E-Paper
Beyond Hormuz: Strategic promise of INSTC
This article is authored by Jajati K Pattnaik and Chandan Panda.
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The Strait of Hormuz transit paralysis in the wake of the Iran-US-Israel conflict casts a shadow of uncertainty on the future of the Persian Gulf energy chokepoint. The Hormuz embargo broadens the scope for the possible revival or revisiting of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC). India hosts the 18th BRICS Summit on September 12–13, 2026. The INSTC may be featured in the catalogue of issues to be discussed at the BRICS Summit. INSTC is a multimodal transport corridor. The network of corridors spans India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia, and Europe, covering nearly 7,200 kilometres. The founding members of the INSTC, who signed the agreement on September 12, 2000 in St. Petersburg, were India, Iran, and Russia. The membership gradually extended to 13 States. The member states that have ratified are Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus, Oman, and Syria. Bulgaria holds observer status. The Eurasian transport corridor successfully bypasses the Suez and Strait of Hormuz transport ecosystems. It is an alternative transit corridor that involves sea, rail and road linkages. However, Iran and its Chabahar Port remain central to this transport network. It reduces freight transport time across Eurasia. It reduces travel time between India and Europe via the INSTC to 25 days, covering a significant geographic range. It also reduces travel time by 40%. It is cost-efficient and reduces dependence on the Suez chokepoint, its congestion, vulnerability, Houthi disruptions, Egyptian monopoly, and piracy.
The route's blueprint connects the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea, and Northern Europe. It involves three important routes: the central, western, and eastern routes. The central route transports cargo from Jawaharlal Nehru Port Authority (JNPA), Mumbai, to Iran's Bandar Abbas by sea; from Bandar Abbas to the Caspian Sea port of Bandar-e Anzali overland; from the Caspian Sea to Russia's Astrakhan by ship; and from Russia to mainland Europe by rail. The Western Route transports cargo from Mumbai to Iran by ship and from Iran to Europe by rail via the Astara-Rasht-Qazvin cross-border rail link, bypassing the Caspian Sea. The Eastern Route connects Russia to India through the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and eastern Iran. It involves the Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran (KTI) railway line network.
INSTC gives India a foothold in resource-rich, landlocked Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan. It provides a geo-economic framework to develop a resilient supply chain insulated from Western maritime disruptions and spheres of influence. The land-port-rail synergy gives India a parallel transit corridor amid the weaponisation of chokepoints and connectivity disruptions. INSTC transforms Iran's Chabahar Port from a mere regional harbour into a crucial global transit artery. Chabahar Port, as a critical maritime gateway, was not included in the early INSTC framework in 2000. It was later integrated into the Eastern Corridor network. It turned out to be the anchor of INSTC's eastern corridor. The cargo arrives at Chabahar's Shahid Beheshti Terminal from India, is transported northward via Afghanistan's Zaranj-Delaram highway, and reaches Central Asia. The rail routes connect the Chabahar Port via Iran's Chabahar-Zahedan-Mashhad railway line, then continue into Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, ending in Russia. Access to Afghanistan and Central Asia is convenient through Chabahar Port.
Chabahar’s location is unique and well-suited to the INSTC network, as it lies outside the Persian Gulf on the Gulf of Oman. Chabahar also bypasses the geopolitically volatile and conflict-stressed Strait of Hormuz. India secures a 10-year operational agreement for the Shahid Beheshti terminal at Chabahar. India has a stake in the port. India's access to Central Asia will help the countries diversify their dependencies. India will have direct access to rare earths, uranium, and other critical minerals from Central Asia, as well as energy imports from Iran and Russia. The Chinese unbridled dominance in Central Asia will be countered to a certain extent. The INSTC can also emerge as a critical conduit for energy during an energy crisis. Hydrocarbon flow to India will be maximised. Grid synchronisation of integrating gas and oil pipelines with a rail corridor will secure a stable and resilient energy flow. The corridor has vast potential, but challenges are also equally numerous. The current Iran-Israel-US conflict has closed all passages for any cargo movement and has increased operational volatility. Private-sector participation in revitalising the network is limited due to fears of US secondary sanctions.
Regional instabilities and shifting global geopolitics are the main impediments behind the paralysis of the INSTC network. International sanctions against Iran and Russia continue to constrain foreign investment and insurance coverage. Private bidders and multinational financial institutions consider the INSTC a high-risk venture due to the fragile legal and political environment, which could cause significant losses of invested capital. The US's coercive tactics raise vulnerability in Chabahar Port's network-building efforts for the success of INSTC. Rasht–Astara rail link and Chabahar-Zahedan rail connectivity of the western route are still under construction. Seamless cargo transport is impossible without critical rail connectivity. Bureaucratic friction is another impediment, as moving cargo across multiple countries entails tedious paperwork and bureaucratic bottlenecks. Regional instabilities, such as the historic tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, also hinder the western corridor of the INSTC from functioning effectively.
The US and China will not be the beneficiaries of INSTC. The corridor will not support their geopolitical, economic, and strategic interests in Eurasia. The US views the corridor as an emblem of the anti-Western bloc and a transit route for sanctions evasion. INSTC weakens Washington's economic leverage. The success of the corridor marks independence from western-controlled maritime chokepoints and financial frameworks. Trade in local currencies also indicates bypassing of the dollar financial ecosystem. A self-sufficient Eurasian economic zone may emerge as an antithesis of the American-led Western bloc. The US exercises economic pressure and sanctions threats to destabilise India's leverage in the Chabahar port.
China exercises a monopoly over Eurasian supply chains. INSTC will invite geo-economic competition. It will rival Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India's importance in the INSTC-led network may emerge as a counterweight to China's heft in the Eurasian regions. Beijing, as a sole hegemon in the Central Asian trade and connectivity network, may find a competitor. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway is Beijing's centralised East-West route. China controls this network. India-led North-South alternative may lead to the loss of China's transit leverage in Central Asia. Beijing seeks to clip New Delhi's strategic, economic, and geopolitical reach in Central Asia and the Caucasus through the INSTC.
(The views expressed are personal)
This article is authored by Jajati K Pattnaik, professor and chairperson, Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Chandan Panda, professor, Central University of Karnataka, Karnataka.
