Pakistan’s dubious record casts shadow over ceasefire deal

India’s efforts to diligently present proof of Pakistani-sponsored terror appeared to be aimed at undercutting its global support and finance for the long term

In February 1999, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee crossed the Attari border with a phalanx of stars and celebrities on the inaugural Delhi-Lahore bus service. The bus, painted in the colours of both nations, rolled into Lahore where then Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif welcomed the delegation. Against the backdrop of Mughal-era monuments, the two leaders signed a declaration that seemed to transcend the bitter history of Partition.

Pakistani nationals celebrate the ceasefire deal in Multan on Saturday. (AP)

The bonhomie was short-lived. In the summer of that year, shepherds tipped off Indian forces that Pakistani soldiers had infiltrated into Kargil and occupied strategic mountains, triggering a full-blown conflict a year after both countries acquired nuclear capabilities.

Two years later, rinse and repeat. In July 2001, then Pakistani PM Pervez Musharraf travelled to Agra as part of an internationally hailed peace summit. Though a pact eluded the leaders, peace seemed tantalisingly close. Six months later, terrorists from Pakistan-sponsored outfits attacked the temple of Indian democracy, killing eight people.

“Terrorism itself is part of Pakistan’s foreign policy…Delhi needs to be careful,” said retired Air Vice Marshal, Manmohan Bahadur.

These considerations explained India’s new red line established by government officials hours before the ceasefire became public, “India has decided that any future act of terror will be considered an act of war against India and will be responded accordingly,” the officials said.

The statement appeared to confirm that New Delhi was cognisant of past patterns of rogue behaviour by Islamabad and was ready to treat conventional conflict and terror attacks backed by state resources at par.

After the 1971 defeat, Pakistan appeared averse to engaging India in a full-blown conflict. But the insurgency in Kashmir in the late 1980s gave it a new lever to trigger instability in India — asymmetric terror strikes that sought to inflict maximum damage on civilian populations while allowing Islamabad, and the Pakistani army, plausible deniability. Through the 2000s, hundreds died as a string of terror strikes on India’s urban hubs were inflicted by mushrooming terror camps even as Islamabad honed its policy book of using border fire to push in terrorists trained in camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

In the past, India and Pakistan sometimes continued their dialogue even in the face of terror strikes in multiple Indian cities. But the statement above, as well as stern responses from the Indian officials throughout the four-day standoff, indicated that India was moving towards a new doctrine when it came to Pakistan.

Similarly, New Delhi’s efforts to diligently present proof of Pakistani sponsored terror appeared to be aimed at undercutting its global support (and finance) for the long term.

“Pakistan unfortunately believes that it can use terrorist groups to advance its foreign policy objectives,” said former Indian high commissioner to Pakistan, TCA Raghavan. But he said the ceasefire was a good development that should be welcomed. “It reflects a mutual recognition by both countries that it was not in their interest to continue fighting,” he said.

A second prong of this new doctrine is imposing costs. Islamabad’s preference for terror attacks stemmed from its belief that conventional warfare was more costly and politically risky compared to a Lashkar–e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed inflicting civilian casualties. But India’s refusal to return to status quo – it said that it will continue to hold the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance, expel Pakistani nationals, reduce diplomatic presence in the neighbouring country and hold the line on other steps announced after the April 22 Pahalgam attack – signalled that New Delhi was seeking to impose permanent costs on Pakistan for its misadventures. Further, its measures showed that such costs would not be dependent on international censure but be built on its various advantages – whether as an upper-riparian state or the largest economy in south Asia where people migrate for economic reasons.

But will Pakistan learn its lesson? Unfortunately, the truth is that many of the levers that control Islamabad’s policies on funding terror are driven by domestic compulsions and the constant state of tumult created by civilian politicians clashing with powerful generals.

Several analysts have pointed out that the Pahalgam terror attack was preceded by an incendiary speech by Pakistani Army chief general Asim Munir and the instability in Pakistan caused by Shehbaz Sharif’s embattled government and the enduring (and ultimately risky) popularity of incarcerated former PM Imran Khan.

As long as this volatile cocktail of army, judiciary and politics continues to cause churn in Pakistan, no external agreement can remain inured from the impulse to use terror to shore up domestic popularity. New Delhi will have to be on high alert.

“You cannot change your neighbours,” Raghavan said. “You have to deal with your neighbours as they are.”