direction for dealing with issues such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan or the insurgency in Balochistan.
Yet Pakistan, perhaps even more than other countries, feeds on geopolitics for its overall national mood and psyche. Its raised international profile has a larger-than-life impact across the country as a whole and suppresses the magnitude of the domestic challenges it faces.
Pakistan’s April-May 2025 crisis involving India and its mediation effort last month in the Iran-US conflict have bookended a third significant development concerning Pakistan — the breakdown of its relations with Afghanistan. Pak-Afghan frictions have been endemic for the past few years but the intensity of the clashes in early 2026 were qualitatively higher with the Pakistan air force striking targets deep inside Afghanistan. The fighting is easily the heaviest in the past half century. Among other consequences is the complete closure of trade routes to Afghanistan’s east, a big issue for a land-locked country.
What is interesting is that Pakistan finds itself in diametrically opposite situations on its eastern and western borders. It accuses Afghanistan of harbouring terrorist groups and has been taking strong military action as a counter-terrorism measure apart from using all other levers it possesses such as mass deportation of Afghan refugees and closing trade corridors. India’s identical charges about Pakistan giving sanctuary to terrorist groups should, in the normal course, have, therefore, led to some introspection in Islamabad. Its complete absence is not unexpected, given Pakistan’s longstanding practice of avoiding realities it dislikes.
Today, however, its upbeat mood stems from its belief that geopolitics is turning in its favour and it is finally on the right side of history.
TCA Raghavan is a former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan. The views expressed are personal
