A year later, the Ukraine war changes the world
Even as there were tectonic shifts in geopolitics and India faced enormous pressure, New Delhi secured its interests, remained friends with both the West and Russia, and emerged as a champion of the Global South
Next week will mark a year since Russia invaded Ukraine. Till February 24, 2022, there could have been some understanding, even appreciation, of the Russian case that the western bloc was coming too close to what Moscow considered its sphere of influence and that the European security architecture was insensitive to its concerns. But an outright invasion left that argument in shreds.
Make no mistake. Here was a great power directly violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a neighbouring State, a young State that had given up claims over nuclear weapons in its territory in 1993 based on security guarantees from the big powers under the Budapest Memorandum. Here was a revisionist power which had not made peace with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, with its leader, Vladimir Putin, hoping to revive its wider empire with a form of ultranationalism that brooked no dissent. And here was a country with one of the world’s largest militaries willing to inflict tremendous human suffering in a much smaller country, despite facing no immediate tangible political or existential threat, in order to expand its borders.
But the immorality of the Russian invasion aside, in the past year, the war has witnessed fierce Ukrainian resistance, aided substantially by western military and political support. The past year has also seen a marked inability of the Russian State to achieve its military and political objectives so far. Moscow may not have lost; it may have used nuclear blackmail last year; and it may well be on its way to mounting a renewed offensive. But there is no doubt that it is a diminished power, with its military and intelligence deficits exposed and economy weakened. While a lot remains uncertain, what is clear is that Russia failed to take over Kyiv, topple the Volodymyr Zelensky regime and undermine Ukraine’s status as an independent country. It has also been clear that Ukraine has not been able to recapture its eastern territories, as well as Crimea, that remain under Russian control.
More broadly, the war decisively marked the end of the post-Cold War era.
The day after the invasion commenced, an analysis in this paper anticipated four key shifts in the global system. The first was the return of a deeper confrontational relationship between the United States (US) and Russia and Washington’s determination to stop Moscow from running over Kyiv — this has happened. The second was a closer relationship between Russia and China, with the former becoming increasingly more dependent on the latter — this is happening. The third was the revision of the strategic posture in Europe with stronger debates in the continent about embracing hard security responsibilities — this is a work in progress where even pacifist powers such as Germany are now providing tanks to Ukraine and revising their defence policy, but the shift is still cautious and tentative. And the fourth was a renewed American focus on the European theatre at the cost of the Indo-Pacific theatre in the short-term — this was a misreading because the US has shown an ability to multitask and focus on both theatres simultaneously and challenge Russia and China in a more effective way than expected.
For India, the war was bad news.
Here was a close friend, Russia, with which Delhi shared a relationship of military dependence, doing something that was quite clearly wrong and taking an action that would push it closer to an arch rival, China. Here was another friend, the US, which was making opposition to Russia a yardstick for countries all around the world. Here was a country under attack, Ukraine, where over 20,000 Indian students were still based. Here was a war that, soon after the Covid-19 pandemic, was disrupting supply chains leading to a food, fertiliser and energy crisis.
In this backdrop, India’s political leadership and diplomacy showed finesse and converted a crisis into an opportunity to increase its own strategic space in the global system.
India first deployed all its diplomatic might and resources to rescue its citizens, even getting both warring parties to cease hostilities for a limited duration, in specific geographies, and getting neighbouring countries to assist in the evacuation and rescue efforts within weeks.
New Delhi then refined its own diplomatic posture — standing firmly for the normative goal of peace, advocating respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, espousing diplomacy, calling for independent investigations into possible war crimes, and using its quiet channels with all sides to intervene constructively whenever possible.
This posture, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s public comment to Putin about this not being the era of war, showed to the US that even if India was not publicly as critical of Russia as it (the US) would like, New Delhi was unhappy with Russian actions; it (India) was slowly taking steps to reduce its dependence on Moscow; and having the India channel open with Russia at the highest levels could be productive during a crisis. Delhi also intensified engagement with the European Union as well as individual European nations to allay apprehensions. Both Washington and Brussels decided that engaging and wooing Delhi was more diplomatically beneficial than reverting to the patronising reprimands of the Cold War era.
India’s carefully framed diplomatic position, its refusal to get into naming and shaming Russia at the United Nations, and its open defence of doing what was in its self-interest in terms of enhanced energy imports from Moscow meant that Delhi was able to preserve its relationship with Russia. At a time when Moscow is relatively isolated on the war, engaging with Delhi and listening to its concerns has been a priority for Russia, exemplified in Putin’s meeting with national security advisor Ajit Doval recently.
At the same time, Delhi became the most forceful champion of the Global South by taking up the issue of the consequences of the war, rather than get into an unproductive discussion on the causes of the war, on international platforms. By consistently focusing on the food, fertiliser and fuel crises, seeking ways to mitigate the worst impact of the war on the developing world, and warning against escalatory actions and rhetoric, Delhi was speaking for much of Asia and Africa.
None of this should give reason for complacency. The war continues. Russia, in its desperation, has shown an inclination to take extraordinarily destructive steps. The West is determined, despite a degree of fatigue, to stay the course in supporting Ukraine. Ukraine’s citizens are committed to safeguarding their independence. The room for compromise is limited. And the situation is set to get worse before it gets better. New Delhi will need to remain sharp and adapt to changing realities, while securing its interests and framing it within larger normative principles.
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