E-Paper
Absence of long-term defence planning cause of concern
YEAR 2002 found the Indian Army in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with its arch enemy, the Pakistani Army, in the wake of December 1 attack by jehadis on Indian Parliament. Possibility of a full-scale war between the two countries was very much in the air. Question is whether the Defence planners of the country at the apex level had appreciated such an eventuality and were the Armed forces of the country ready to face such a situation?
YEAR 2002 found the Indian Army in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with its arch enemy, the Pakistani Army, in the wake of December 1 attack by jehadis on Indian Parliament. Possibility of a full-scale war between the two countries was very much in the air. Question is whether the Defence planners of the country at the apex level had appreciated such an eventuality and were the Armed forces of the country ready to face such a situation?
When this near-war situation took place, Indian Navy, which in early nineties was the strongest Blue Navy in Asia built around two aircraft carriers Virat and Vikrant, had Virat under major refit and Vikrant retired in 1998 with no replacement. In other words its status was of a coastal Navy. With bulk of their fighter aircraft fleet composed of accident–prone and aging MIG-21 bis aircraft, plight of Indian Air Force was also no better. Indian Army had only two of its regiments equipped with their latest T-90 tanks bought from Russia. Russia had to be requested to rush their first line reserve of T-90s to meet the crisis. This speaks volumes of what goes on in India in the name of long term Defence planning or the lack of it.
It is not that we did not have enough warnings that there is something basically wrong in our Defence planning system. As early as in 1962 when we were pounced upon by China, Indian Army had to fight a well equipped and clad Chinese Army on the freezing heights of Himaylayas with outdated equipment and clad only in summer uniform. If we lost the war it was not because we lacked the valour but because of faulty planning and higher direction of war.
After this debacle number of committees which were set up to go into the cause of the mishap, pointed their fingers at the MOD, specially its total staffing with civilian bureaucrats masquerading as Generals with no knowledge of matters military. All this was done in the name of civilian control over the Armed Forces.
A situation that exists even today. All-powerful bureaucrats still rule the roost despite recommendations of these committees to clip their wings.
After the 1962 defeat, the Indian political bosses learning the belated lesson of not neglecting the Armed Forces, went on an over drive. The size of the Forces was doubled and the arms were bought from anywhere and everywhere.
The result was a good performance in 1965 Indo-Pak war and a resounding victory over Pakistan in the Indo-Pak war of 1971. We then went into a great euphoria.
Then a strange slump set in. Almost no modernization programme of the Armed Forces took place for more than two decades. It enabled Pakistan to narrow the gap in technological and weapon superiority that Indian Armed Forces had over Pakistan apart from numbers.
Thus emboldened Pakistan attempted Kargil in 1999.History is again repeating itself. In the knee jerk action after Kargil we have purchased weapons worth 28.2 billion dollars till date.
The Subramanium Committee set up after the Kargil episode, has hit the nail on the board by identifying the main reason for lack of proper Defence planning in India being the absence of coordination between the three Services and between the Service Headquarters and the MOD as also the total stranglehold that the beauraucrats have over MOD.
The Committee has rightly recommended the chief of Defence staff system (CDS) to be implemented in India as is being followed in all other major democratic countries. Lo and behold, again the bureaucrats have succeeded in convincing our political masters in putting this main recommendation concerning CDS in cold storage.
The bureaucrats play one service against other and the final plan that emerges is a compromise plan depending upon the clout, which each Service has with the MOD.
Only way out of this sad situation is the implementation of CDS system in India who not only coordinates the plans of the three services but also provides single point advice to the Government in Centre.
Earlier it is implemented better it is for the country. Need of the hour is the political will and better understanding from political masters of this country of matters military.
