Cabinet secretary TV Somanathan recently sent a note to every secretary to the Government of India, warning against settling into “a beaten track.” Would an officer, looking back at the end of a career, find “30 years’ of experience” or “one year’s experience repeated 30 times”?
Somanathan’s diagnosis is spot on. But the cure he prescribes, urging officers to take more care with the “small things,” treats this as a question of individual mindset.
Public management experts have time and again emphasised that motivations in jobs have a direct bearing on people’s performance and the effort they invest in their work. However, current administrative rules and management structures seem rather lacking when it comes to motivating the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) to prioritise performance and substantive reforms over mere compliance. The officers are selected through a rigorous process. Yet, ironically, they fail to deliver essential public services such as health, education and justice. For example, while India has achieved a 95% gross enrolment ratio (GER) in primary schools, learning outcomes are extremely poor, with only 49% of grade 5 students able to read a grade 2-level text (ASER 2024). This gap underlines the bureaucratic focus on increasing enrolment figures rather than the more substantive task of improving classroom learning.
The key puzzle is that the same officers, who underperform in their normal daily responsibilities, do a remarkable job in “mission mode” tasks — short-term tasks with clear accountability. The Election Commission of India is one example, successfully conducting national elections every five years for a population of 1.4 billion. Research shows that in their regular roles, IAS officers report having “no faith in their own contribution to public welfare”.
{{/usCountry}}The key puzzle is that the same officers, who underperform in their normal daily responsibilities, do a remarkable job in “mission mode” tasks — short-term tasks with clear accountability. The Election Commission of India is one example, successfully conducting national elections every five years for a population of 1.4 billion. Research shows that in their regular roles, IAS officers report having “no faith in their own contribution to public welfare”.
{{/usCountry}}This lack of motivation is primarily driven by two management factors.
Misaligned accountability: Bureaucrats rarely have to answer for poor performance, thanks to misaligned accountability — it upholds compliance over service delivery. The Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) illustrates this starkly: A 2016 audit report revealed that while the roads were built within budget and time, most were of poor quality and failed quality checks soon after completion. Yet the officers overseeing the scheme faced no consequences, since they had met the financial and procedural targets.
There are no consequences for poor outcomes. The focus tends to be on adherence to procedures and paperwork, rather than innovation or results. This excessive emphasis on procedure also breeds risk aversion as they are more concerned about avoiding frauds than prioritising service delivery. As P Sneha and co-authors argue in Bureaucratic Indecision and Risk Aversion in India, “bureaucratic indecision, in a large part, is a form of rational self-preservation exercised by bureaucrats from the various legal and extra-legal risks to their person, careers, and reputation”.
Promotions are based on seniority. Officers move up through an appraisal system that fewer than 16% of bureaucrats believe is effective, since it has become standard practice to give nearly everyone an outstanding rating regardless of performance. This further erodes any incentive to focus on outcomes.
Lack of stable tenures: Another factor contributing to the lack of motivation among senior bureaucrats is the instability of their tenures. The bureaucracy struggles with frequent transfers. On average, an IAS officer remains in a position for just 15 months, which is significantly shorter than the typical three-to-five year tenures seen in other types of organisations. These short tenures reduce incentives to implement significant reforms because reforms take time to design, and officers are often transferred before the results of their efforts become visible. As a result, they are more likely to maintain the status quo. Two critical administrative reforms are needed.
First, institute accountability for outcomes over compliance. Salaries and promotions should be linked to performance in delivering public services rather than seniority, with specific indicators to assess officers’ performance objectively. Competence-based rewards can help public organisations build a culture where employees are motivated by results rather than rule-following.
A second key reform focuses on ensuring stable tenures by instituting a minimum tenure of three-to-five years for all IAS-level positions, building on the Union government’s existing mandate of five-year tenures for joint secretaries. With more time in a role, officers are better positioned to acquire domain knowledge, see the results of their work, and be held accountable for it.
Somanathan’s note was right to flag the problem. The fix, though, has to reach further than asking officers for “greater care”, and into what they are actually paid and promoted for.
(Akshat Sogani is a former LAMP fellow and a National University of Singapore and Ashoka University alumnus. The views expressed are personal.)