E-Paper
Hybrid espionage hits home
Author - Sriparna Pathak, professor, China Studies and International Relations, Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat.
Among the world’s oldest professions, espionage, or the clandestine gathering of secrets, to gain advantage over adversaries, ranks high. Across centuries, it has shaped the future of empires, played decisive roles in outcomes of wars, and toppled or preserved rulers. Ancient texts bear witness to this, in the Art of War by Sun Tzu, an entire chapter is dedicated to the indispensable role of agents; Persian kings like Cyprus the Great relied on the networks of their ‘eyes and ears’ to monitor threats, and Romans and Greeks employed informants and ciphers to outmanoeuvre enemies. In the medieval courts, Walsingham’s spies thwarted plots against Elizabeth I, and in the shadowy intrigues of the Cold War, espionage meant deception, the quiet theft of knowledge, and betrayal. Needless to state, it all entailed great personal risk to secure military, political or economic edges over the adversary, as it traditionally involved human assets. The risks of capture, torture, or even execution in hostile territories remained paramount.
Even in the current epoch of history, the core impulse remains changed, as knowledge is power and those who possess hidden secrets hold the leverage. What has changed in the modern era, is how espionage is conducted, as advances in technology and digital connectivity have democratised the access to information, while enabling states to pursue intelligence goals with unprecedented scale, deniability and minimal physical risk. Sole reliance on dead drops, microfilms or midnight border crossings are largely things of the past. Today’s operations blend traditional statecraft with cyber tools, social engineering and innocuous commercial or academic channels.
State actors now use open platforms like Facebook, LinkedIn and job portals to identify, approach and recruit unwitting sources, as they mine public data for sentiment analysis, on sensitive issues. The usage of fake personas to harvest intelligence, or to spread disinformation is common, and covers from myriad actual examples seen from across the globe, now include short-term rentals, tourism visas, business ventures or even paid freelance gigs. These are all low visibility tactics that exploit the openness of democratic societies.
This evolution is vividly seen in the escalating global pattern of Chinese-linked espionage activities. From the February 2026 arrest of a Greek air force colonel transmitting NATO secrets to Chinese intelligence, after online recruitment, to French nationals intercepting satellite data from rural Airbnbs, Australian charges against Chinese operatives monitoring religious groups, Philippine detentions of Chinese nationals, near strategic naval sites, U.S. cases targeting military recruitment, and India’s arrests of Chinese nationals near sensitive Tibetan exile hubs; reveal a hybrid playbook—long-term placements, diaspora networks, cash incentives and heavy digital reliance.
To elucidate with examples from home, last year, in 2025, two Chinese citizens were arrested by Indian security forces, near the Indo-Nepal border, and they were making videos of the border area, and dozens of anti-India videos were recovered from their mobiles. In February this year, a 60-year-old Chinese national was arrested for illegally staying in India for 130 days, without a valid visa. He had entered via Nepal, and stayed in McLeodGanj in Himachal Pradesh. While the primary charge was visa violation, under the Foreigners Act, suspicions are heightened owing to his suspicious movements in the town, which is associated with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan community in exile.
In December 2025, a Chinese national was detained in Jammu and Kashmir, for visa violations and for visiting restricted areas in Ladakh, with concerns over searches related to India’s security forces. There are myriad such examples, and these three cases are from the last year alone.
Given that China has amalgamated traditional espionage with the tools now available in the highly connected digital world, India’s University Grants Commission (UGC), under the ministry of education issued an advisory in January this year, and mentioned the existence and attempts of vested foreign entities, that actively collect sensitive information tied to India’s national security, defence establishments, critical infrastructure, and government functioning. These entities have been found leveraging professional networking sites like LinkedIn and job portals to target individuals with journalism or defence backgrounds, to assign them paid tasks to write source-based articles on troop deployments, defence procurements, joint military exercises, and international relations. Payments flow through overseas transfers or Indian student accounts, often via intermediaries, while applicants are asked to share personal documents such as PAN or Aadhaar cards. The UGC’s advisory is timely and urges institutions to sensitise students and faculty, caution against suspicious approaches, and avoid sharing sensitive details. The UGC’s advisory comes at a time when everyday digital interactions can unwittingly feed foreign intelligence efforts. The alert marks a critical bridge from historical espionage to contemporary form. What once needed physical infiltration now often begins with a benign online conversation.
For India, which is hosting the AI summit this year, is the fastest-growing major economy, facing persistent border frictions from China, responsibly hosting the Tibetan community in exile, and with a burgeoning digital economy, the stakes are high. Digital espionage operations from malicious State actors risk compromising defence insights, and influencing narratives, or enabling broader hybrid threats. Given that India has minilateral groupings with like-minded partners like Japan, for example, a discussion at track 1 levels on how to collaborate and share lessons on countering new age espionage from common threat actors could also go a long way. The lesson for democracies is clear: There have to be countermeasures, along with robust counterintelligence, in academia and in online spaces. Digital literacy to spot red flags in the digital space is also a need of the hour, as malicious actors are ever evolving in their tactics.
This article is authored by Sriparna Pathak, professor, China Studies and International Relations, Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat.
