AAIB calls for tighter ATC procedures after near miss

The recommendations comes months after the May 4 airprox incident involving Air Arabia flight ABY405 from Sharjah to Mumbai and AeroLogic flight BOX622 from Frankfurt to Mumbai

The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) has recommended tighter air traffic control procedures and improved staffing after a serious airprox incident between two aircraft over the Mumbai Flight Information Region (FIR) earlier this year.

AAIB calls for tighter ATC procedures after near miss

The recommendations comes months after the May 4 airprox incident involving Air Arabia flight ABY405 from Sharjah to Mumbai and AeroLogic flight BOX622 from Frankfurt to Mumbai, with both aircraft entering Indian airspace at the same altitude of 35,000 feet with a three minute gap, instead of the mandatory 10-minute separation. Both aircraft were also flying on the same route (near waypoint PARAR) along the Muscat-Mumbai boundary.

An airprox is a situation where two aircraft come dangerously close to each other, leading to a potential risk of collision.

In its final report, dated October 14, AAIB said the separation loss occurred because the Muscat controller failed to climb the Air Arabia aircraft to the coordinated level of 37,000 feet before handover, while the Mumbai controller, engaged in other coordination tasks, detected the conflict late. The AeroLogic aircraft was also travelling around 40 knots faster, which further reduced the spacing between the two flights, it added.

The report stated that the Mumbai controller subsequently issued corrective instructions via data link, directing BOX622 to change course and descend to 31,000 feet to restore safe separation.

No injuries or damage to both aircraft were reported in the incident.

The AAIB stated that the increased air traffic workload due to the closure of Pakistan’s airspace at the time added complexity to the situation. It highlighted lapses in coordination between Muscat and Mumbai air traffic units and the non generation of automated conflict alerts at both control centres.

The investigation concluded that the primary cause of the incident was “coordination failure” between Muscat and Mumbai controllers, compounded by delayed monitoring on the Indian side.

Issuing safety recommendations to prevent recurrence, the AAIB advised that Muscat Air Navigation Services (ANS) should ensure full staffing during high traffic situations and avoid assigning instructors dual roles during training.

“To ensure safety, instructors must not be assigned dual roles during On-the Job Training (OJT), enabling them to focus solely on both training and the management of air traffic,” it said.

The AAIB recommended the Airports Authority of India (AAI) to separate hotline communication lines used for different sectors to reduce controller workload, bifurcating system oversight roles to prevent data errors, and creating a standard operating procedure for backup recording mechanisms when primary voice recording systems are unserviceable.