On August 31, 2026, the Court of Arbitration in The Hague held that the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) remained fully in force despite New Delhi’s decision to hold it in abeyance. It also issued a limited interim order on Ratle. The order does not halt the project. It restricts concreting above specified levels in parts of the dam wall and power intake until 90 days after the Neutral Expert’s final decision and requires reports on the construction schedule. The Court declined two other measures sought by Pakistan. India did not take part in the proceedings. The ministry of external affairs rejected the Court’s award and interim order, saying the Court had neither legal existence nor jurisdiction to rule on India’s position. The more fundamental issue is whether this Court was validly constituted at all. Its authority now matters as much as the technical dispute over the dam.
India’s objection goes back to the Court’s creation. New Delhi opposed it before any ruling was issued. Pakistan first requested a Neutral Expert, withdrew that request, and then described its objections as arbitral disputes in August 2016. India sought a Neutral Expert that October. That process now covers both Ratle and Kishenganga. The World Bank paused both appointment processes because it saw a risk of contradictory outcomes. It later completed both appointments in 2022, despite acknowledging practical and legal difficulties. A Court whose authority India contests has linked work at Ratle to the outcome of a separate Neutral Expert process, allowing two forums to shape the same project at the same time.
India’s argument is that the IWT was not designed to permit two overlapping tracks for the same kind of technical controversy. Article IX of the IWT first sends disagreements to the Permanent Indus Commission. Technical differences go to a Neutral Expert. Disputes go to arbitration. India also relies on paragraph 6, which suspends the steps leading to arbitration while a difference is before the expert. On this reading, Pakistan cannot convert an engineering objection into an arbitral case merely by changing the label. The choice of forum matters. A Neutral Expert deals with defined technical questions. Arbitration can open wider issues of treaty interpretation and procedure. An Indian project can then remain tied up in proceedings for much longer.
Also Read | India rejects Court of Arbitration's Indus Waters Treaty award: ‘Illegally constituted, has no jurisdiction’
{{/usCountry}}Also Read | India rejects Court of Arbitration's Indus Waters Treaty award: ‘Illegally constituted, has no jurisdiction’
{{/usCountry}}The Court rejected India’s objections in 2023. A tribunal may examine its own jurisdiction, but that power does not enlarge the consent given under Article IX. A later award cannot erase India’s original objection. A State’s absence does not settle jurisdiction either way. The US contested jurisdiction in the Nicaragua case and later withdrew from the merits, but the International Court of Justice continued. China refused to accept or participate in the South China Sea arbitration, and that tribunal also continued. In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, Turkey did not appear at the jurisdictional stage, yet the International Court of Justice still examined consent and found that it had no jurisdiction. India stayed away because it maintains that Article IX did not authorise this Court.
A harder question is what abeyance means in practice. Article XII(4) says the IWT remains in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty between the two governments. India does not claim formal termination. The issue for New Delhi is how this system of cooperation can function in the radically altered security environment of 2026. The IWT operates through notices, drawings, inspection visits, data tables and meetings. These procedures require a minimum of reciprocity and good faith. Before placing the IWT in abeyance, India had invoked Article XII(3) and sought a negotiated modification.
Through wars, terrorist attacks and prolonged hostility, India has continued to protect civilian water needs while reserving its right to respond to the conduct of the Pakistani State. The IWT’s water allocation rules and its machinery for daily cooperation are not the same thing. By treating every obligation as fully operative, the Award preserves the text while saying too little about the security and political conditions needed to make its procedures work. The preamble’s references to goodwill, friendship and a cooperative spirit record the assumptions on which this demanding regime was built.
Ratle shows the practical cost. The IWT permits India limited run-of-river hydropower on the Western Rivers, subject to design rules. That right can be worn down without being formally denied. Repeated objections, parallel proceedings, delayed decisions and interim restraints can leave India with a right that exists on paper but is difficult to use on the ground.
India’s rejection must be backed by a clear public narrative explaining why treaty cooperation cannot be separated from the security conditions that make it possible. New Delhi should set out its objections to parallel proceedings and how it will protect its legitimate hydropower rights. It should also restate that normal cooperation can resume only when Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures support for cross-border terrorism. An order can mark a level in concrete. It cannot answer India’s objection to the Court’s creation or restore the reciprocity the IWT requires.
Syed Akbaruddin served as India’s permanent representative to the United Nations in New York and is currently dean, Kautilya School of Public Policy. The views expressed are personal