On September 17, the US announced the end of the sanctions waiver related to Iran’s Chabahar Port. The waiver — in place since 2018 when President Donald Trump (in his first term) unilaterally withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and launched a “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran — allowed New Delhi to develop and operate the port. In his second presidential term, Trump resumed his coercive diplomacy with Iran.
In February 2025, when he asked for a review of the waivers, India faced tough choices. Having signed a 10-year bilateral contract with Iran in May 2024 to develop and operate the port, India focussed on using Chabahar to enhance its connectivity with Eurasia. Meanwhile, New Delhi also viewed its partnerships with the US, the EU, Saudi Arabia, and Israel in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) as crucial to counter China’s growing influence in West Asia. Since then, West Asia’s geopolitical landscape has seen radical shifts and realignments. India must refresh its strategy for the region.
During the 12-day Israel-Iran war, triggered by Israel’s surprise attack on Iran’s strategic sites, the Gulf States found themselves caught in the crossfire. Iran retaliated against the US bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities with missile strikes — though symbolic — on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Israel’s war against the Iran-backed “axis of resistance” has reduced Iran’s level as a threat in the region to a point where Saudi Arabia no longer feels compelled to pursue diplomatic normalisation with Israel. Also, Israel’s unrestrained warfare and its bid to become an unchallenged military power in the region have alarmed the Gulf States. Israel’s air strike on the Hamas leadership in Qatar highlighted the limitations of US security guarantees as a deterrent. Saudi Arabia’s signing of a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement with Pakistan — which has no diplomatic relations with Israel — has ended hopes of a geopolitical alignment among India, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE as the key US partners and allies.
Since the Pakistan-sponsored terror attack in Pahalgam and the ensuing military conflict between India and Pakistan, Islamabad has sought to strengthen ties with Tehran through two-way high-level visits. Given Iran’s postwar security calculus involves deepening dialogue with neighbours, it is unlikely to be alarmed by the Saudi-Pakistan defence pact. Iran’s longstanding position has been to support region-led security arrangements, while opposing the US-led security architecture. Under its Look East strategy, Tehran has also downplayed the importance of Chabahar Port as a geopolitical investment involving India. At the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in China, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian noted that Chabahar will soon be linked with Iran’s railway network, creating a vital corridor linking China, Central Asia, and Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean. Tehran has also sought cross-border railway linkages and shipping routes between Chabahar and Gwadar in Pakistan.
{{/usCountry}}Since the Pakistan-sponsored terror attack in Pahalgam and the ensuing military conflict between India and Pakistan, Islamabad has sought to strengthen ties with Tehran through two-way high-level visits. Given Iran’s postwar security calculus involves deepening dialogue with neighbours, it is unlikely to be alarmed by the Saudi-Pakistan defence pact. Iran’s longstanding position has been to support region-led security arrangements, while opposing the US-led security architecture. Under its Look East strategy, Tehran has also downplayed the importance of Chabahar Port as a geopolitical investment involving India. At the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in China, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian noted that Chabahar will soon be linked with Iran’s railway network, creating a vital corridor linking China, Central Asia, and Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean. Tehran has also sought cross-border railway linkages and shipping routes between Chabahar and Gwadar in Pakistan.
{{/usCountry}}India has shown significant resilience in developing Chabahar Port. Earlier this month, on the sidelines of India-Iran Foreign Office consultations in Tehran, the two countries held trilateral meetings with Armenia and Uzbekistan. A key discussion point was the use of Chabahar port to expand trade. As India aims to deepen its strategic and commercial engagement with the Gulf and Central Asia, it must demonstrate an independent posture and the ability to build long-term partnerships.
Deepika Saraswat is an associate fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.The views expressed are personal