Diplomatic dimensions of post-Pahalgam developments

This article is authored by Rajiv Bhatia, Distinguished Fellow, Gateway House, and a former ambassador of India.

The 18-day period between April 22, the day of the barbaric terrorist attack on innocent civilians, and 10 May, when Operation Sindoor was suspended as an understanding was reached to stop firing, will represent an unforgettable chapter in India-Pakistan relations. It may also be studied for a long time to appreciate how India’s political, military, and diplomatic leadership worked in perfect coordination to safeguard the nation’s diverse interests.

Operation Sindoor (AP)

In this context, the diplomatic facets of the crisis require scrutiny. It should reveal how key stakeholders reacted to the India-Pakistan conflict and how India’s diplomatic machine coped with it.

Among the big four players--the US, China, Russia, and the EU –Washington drew maximum attention.

It all began well, with the US promptly issuing a clear condemnation of the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, while articulating full support to India to bring its perpetrators to justice. As New Delhi took a series of counter-measures against Pakistan, the Americans took due note. Once the crisis escalated and hostilities commenced, Vice President JD Vance stated, on May 8, that the US would not intervene in the conflict, adding that it was “fundamentally none of our business.” Privately, however, he and secretary of State Marco Rubio held numerous telephonic conversations with the top leaders and senior officials of both India and Pakistan. On May 10, the US State Department issued a routine-sounding statement, saying that the governments of India and Pakistan “have agreed to an immediate ceasefire and to start talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site.” Except that it was neither routine nor accurate. India had not agreed to any talks at a neutral site.

What truly raised the diplomatic temperature was a series of statements made by President Donald Trump. They have been well analysed elsewhere. Many of their aspects – such as the claim that US ‘mediation’ brought the ceasefire, ‘hyphenation’ between India and Pakistan; ‘parity’ between a victim of terrorism and a perpetrator of terrorism; and insistence that ‘trade’ was more important than a resolute combat against terrorism – were unacceptable to New Delhi. Effective ways were devised to rebut the President’s views, including a bold address to the nation by Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi. India’s perspective eventually reached the State Department, which reverted to its traditional position during a press briefing on 16 May: “We want to encourage and see direct talks between the parties.”

China is in an altogether different category, as India’s known adversary, and as the time-tested friend and partner of Pakistan. Chinese satellite communication equipment is known to have helped the terrorists in Pahalgam, and Chinese weapons, including planes, formed an important segment of the Pakistani arsenal against India. On the diplomatic plane, Beijing publicly assured Islamabad that it would continue to stand by Pakistan in upholding its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national independence. By May 10, Beijing expressed its “deep concern” over the escalating situation and offered to play a constructive role in resolving the matter.

Russia has long been a dependable friend and a special strategic partner of India for long. The BrahMos missiles proved to be a game-changer in India's effective kinetic action. In the preceding days, long-distance diplomatic parleys took place between Delhi and Moscow. While discussions at the level of foreign ministers raised some concern, they were substantially alleviated once President Vladimir Putin conveyed his full understanding and support for India’s stance to PM Minister Modi.

At the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory in WW II, India’s minister of state for defence Sanjay Seth met Putin in Moscow After this meeting, the former observed, “Russia assured that it will support our battle against all manifestations of terrorism and said the cooperation between the two nations will continue to advance based on existing agreements.” Nevertheless, some analysts have argued that, given China’s growing influence over Russian policy, budding Russia-Pakistan cooperation, and Moscow’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war, the Russian side may be less than fully committed to India’s cause.

The position of the European Union (EU) was reflected in a statement issued by its High Representative on May 8. The EU conveyed its “deep concern” over the escalating situation, called for “restraint by both parties”, and urged both “sides to engage in dialogue.” This statement showed that, despite a country blatantly weaponising terrorism as State policy against another country, third parties conventionally adopt a high-sounding moral position of neutrality as soon as an armed conflict begins.

South Asian neighbours, situated close to the area of conflict and generally enjoying good relations with both India and Pakistan, tended towards neutrality and a desire for an early end to hostilities. Bangladesh's foreign ministry, for example, urged both countries to remain calm, exercise restraint, and refrain from actions that could further escalate the situation. Dhaka conveyed to Pakistan that the former wanted peace. When asked if the same message would be conveyed to India, foreign affairs adviser Touhid Hossain said, “If India wants to know anything from me, I will tell Delhi the exact same thing.”

Sri Lanka made it clear that it would not take sides in the India-Pakistan conflict. Nalinda Jayatissa, minister of health and cabinet spokesperson, stated that Sri Lanka would maintain neutrality and adhere to a non-aligned policy. As soon as the announcement about the ceasefire was made, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake hailed it as “a significant step towards peace,” applauding the leadership of both countries – India and Pakistan. Nepal immediately and unequivocally condemned the Pahalgam attack (which led to the killing of its national too). Still, once the hostilities began, it called for de-escalation as a measure towards peace. Bhutan and Myanmar, both adjacent neighbours to India and enjoying cordial relations with it, seemed to have preferred to convey their views privately to the authorities in Delhi.

The conflict presented an opportunity for India and Afghanistan to take their relations forward. In a significant development, external affairs minister S Jaishankar held a telephone conversation with Afghanistan’s acting foreign minister Abdul Muttaqi on May 15. The former conveyed India’s appreciation for the Taliban government’s strong condemnation of the terrorist attack in Pahalgam. Besides, the two interlocutors explored ways to strengthen India-Afghanistan cooperation.

Türkiye’s strong political and diplomatic support, as well as a heavy supply of arms and drones to Pakistan, has drawn serious negative attention in India. Several punitive measures seem to be in the pipeline.

Regarding the statement issued by the UN Security Council (UNSC) on April 25, India experienced disappointment over its weak content. UNSC did view terrorism as “one of the most serious threats to international peace and security” and “underlined the need to hold perpetrators, organisers, financiers and sponsors of this reprehensible act of terrorism accountable and bring them to justice.” However, there was no mention of Pakistan in the text, nor its authorship of the terrorist act.

Both the ministry of external affairs and the nation’s strategic community should internalise the full implications of all relevant developments, reflect on them, and suggest what changes India might need to introduce to its diplomatic strategy in the future.

This article is authored by Rajiv Bhatia, Distinguished Fellow, Gateway House, and a former ambassador of India.