Judges accountability, half ?new?, half ?old?

UNDER ARTICLE 124(4) the Constitution, a deviant judge can be removed according to the procedure prescribed by law. Accordingly, the first Judges Inquiry Act, prescribing the procedure, was passed by Parliament long back The Judges Inquiry Act provided that an address by the aggrieved for a judge?s removal must first be signed by 50 Rajya Sabha members or 100 Lok Sabha members for submission to the Rajya Sabha Chairman or the Lok Sabha Speaker.

UNDER ARTICLE 124(4) the Constitution, a deviant judge can be removed according to the procedure prescribed by law. Accordingly, the first Judges Inquiry Act, prescribing the procedure, was passed by Parliament long back
The Judges Inquiry Act provided that an address by the aggrieved for a judge’s removal must first be signed by 50 Rajya Sabha members or 100 Lok Sabha members for submission to the Rajya Sabha Chairman or the Lok Sabha Speaker.
If satisfied, the Chairman or the Speaker could have the charge against the judge investigated by a committee, consisting of judges and a noted jurist. If the committee found the charge proved, the address for his removal was required to be supported by not less than two-thirds of the members present in each house, and if carried, the judge’s removal by President was to follow.

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The only one occasion when these provisions came into play concerned Justice Ramaswamy. Ultimately, the inquiry committee, constituted by the Lok Sabha Speaker following an address presented by the aggrieved to him for his removal, found him guilty. But the impeachment motion against him fell in Parliament for want of the required majority of votes.

Since then, though the integrity of some judges came under cloud in recent years, nobody opted for the long-winding procedure prescribed by the Judges Inquiry Act for their removal. Meanwhile, allegations about corruption in higher judiciary picked up momentum in the backdrop of the existing unworkable mechanism for removing a deviant judge. It is to address this issue that the UPA government has now decided to introduce a new Judges Inquiry Bill during Parliament’s winter session to amend the existing Judges Inquiry Act.

However, going by the media reports about the Bill, it seems to be only a mix of the ‘new’ with the old’. First, about the “new”. The Bill merely seeks to replace the existing long-drawn procedure of inquiry against a judge.
Under the “new” mechanism, one can straightaway complain against a judge to a National Judicial Commission (NJC), comprising the CJI, two senior most apex court judges, and two senior most chief justices of High Court. The NJC will investigate the complaint against a judge, and if it finds that the judge is really deviant, the step for his removal will ensue.

Now, about the “old”. The existing provision in Article 124 (4) of the Constitution for the removal of a judge only by Parliament will remain intact. That is, even if a judge is held to be deviant by the NJC, his removal can come about only after he is impeached by Parliament with the requisite two-third voting support of both Houses of Parliament. The exact route through which the NJC’s recommendation for a judge’s removal will now reach Parliament under the new Judges Inquiry Bill for his impeachment will be known only when all the provisions of the Bill are known.

One view, meanwhile, is that the shorter route now, without any role of the Rajya Sabha Chairman or the Lok Sabha Speaker, for an inquiry by the NJC will facilitate an expeditious disposal of complaints. Besides, the provision that a judge found prima facie guilty would be stopped from attending the courts pending inquiry may act as an effective some real deterrent.

However, the other view is that notwithstanding a new inquiry procedure under the forthcoming Bill, the power to remove a judge will, ironically, still rest with Parliament, keeping the process of removal of a judge within the existing zone of uncertainty and political manipulations.

At the end, it may again turn out to be unworkable for the reason of political pressures at the time of voting, as it happened in Justice Ramaswamy’s case.
Then, if an impeachment motion falls in Parliament, will it not amount to denigrating the NJC, composed of the CJI, two senior most apex court judges, and two senior most chief justices of High Court? Will it not amount to making those holding high offices in the judiciary look ridiculous?

So, what’s the right solution? Considering the murky Indian politics and its ever-changing colours and contours, some say, the whole mechanism for the removal of a judge should be placed exclusively under the judiciary.